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INTRODUCTION

Belgium in the 1930s was no different from the rest of Europe. It was in a crisis
-- f.iJlancial, political, 'aq.d, as it appeared to some, social. Unemployment reached a peak
for- the decade in 1934 (with 183,0001 out of a population of about 8,092,000 2). Yet.iJl the
first half of the 1930s, the government had no working policy for either inflation or
unemplQyment. 3 Furthermore, the nature of Belgian politics at the time made
Parliament ineffectual. Since the First World War, Belgium had been run by the Union
Nationale, a coalition of the three strongest parties in the nation, the Catholics, the
Socialists, and the Liberals (.iJl the November, 1919 elections, the results in the
Parliamentary House were 71 seats, 70 seats, and 34 seats, respectively).4 Although
such a union guaranteed that a plurality of Belgian opinion would be heard, and '
protected against anyone party -- and ideology -- unfairly superseding others, it also
made the process of change very slow. For instead of being able to work on proposals
for policies, the party representatives spent most of their time concentrating on
compromising with each other. Enacting new legislation was a trying process. As a
result, it seemed to some Belgians that the government was not doing its job.
The younger generation of Belgians who had just reached the voting age of
twenty-one were particularly aggravate,d by this sta1~ and sluggish political system.
Many of them wanted to 'have a voice'in politics beyond their ballot, and were'\mpatient
,

I

1Jean-Michel Etienne, Le Mouv-ement rexiste jusgu'en 1940 (Paris, Librairie Armand
Colin, 1968), p. 58.
2Population figures only available for 1930. B.R. Mitchell, European Historical
Statistics: 1750-1970 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 19.
3Inaction on the financial crisis ended in March, 1935, when economist and banker
Paul Van Zeeland was appointed Prime Minister and given special powers to rectify the
situation through a rigorous program of devaluation '
4Roger E. De Smet, Rene Evalenko, and William Fraeys, Collection de Science poUtigue:
Atlas des Elections Belges 1919-1954 (Brux" Institut de Sociologie Solvay. Universite
Libre de Bruxel1es, 1958), p. H.
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to effect change within their country. Some sought out political youth groups, such as
the Socialist youth, while others turned to more socially and religiously active groups,
such as Catholic action . The Belgian Rexist movement emerged out of the latter.
The future Rexists were a group Qf university and secondary school students
who wanted to bring moral and religious reform to their nation. The proselytizing
aspect of Catholic action appealed to them because it offered them the chance to
actively bring reform to society around them, and to immediately measure their results.
At the same time, they realized that Qnly through politics, only through entering the
pplitical arena could they accomplish the societal reforms they wanted on a grand
scale. The history of the Rexist movement is the history of its attempting to bring
Catholic activism for moral and religious reform to Belgium through political channels.
It is also the history of the Belgian form 9f fascism . For in the process of its political

developement, Rex would be swayed by an ideology which was growing fast in all of
Europe, and which seemed ·to offer an answer for some of the other Europeans who
were searching for a way to reform their society: fascism. Because of Belgiums'
historical and geographical situation. and because of the political tensions unfolding in
Europe in the 1930s, the evolution of fascism in Rex would be important.
Belgium was a geographical and political crossing. Bordering on three of the
most important European powers in. the 1930s. it was the keystone of German. French,

,

and English political relations. In the First World War, it was through Belgium that the
-

Germans had entered France. 'In the eyes Of the Belgians and.- indeed, of most of the
rest of Europe, if a second were to come, the aggressor would undoubtedly again attack
through Belgium. If at that time Belgium were more fascist than democratic, if
Degrelle had won a parliamentary majority and established a fascist regime in alliance
with Hitlerian Germany, democratic France and England would be especially
!

endangered. "Belgium is a frontier country in a double sense," wrote Harold Callender
of The New York Times.

iii

She is a bastion on the frontier of democracy and of Western
civilization. Hence her part in the struggle between fascism and free
government has, like her foreign policy, an importance far greater
than her geographical area might suggest. 5
The development of Rex into a political group would be watched not only from within
the nation, but also from without.
Luckily, Belgium's pre-war fascism was only a flirtation, and quickly died-out.
The failure of Rex to stay alive on its own was due mostly to its own failure to be
realistic. Caught in the glories of its first political successes in 1936, Rex never stopped
to consider whether, once in politics, it might have to change its tactics. It refused to
realize that to keep its supporters it would have to have some concrete results to show '
them. Having been thoroughly educated in the techniques of propaganda by Mgr.
Picard, the leader of Belgian Catholic action, Rex did not see the need to go beyond it.
This thesis will be an exploration of Rexist history with the intent to prove that it was
Rex's inability to move beyond propaganda which caused its downfall before the war.
In explaining the evolution of the Rexist movement, I have divided its pre-war
history into a pre-phase followed by four distinct phases. The pre-phase covers the
period before Leon Degrelle, founder of the Rex movement, became head of the Catholic
action publishing house, Les Editions Rex. Once Degrelle became the publishing house
editor, Rex entered its first phase. It remained in this phase, developing considerably
as a movement to protect the Church, uiltil it became too political for the Church, and
was forced ~ break off its ties~ith Belgian Catholic action in Ja.nu~, 193"!. l"t1 its
second phase, Rex continued to politicize itself through its press, aad still acted to
protect the Church, though not through Catholic action, but by influencing the
Catholic Party directly. Rex's third phase began decisively on November 2,1935 with
the coup de Courtrai. at which point Rex openly declared itself political for the first
time: Rex would no longer try to bring reform to Belgian society by working through

'The New York Times, Mar. 7,1937, section VIn , p. 13.
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the Catholic Party; instead, it would form its own party. Rex's purpose in its third and
most important phase was no longer to protect the Church. but to protect Catholic
morality in general. and to fight corruption in financial and government circles. In
this third phase. Rex launched continual attacks on the three established parties
(Catholics, Socialists. and Liberals), and supposedly engaged in traditional politics by
becoming a political party represented in Parliament. The fourth and final pre-war
phase of Rexist history began with Degrelle's total failure in the 1937 elections and
lasted until the German invasion of Belgium on May 10,19-40. During this last phase,
Rex would lose almost all of its support and would turn more and more towards Hitlerian
and Mussolinian fascism as the only way to regain power -- or so it thought.
, In order to preserve continuity, I have divided my chapters less along
chronological guidelines than along guidelines of important issues. Chapter one
narrates the chronology of the movement to the beginning of phase three. Chapter
two discusses Rexist ideology, an understanding of which is necessary to be' able to
explore the third and fourth phases of the movement, described in the third chapter.
Chapter four elaborates on Degrelle's biography. and on his role as a leader, orator. and
writer. And chapter five discusses the Rexist press. the most important vehicle of
Rexist propaganda and the very basis of Rexism.
I must add a note on historiography before I begin with my narration. Few
historians have written on Rex. and eve~ fever have done a careful-analysis of the
~

importance oJ Rex. Because De'grelle is sti11living today and is very wi11i~g to be
interviewed. most modern works on Rex are long interviews written up in 'book form.
These. however. are frequently inaccurate and disorganized. Although I have tried in
this thesis to use a wide variety of sources. I have relied heavily on Jean-Michel
Etienne's work. because his is the only comprehensive historical treatment of pre-war
Rex which can be completely trusted.

v

Cltapter 0.110

•••
ChroJlo.o,y: Rex before ParliLllloJlt

L' Avant-Garde and the great Louvain farces
The origins (or pre-phase) of Rex can be traced back to the student newspaper
at Louvain university, L'Avant-Garde, and to the group of writers that formed around
its chief editor, Leon Degrelle. The student newspaper must have been just like any
other newspaper, except that its journalists had a special affinity for joke-making and
pranks. These were always rather harmless and the main intent of them was to have
fun and to get attention. Indeed, Degrelle's groupies ~ained a considerable reputation
for these fuces, some of which ue, even today, still remembered.
One graduate told me about how Degrelleand his friends once fooled the entire,
town of Louvain by dressing up as workmen and pretending to be doing road-work.
They managed to set up a road block and to divert traffic away from the major street for
an entire day, until they decided that the joke had lasted long enough and that it vas
time to leave} A more famous prank is the "Proces Dumas."
For seve.ral veek in 1927, L' Ayant-Garde ran a serial entitled "La. barbe
ensanglantee" and signed "Alexandre Dumas, petit-fils."2 Wanting to bring some fresh
attention to the student newspaper, Degrelle and his friends decided to make' use of the
story's pseUdonym. They fabricated a suit brought against them by the inheritors of
A1e~dre Dumas for defamation of the great novelist's name. To do this, they drew up a '

fake letter from the , inheritors~ lawyer, !lenri Torres -- who happened to be one of
'\

Paris' most reknovnlawyers -- and printed jt in the next isSue of L' Avant-Gar,. They
•

I

then found a Belgian lawyer, a M. Cleyman~, to r~present M. Torres in court in'Louvain.
(Claymans vas all too honored to be associated vith the great Parisian lawyer's name to
investigate the matter fully.) They even convinced alov-Ievel court official (whose
1As told to me by a student of Louva.in university who graduated in the 1950s. He is

proof that Degrelle stories have indeed gone dovn in university history.
2Jean Ladriere and Robert Pfeiffer, L'Aventure rexiste (Bruxelles, Pierre de M6yere,
ed., 1%6), p. 18. These authors date the event in 1932. This, hovever, is impossible,
since Degrelle leftL'Avant-Garde already in 1928. Jean-Michel Etienne (see note 3), a
most reliable source, gives no date. My date is only a guess, therefore.

1

name they. had literally picked out at random from the phone book!) to deliver a
summons notice to the offices of the students paper. What with all the student press
coverage and excellent preparation of the L' Avant-Gardists. the suit caused a great
sensation. All of Louvain turned out for the trial and the judge deemed the case so
important that he postponed judment for eight days. The great prank had yorked even
better than expected. In fact, it yas becoming a little too real to be safe. The students
finally decided to put an end to it and the'next issueofL'Avant-Garde revealed the joke .
. Surprisingly, perhaps, everybody took it in good humor -- even the great Torres, yho
Yrote a witty response to the paper. 3
The experience at L' AYant-Garde taught the future Rexists not only YritiJig
and journalistic skills, but also propaganda and attention-getting methods. as well as
leadership techniques. The atmosphere must have been like that of a gang:
participants in the journalism and in the pranks (yhich, as in the Dumas case. were
often one and the same) were part of a tight group. And this group ,was lead by a strong
leader. Indeed; L'Avant-Garde and its various extra-curricular activities offered
Degrelle his first opportunity at real1eadership. Within such a small and c1ose-.knit
community, he yas able to develop his rhetoric and tactics without feeling threatened
by greater forces. It is nevertheless rather remarkable hoy much attention he ~
able to bring to himself and his student friends. L' AVant-Garde was also the fostering
ground for Degrelle to gather his future'Rexistes de la premiere heure, the disciples
who would follow him and work with him to form the new Rex movement.

"'\.

Yet yhile still at L'Avant-Garde. much had to be learned. Pranks and comical
articles yere not enough to keep a band of youths together for long. i'hey needed
direction, guidance. This, they received from the Association Catho!igue de 1a Jeunesse

3Ladriere and Pfeiffer. p. 18-21; and Jean-Michel Etienne, Le Mouvement rexiste
jusQy'en 1940 (Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1968), note 5, p. 11.
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BeIge and its leader, Monseigneur Picard. It is important, therefore. to take a brief look
at this organjzation and at its philosophies.

The ACm and Mgr. Picard: buiJdin& blocks of the Rexist movement
The actual. formal movement of Rex originated in the Association Catholigue de
la Jeuness BeIge (ACjB) and drew most of its ideas from what it had learned there. The
ACjB was a Catholic action group; that is. it was a Catholic Church organizationvhich
existed to spread the vord. so to speak. In a Catholiccount.ry like Belgium. there vas
little converting which needed to be done. The ACjB's task. therefore, vas more to
spread awareness of a Catholic ideology and to bring more people into its fold. It vas
also an institution for the young. -a place where they could meet, discuss and work
together for the Catholic cause. Mgr. Louis Picard, head of the ACjB as the Rex
movement was forming, defined the institution as a link between ACjBists -- lay
apostles of Christ living io: the temporal world -- and Church leaders.4 The ACjB. like
other Catholic action groups, wanted a state based on Christian principles.
Elle U'ACjBJ entend exercer une influence sur toute la vie et sur
toutes les institutions saciales, sur la famille. sur la profession. sur
fEtat lui-m6me .... Ca.r il y a une conception chretienne de toutes
choses, et de toute activite, et l'Action Catholique ou plus exactement
l'Eglise par fAction Catholique veut travailler de tout son pouvoir a
l'application et a la realisation de cette conception chretienne. 5
In his book. La. doctrine Catho1igu~ de L'Etat. Picard describes in d¢tail what a

state governed by a Catholic party would be like. First of all. State and Church'Ve
J

distinctly separated. God created two societies. a temporal one in the Staie and a
spiritual one in the Church. which must remain autonomous. Yet. autonomy does not
cancel out collabo.ration. Indeed. each plays a crucial role in human society. While the
State exercises economic and legal control over its citttens. the Church holds full power
4Mgr. Louis Picard. 4 Doctrine catholique de l'Etat (Louvain. Editions Rex. 193~).
p.127-128.
'Picard, p.13S
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over religious and moral matters. Both must work together to form a political economy
and, as they interact, both must respect each other's realm of authority. For a state
economy following only economic laws is doomed to liberalism, and one subject only to
moral laws is theocratic -- both enemies of a Catholic state. The Catholic State receives
its power not from the people but from God himself. Rebellion against society's
institutions and leaders, therefore, means rebellion against God. Such a state, then, is
authoritarian and must guide and control its citizens, for the science of politics is too
complicated for the individ~al to venture into alone: "La conception catholique de l'Etat
implique donc l'autorite incontestable des pouvoirs publics. 6.... L'autorite forte remise
en honneur par Ie fascisme et rhiU~risme n'est pas en tan.t que telle oppo~e ala
doctrine catholique."? Indeed, not only can the Christian idea of national life and
political institutions be realized in democracy and parliamentarianism, but it survives
even in authoritarian and dictatorial systems, for it will soften their sometimes harsh
actions and deter dangers that they might bring to the nation's citizens. The role of the
-statesman, then, is to guide and protect the citizens. Guide them in acting for the
common good -- and, thus, the supernatural good of the souls -- and protect them from
particular individuals and groups (clans, classes, private societies) which might work
against the common good. He must unify and stimulate their activities and those of
their associations. and he must keep order and security. Above all, the statesman must
be free from personal ambitions and interests within the society.
A CathoH-c state would be tolerant of all religions: "Les catholiques con~tu~s en
parti n'o.o.t qu'une ambition: gouverner sagement Ie pays tout en assurant Ie respect et

..

la liberte de la religion."S Picard's definition of tolerance, however, does not include
propaganda. Non-Catholic believers, therefore, may live freely in a Catholic state, but
only if they keep quiet about their faith (or non-faith) and don't take any open actions
6Picard, p. 16
7Picard, p. 19
8Picard, p. 118
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to enlarge their following. Such a narrow understanding of tolerance fits in perfectly

with Picard's anti-liberal and authoritarian type of state.
In the social field, the Catholic State would enforce traditional types of laws: the
religious marriage sacrament would become official; the sanctity of the family and
other traditional Catholic mores would be implemented; birth control and divorce -- a
-

sacriligious breaking of the marriage sacrament -- would be forbidden; financial
support would be available for parents who wished to send their children to private
(i.e. Catholic) schools and for the Catholic schools themselves; and the media would be
censored against stepping out of the strictly-laid, Catholic moral grounds. In education.
the State must fully collaborate with the Church, for it is the Church which ultimately
controls a child's education (the parents are susceptible to Church laws) and a child
must be educated in the Christian doctrine. Collaboration here consists of protecting
both the family and the Church as they educate the child, as well as protecting the
child from unfit parents. 9 ,
Finally, in the realm of economics, besides Church-State collaboration to ensure
good economic and moral policy-making, Picard prescribes a corporative State. Cross-

class professional associations would act as intermediaries between people and State and
ensure a close relationship between the two. 10 On an international scale, nations
should work with each other econoniically -- this, as an expression of "la fraternite
humaineque nous enseigne et nous inc~lque l'Evangilique'."l1 Writing in the earl;
,

"\

'30s, Picard criticizes the present economic organization which, he says, makes work
seem as if it is produced only for the producer and not for society as a whole.
90f course " Picard does not say what the state should do in the event of an unfit priest.
Could such a creature even exist? One can assume that, if it did, the state would have to
get rid of him also.
1OCorporatism vas not a new invention. It had been around in the dialogues of
important religious leaders for several years. Picard notes that Pope Pius XI called
corporatism an essential element of social organjzation "comforme a la nature des
chases." Picard, p. 43
11 Picard, p.'110

5

Corporatism would return the professional system to a healthy state. where work
supported the common good.
This elaborate philosopy was actually not so innovative. Picard essentially
ouUined a traditional Cath~lic state which takes responsibility for all aspects of its
citizens' lives by controlling ~oth their public and private affairs. It is this type of
society that the early Rexists first envisioned. It is out of such a background that they
would develop their Rexist ideology.
But if the ACJB organization itself offered a base for the Rexist movement. its
leader. Monseigneur Picard, also exercized a lot of i.nfluence. Mgr. Picard was residing
at Louvaln when Degrelle and his future Rexist compatriots were attendi.ng the
university. The chaplai.n soon heard about Degrelle's exploits at the L'Av8.nt-Qarde
student newspaper and engaged him to.write for the ACJB's student journal, Cahiers de
la Jeuness Catholique, i.n 1927. Degrelle became a regular at the ACJB house and
beginning i.n 1928. he and his coUeagues of L'Avant-Garde consulted frequenUy with
Mgr. Picard. Picard was a leader for them and someone with experience in leadership.
He gave them direction. a cause to work for: the Catholic cause. He taught them
publishi.ng s.kills and modern techniques of propaganda and action: he showed them
how crucial it was to win over the masses to one's side in any endeavor for societal
change. 12 Fi.nally, in 1928, he convinced them to leave L'Avant-Garde and devote
themselves solely to Catholic action. ·

Christus-Rex: the com.ing together of pastime and ideal
ACjB action had always been based on the press, its own press, called ~
Editions Rex because of a cult for the Christ-king which was becoming more and more

12Jacques Saint-Germain, La BataiUe de Rex (Paris, __ . 1937), p. 67
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popular among student in the mid to late '20s.13 By 1930. however. Mgr. Picard had
grander visions for his movement and established a full-scale publishing house for the
ACJB. The new institutionwas located in an ACJB building at 52 rue Vital-Decoster.
Louvain. and used the insignia of Christus Rex: three large letters spelling out "Rex."
i1lterlaced and attached to a crown whose last point was a cross. (See plate 1) The new

LeS Editions Rex was in charge of the propaganda wing of the ACJB and its aim was to:
...repandre dans Ie pays des publications de nature afaire rayonner
Ie Christ dans Ie's foyers. Le programme ewt vaste et comprenait
non seulement la propagation de la Huerature spedfiquement
doctrinaJe. mais aussi de la litterature profane a caractere chretien
ou'moralisateur. 14
In October 1930. Degrelle was appointed its ne", director. and Rex entered what I have
caUed its nm phase. 1,
When he came. he brought with him his tight group of faithful disciples from
L' AY&Qt-Garde. To them, working at Los Editions Rex -vas a new chance to coordi1late
hobby -- So to speak -- and ideal. AU of them had a passion for iinaginwve and
provocative ",riting. <The French ",riter, Saint-Germain, described them as ".. .1a jeune
equipe. dont chaque membre cachait au plus profond de lui-m6me un ecrivain
i1lgenieux ou un poete sensible ... ")16 They had been able to turn this passion into
~bstance

at L' Avant-Garde" yet one can imagi1le th~ the atmosphere at the ACJB was

13The celebration of Christ-king was initiated by Pope Pius XI in his "Quas Pr~as"
encyclical of. 1925. The last Sunday of October was devoted to aU sorts of festivif'ies in
the name of the Christ-king. [Usmard legros, Un Homme. un chef.'Laon Degrelle
<Bruxelles, Editions Rex, 1938), p. 107.]
14Legros, p. 108.
15Etienne, p.l4. I have noticed some discrepancies among historians of Rex as to
whether or not Degrelle took: on the leadership of a newly-established publishing
house or simply a renewed one. Etienne claims Rex editions were founded in 1926 and
were overhawled in 1930, when Degrelle came in. Hoyois' account, on the other hand.
implies that it was only in 1929 that Mgr. Picard decided to found a publishing house, to
which. shorOy thereafter. he appointed Degrelle. Because Etienne's wort: is the most
recent of the tva and has gained considerable repute as a careful piece of research. I
shall abide by his dates here. and throughout the thesis.
16Saint-Germain, p. S9
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quite different from that at the university. They now devoted their attention to much
more serious actions which, though they included writing, allowed them neither the
freedom of imagination, nor the possibility as before of working tightly together in an
autonomous group. Les Editions Rex brought the old gang together again. It gave them
a focus. It allowed them to use their old writing and propaganda skills in combination
with their strong Catholicism to express a new and developing passion, learned mostly
through the guidance of Mgr. Picard at the ACJB: the proliferation of a Christian ideal.
For it seemed to them that society around them had fallen into an abyss of immorality
which could only be saved if everyone abided by the basic concepts of Christian mores.
DegreUe ben~fiued'from the transfer to Les Editions Rex just as much as his old
friends did. In his new leadership position, he too could bring together his enthusiasm
for journalism (and for getting people's attention through provocative journalism) and
his new-found aim. inille, converting the public to Christian morality. In addition, ill
Editions Rex finally offered him real leadership opportunity. Granted, as chief editor of
L'Avant-Garde he had exercized a certain amount of control over his colleagues, yet
because he was a student and because the paper was only one of several student
newspapers at the university, the amount of time he could devote to it and the
influence he could hold over the Catholic community in general was limited. NoW' he
had an entir~publishing house at his disposal and could put into practice what he
believed in :-- or so he thought.
~

It is obvious from th~ development of the editing house in these first few years
. that his control over the institution was quite firm.1? It is also obvious, in retrospect,
that he used his position to .further his personal ambitions of getting involved in

paiitie s vet

it ;$

baed fo

pinpoint _exactly when DeareUs's pglitical i5pirations began to

take over his Catholic ones. Did he, at first, only want to be a leader of the Catholic
1?Because of the importance of the development of the Rexist press, I have decided to

accord it a separate section of its own. All future references to the press in this
chapter, therefore, will be elaborated upon in the chapter on Rexist press. (See below)

8

youth movement? Was it only after having tasted the power of leadership at the ACjB
that he expanded his sphere of reference -- talked about reaching il1. Catholics and III
Belgians? Perhaps such grand hopes had always been in his mind and the stints at
L'AYant-Garde and the ACjB were only conscious stepping stones to something more
challengitig and glorifying. Anybody who has .kno~n Degrel1e or has studied him
knows of the story of how, when his father asked him what he would lite to become
when he grew up, fifteen year old Degrelle unhesitantly answered "Premier
Ministre."18 Of course, sucb. stories may only be stories and one cannot accord them
undue significance, yet, ~e or not, the very fact that it has become part of .tl.i§ story
tells us about the impression he gave. By 1930 Degrelle was bent on changing the
world; he wanted to be a leader: "SitOt entre dans la place [Les £ditions Rex}, Degrelle
decide que '~a va changer'."19 From editor of a successful, but nevertheless small
student newspaper, he had gone on to become director of the publishing house of one
.of the Belgian Catholic Church's most hnportant institutions. Thiscertai.nly was a leap
fot'Vard and one which brought much power and prestige vith it. Was Degrelle
looting for this? As director of Les £ditions Rex he could control all literature that
issued out of the house. This meant, then, that everything that vent out held his
approval. With this nev andpoverful tool in hand, Degrelle's vision of himself as a
changer of the world through Catholicism and politics began to tate over his vision of
'.,

himself as changer of the vorld through Catholicism alone. He wanted to bring
.
.
"'\
attention to himself and to LesEditions Rex ..

18f:tienne, p.10
19£tienne, p.l <f
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The first chance for this came up when he was assigned to take over the
propaganda for the Catholic party in the November, 1932 legislative elections. 20 The
opportunity had come for Degrelle to get his hands into something he had always
wanted to do, and it was an opportunity which would bring attention to his excellent
propagand8. track-record. Thus, he could use the occasion as proof of his s.kills and as a
way of getting himself on the forefront: his name and t4e name of Les £ditions Rex
would be distributed all over the country, as would be his successes. Degrelle was good
at his task and his hard work payed off. The Catholic party carried 38."% of the vote,
up from 3'.37% in 192931 and

g~ed 3 seats, for a total of 79. 22 In additon, Degrelle's

name was no longer unfamiliar within Catholic circles. He was beginning to break out
of isolation.
But Degrelle .t.o.ew that. only a varied and exCiting press could reach all the
Catholic masses and could bring growth in size and importance to Les Editions Rex.
Between Fall, 1932 and Spring, 1933. therefore, he bought out Soirees from the other
editors. and launched four new periodicals,

m

Vlan. Foyer, and Crois. 23 The second of

these was purely political and thus marked a first break with the strictly non-political - indeed. anti-political-- attitude that. the AClB and Mgr. Picard had enforced so far. Yet
the chaplai.o. had consented to the revue (though with the qualification that it limit
.
.
itself to ChristiaJl discourse on political" affairs and never enter into politics, per se),
and Degrelle seemed to be getting his way.24
I

n

20Legros. p. 1. Historians differ on whether he was given this task or whether he
fought to get it. Legros says that. the Catholic Party at. first refused to allow Degrelle to
take on the propaganda. and that it was only after the youthful leader's insistan'ce that
they finally agreed. [Legros. p. 111-112] Etienne, on the other hand, declares that the
Catholic Party never hesitated in asking Degrelle to take on the job. particularly in
light of his propagandistic successes so far. [Etienne, p. 15]
21Roger E. De Smet, Rene Evalenko, William Fraeys, Collection de Science Poiitigue:
Atlas des Elections Belges 1919=1951 (Bruxelles. Institut de Sociologie Solvay, Universit.e
Libre de Bruxelles, 1958) p. 10.
22Legros,p.ll1-112.
23Etienne, p.1,. (See separate chapter on Rexist press, below.>
24Etienne, p. 16
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The politizaijon of Rex: a movement emerges

If the publication of YlJA. marked the beginning of a self-imposed politization
of Les Editions Rex. it also marked the first climax in the development of Rex as a
movement -- the second phase of Rex. "Rex devenait donc une sorte de soul6vement des
jeunes, soulevement en general sympathique aux a.lnes qui suivaient avec interit les
phases de revolution rexiste."25 Degrelle had already expanded beyond the boundaries
set by the ACjB for the publishing house -- the journals, pamphlets and books vere
geared tovard-a broader public nov -- and,
imbu d'une immense confiance en lui-m6me, i1 se tenait pour un
6t.rea part et ne cachait pas a. 58S amis qu·it se sentait appel6 a. de
gran'des choses. S'il entendait se livreI' a. l'apostolat chretien. toute
tutelle d'un comite d' Action catholique ou d'un -personnage m6me
des plus sympathiques lui 6wt intolerable. 26
Degrelle vanted to be his ovn boss and ~ailted to enter full swing into political
journalism.
Separatism and politization, hovever, would soon lead to disagreement vith the
ACjB. For, as Mgr. Picard emphasized in La Doctrine Catholigue de fEtat. Belgian
Catholic action vas adament about the separation of religious and political affairs.
T-ension increased, therefore, as Degrelle led Les Editions Rex into a political press.
Money problems also set in, for Degrelle'had tried ~ do too much too fast. The editions'
deficit 'Vas rising and the secretary general of Belgian Catholic action deemeih.
prudent to disassociate itself from the publishing house. Luckily, DegreUe vas able to
collect enough funds to buy Les Editions Rex. 2? Under the agreements made on July 31,

2'Legros. p. 116.
26Giovanni Hoyois, "Mgr. Picard et Leon DegreUe," in Revue ienerale beIge (Nov. 1959),
p.85.
2?Jt seems he received most of the money (about 700,000 FB) from his parents-in-law.
rich industrialists in northern France. The Lemays would support him frequently in
the early development of the movement. [Daye, p. 66; and Etienne, p.84.J
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1933, he now leased the building from the ACJB, while continuing to publish for it. As
proprietor of Les Editions Rex, Degrelle vas able to steer the publications more and
more towards the political field. By 1933, "Rex n'etait deja plus un mouvement
litt6raire:'28 Ylim. became overUy political and more and more books on political
subjects were published.
Indeed, Mgr. Picard's earlier confidence in Degrelle's good vishes soon
dwindled. DegreUe appeared to be leading his" groupies" away from the ACJB:
D'un modeste service d'edition, Rex passait au rang d'un mouvement
deciare ...Degrelle soulevait une jeunesse unitaire, en lui infusant
une immelnlse ambition": ceUe de realiser dans la vie sociale, et
d'abord dans l'arene politique, !'ideal spirituel qui avait fait
flamboyer des jeunes hommes en masses compactes dans Ies congres
de l'A.C.j.B.29
Degrelle's press had also begun a series of attacks on, first. socialists and freemasons,
and, then, actual leaders of the Catholic Party -- starting with the Prime Minister
himself, M. Henri jaspar. The situation vas becoming very awkward for Mgr. Picard.
"Though the Catholic Party was technically not a Church institution, it vas still
connected -with it and supported by it. The fact that the ACJB, an institution of the
Church. 'Was closely connected -with the very source of this harsh criticism did not
bring good light to the organization. In December, 1933. the secretary general of
Belgian Catholic action called upon Les Editions Rex to end pUblication of ~ to
choose between-politics and the support

of the secretary general. and to draw up a:

reasonable and balanced budget. SO Rex editions' only response -Was to launch ~ev
attack, this time on the vice-president of the ACJB himself, Helbig de Balzac!S1 This
latest scandal proved too much for both the secretary general and Mgr. Picard, and, in
late january, 1934, the ACJB officially separated itself from Les Editions Rex. Degrelle

28Legros, p. 116.
29Hoyois, p. 85.
30Etienne, p. 21.
31F:tienne, p.2l.
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remained undaunted by the split, however, especially since his friendship with Mgr.
Picard was not affected. (Picard published his book on the Catholic state with Les
Editions Rex after the split.) In fact, it seems that the separation was ordered only to
enforce the traditional view that Catholic action and political action were truly
incompatible. It did not mean a condemnation of Rex editions' activities. 32
Indeed, a most important example of continued politization was the fusion, on
March 22, 193<f of YlK and BR into a new politico-literary weekly. The new periodical,
however, also markedthe onset of renewed financial difficulties, for Degrelle saw no
limits to .the expansion of the publishing house. "Sa confiance en sOl 6tait sans limite,
et sans limite son ambition. Comme directeur de Rex il d6ploya une telle m6galomanie
et lan~a un si grand nombre de p6riodiques ... que l'entreprise en arriva au bord de 1a
faiUite."3! Though Rex managed to pay for itself, the other journals operated at great
cost to Les Editions Rex. The publishing house was forced to abandon both fQnr. and
~.

But DegreUe refused to give up either his cherished political bi-monthly, or his

successful Catholic literary revue. So he simply combined them. The fusion of the too
was, in fact, a stroke of genius, especially since he managed to convince his readership
that he was now offering them one of the pair free -- though at a higher price!34
Nevertheless, the fusion did not solve Rex's severe financial problems. In May,
Les Editions Rex was evicted from the AC~ building because it was not paying rent.
The editions' total debt constituted 1.'00,000 Belgian Francs (FB) in liabititi~s ~d about
J

600.000 in assets. 3' The revenues from publications could ~ever come close to covering
this sum. Something had to be done fast. DegreUe at first founded a Fonds de combat.
and sent out pleas for money through his press. 36 (Such pleas appeared continually

32Etienne, p. 21.
33Stengers, p.27.
34Etien.o.e, p .22.
35Etie.o.ne, p.23.
36Etie.o.ne, p .22.
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throughout Rexist press history.) Yet voluntary donations w.ould never be enough. So
he decided to replace Les Editions Rex by a Nouyelle societe la presse de Rex which took
on the old asset debts, to a sum total of 1.100,000 FB. With the help of his shrewd lawyer,
M. Dubois-Clavier, he was able to convince all of Rex editions' creditors to accept
immediate payment of -to% of the debt (thus preventing property seizure), and the
Premontres d'Averbode, Rex editions' printer, to collect their partin shares of the new
Presses de Rex.3? Luckily for the Presses de Rex, the condition for such a deal was that
the Premontres would have a say in the internal affairs of the new societe. They placed
their representatives in the administrative council of the Presses, and forced a realistic
budget upon them. As a result, and because of the increased profits from the weekly

hL Les Presses de Rex was put back in the black.38
Started on a new career, so to speak, Degrelle accelerated his political activities.
Since 1933, he had begun malting speeches to small gatherings of supporters. 39 The
frequency and propagandistic quality of these increased quickly after the break from
the ACjB, though they did not go unnoticed by the Church. The Charleroi case is
exemplary. In late summer, 1934, Degrelle began planning for a great gathering of
Relist forces to take place at Charleroi on October 21. The event would gather some ,000
to 7000 Catholic youths in a sort of press conference, wh.ere Degrelle would set out his
goals for the movement. He had already.,begun a great propaganda campaign for the
.

meeting in September. October 21 would be memorable asa "journee de propa&jUlde,
•

r

journe'e de conqu&tes, journee de rayonnement et journee triomphale pour REX ... "40
Advertisements in R.a asked Rexists to spend their time at Charleroi distributing

3i'Etienne, p.22-23.
38£tienne, p.23. Rex":Ylan had meanwhile become simply Rex. though it remained a
politico-literary revue.
39Etienne, p.23.
40"Charleroi est mort. Vive Charleroi I," in ~ no. 40, Oct. 12,1934, p.16.
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100,000 copies of Ru. in order to "6clairer et reconforter les cathoHques" after the
break with the ACjB:41 (See also Plate 2)

La bataille de Charleroi
Le 21 Octobre
tous nos lecteul"S, tous nos amis
se feront apOtres, militants et propagandistes de REX
(instructions a la page 16)
100.000
REPANDEZ REX
100.00042

FAITES LIRE REX
The day was. guaranteed to be a sensational affair. Brought to Charleroi station. on
special trains, the. participants would be accompanied by march music as they
processed "en un ordre impeccable" toward the church where mass vas.to be held.43
After the service, they would be lead to the tent for the great banquet:
L'ordre Ie plus 6nergique sera assure par cinq cents commissaires
rexistes responsables chacun de db congressistes. Meme repartition
a. table. Un homme de confiAAce sera place tous leS dix sieges et aura
la charge de la tenue, du service et. de l'enthousiasme (sicJ.l .. ~ Le
banquet sera extrimement pittoresque. Jass {siel, musiques entralnantes alterneront avec des discoul"S enflammees, courts et ordonnes.
Ven quatre heures et demie, Leon Degrelle monte sur une tribune de
plusieurs metres de hauteur, au milieu des drapeaux ecla.ta.nts, haranguera l'immense foule a.la lueur des phares.44
Sensing the danger of such an event, however, the bishop of Tournai, Mgr. Rasneur.
did not authorize the mass. Degrelle's reaction was clever. Instead of denouncing the
bishop's declaration and going on with the event as planned, he cancelled the whote
thing and proclaimed October 21 a. day of-prayer for Rex.
Nous ~mmes ici-bas pour servir Ie catholicisme. Pour servir
utilement. it faut obair. Les ev6ques sont nos maItres et nos guides.
Nous avan~ons dans Ie sens qu'its nous indiquent, sans discuter,
comme
Nous
. des soldats.. ..1 Leurs arguments nous ont convaincus.
.

41 "Charleroi est ~ort. Vive Charleroi!." in Ra. no. 40. Oct. 12.1934. p.16.
42R.u., no.40. Oct. 12.1934. p. 24.
43Soides. Sept. 28. 1934, as quoted in Etienne. p. 24.
44Reading this description, one can understand vhy Hoyois calls the event "un banquet
tintamarresque. avec exhibition spectaculaire de sa personne, ala maniere des parades
de Mussolini et d'Hitler." (p. 86) I shall discuss the possible influences of both these
leaders on the Rexist movement in a later chapter.

15

no us sommes rendus avec joie a, leurs avis et a, leurs desirs. 4 '
From then on, he continued in the same article, Rexist press would be oriented towards
Catholic action and would broach political subjects only if they had religious relevance.
Degrelle certainly was a cunning politician, even. if he hadn't officially entered
politics yet. The A~JB and the Belgian Catholic action were quickly appeased and
Degrelle cOtJld go on in his activities unhampered.
Though a failure, the Charleroi meeting is an interesting preview.of Rex 19
come. The group of Catholic youths who were part of Les Presses de Rex now formed
only the core of a much larger band of adherents. Beginning with the split from the
ACJB. the publishing house had transformed itself into a regular movement, calling
itself simply~. Degrelle had naturally taken on the leadership of the movement, as
he had that of the publishing house, since he was its founder. As director of movement
and publishing house, he did all he could to enlarge the supportofboth these
institutions, Le. he embarked on wave after wave of imaginative propaganda that drew
more and more Rexists into the fold.
After the appeasement at Charleroi had settled a bit, DegreUe quickly started up
his various scandal attacks again. Between November and December, 1934, in. devoted
many of its pages to attacking a certain M. Moreau. Moreau was an ex-abbot who had
consented to giving a series of eighty.1ectures in support of the Socialist Party at
various of its "maisons du peuple."46 In the process, however, he was attackin.... the
good name of the Church. Degtelle took it upon himself. to rectify the situation. He set
out on the track. of the ex-abbot and, at each of the meetings, waited for an opportune
moment to openly denounce Moreau. The tactic worked. Within a short time, the exabbot was forced to abandon his speaking tour. The Rexist leader of course used the
occasion to proclaim. himself single protector of the Church and to point out the
4'Uon Degrelle, "Au Service de rEglise,"
46Etienne, p' 26

m

0.0.40,
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Oct. 12, 1934, p. 2.

repeated failure of the Catholic Party to take a stance on Church issues. In fact. after
the Moreau affair. his attacks on the Party became more frequent. culminating in the
famous coup de CoUrtrai.
On November 2, 193', the conservative branch of the Union Catholique. the
F6d6ration des Cerdes catholigues.led by M. Paul Segers, minister of state. held a.
meet.iJlg at Courtrai. On the eve of the reunion, and without previous warning. Degrelle
sent out telegrams to all local Renst groups and ordered them to come to the meet.iJlg,
bringing with them some bread and a blanket. "pour une aventure que leur plairait:"41
Duly o~eyiJlg their leader. about three hundred young Rexists arrived, quietly and
unrecognized infiltrated the hall at Courtrai and waited for a signal from De_relle.
Some time into the meet.iJlg.a voice shouted out from the back "Degrelle ala Tribune,"
aild was echoed by several hundred other voices.48 M. Segers and other Catholic Party
leaders could not prevent Degrelle from spea.king to the audience and, after one or tva
more speeches. ceded him the stand. As soon as he had reached the platform, Degrelle
started into a tirade of accusations against Segers and his Party. while his supporters
unveiled their Rexist insignia, blocked the entrances to the hall so that no one could
leave and loudly applauded the Rexist leader. The meet.iJlg ended in chaos. though the
Rexist troops nevertheless managed to escape arrest.49 Degrelle had fuUy succeeded in
getting the country's attention. and in the
weeks that followed; the people eagerly read
'.
about scandal after scandal that the now admittedly political movement unfoldejl.
J

Courtrai more than made up for the failure at Charleroi. Whereas Rex had
worked according to Party lines before November 2.193', Courtrai marked a new period
for the movement: what I have called the third phase of Rex. Rex would now act upon
the Catholic Party to change it: "La.lutte allait se faire contre lui [the Party], et i11ui
41Legros,p. 123-~.
48Ladriere and Pfeiffer, p. 31.
491 use the word "troops" figuratively. here. There were no military forces in pre-war
Rex.
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faudrait se soumettre ou se demettre."'O The Catholic Party, Degrelle cried out at the
meeti.ng, was not only corrupt, but also disunified and characterized by a vacuum of
leadership. Under his directorship, the Catholic youth of Belgium would rejuvinate the
Party and would return it to its former respectability.'l The coup de Courtrai was
indeed a coup. It launched the Rex movement into a decidedly political career and onto
the forefront of the public scene. It also provoked a further (though. as we shall see.
not as yet a final) condemnation from the Church authorities. On November 20, 1935,
the cardinal of Malines. Mgr. Van Roey. defied all Catholic priests from taking part in
Rexist meetings of any sort. asks that Rn. no longer be sold at church entrances. and
called upon teachers to keep students away from any Rexist activities.'Z As before.
Degrelle took no heed of the declaration. for he had decided to enter politics no matter
what anybody said. On May 24. 1936. legislative elections were to be held. He planned to
form a political party before then and to. thus. perform another coup that would finally
give him full control over his count1}r -- though within all legal outlines, of course.

50Saint-Germain, p. 95.
5lSaint-Germain, p. 92.
52Legros, p. 130. Legros gives Nov. 28 as the date, whHe Etienne gives Nov . 20 . As
before, I shall abide by the latter's statistics as more reliable.
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•••
Renst Ideoio",

By Winter, 1935, then, Rex had become an official political movement. But what
was it saying to its supporters? What utopiac promises:was it making? Like any other
serious movement. Rex had an ideology and treatises to explicate this ideology.
Although it did change over time, these changes were only minor, and Rex's rhetoric
remained basically the same during the pre-war period.

Rex defined by Rex:
Rex _saw itself very much as. p~t of a historical continuum. It was meant to
,

come about because its historical precedents and its historical context made its
formation iD.evitable. Belgium had sunk into a mire of vice, of greed, selfishness, and
corruption. If nothing was done fast, the country would break apart into a myriad of
enemy factions or, worse, would fall into the hands of the Communists, emblems of all
evil.l But a few like-minded young people had realized the desperateness of the
situation and had spontaneously come together to save their people and country. "Les
promoteurs de Rex se sont rassembles sponta.n.ement parce qu'ayantre~u une formation
identique et vivant dans un meme monde its se trouvaient d'accord sur l'essentiel et
pouvaient, a. travers Rex, exprimer leurs identiques revendications primordiales." 2
Rex defined itself as a revolution against the forces which were pulling Belgium
down. 3 Fr~m its earliest stages, when sij:il ~onnected with the ACJB, Rex opposed itself
to the established political' and ,religious institutions of Belgium. It was determrlned tobe something new -- though it glorified the past and took its cues from history for its

lDegrelle, preface to Denis, Bases doctrinales de Rex. p. 3.
2Streel, p. 7.
3"Nous nous rendons parfaitement compte qu'i! s'agit 130 d'une revolution COMPLETE,"
wrote Degrelle, when describing Rex's aims. ["Rex monte a Bruxelles," in Rex, Mr, 22,
1935, p . 32.1
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changes for the future _-4 something which would reverse the pattern of immorality
that was taking over Belgium. Rex's revolution was first and foremost a social one. for
it was believed that politics and economics were subservient to the social laws of
society. What was needed was a return to morality. and to Christian morality in
particular. This could not come about through simple changes in institutions: the
whole mentality of the country had to be reformed. The treatises of Rexist philosophers
always began by defining Rex before they devised a detailed program of the proposed
Rexist state, because philosophy was more important to them than program.' Rex was a
movement and the Rexist revolution was a revolution of youth, of unity, and of soul.
Rex's revolution was sentimental (appealing to the people's sentimentality about their
family, their community, their country), spiritual, mystical and, above all. moral.

Rex as a movement:
Rex saw itself as flexible. as adapting to whatever c.i!cumstances befell it. When
the philosopher oIRex. Jose Stree1,6 wrote "REX n'est pas une faction. ni un parti, .01 un
groupement d'interets. ni une secte philosophique. C'est un mouvement," he was using
the word in both its senses: movement as social motion and movement as physical
motion and change over time. For. unlike traditional parties and sects. which were

4See. for instance. Rex. Renaissance de la Patrie (Brux .. Rex Editions. 1940), a ~
photographic essay about the movement. It is devided into three parts: the first section
romanticizes Belgium's history. her heroism. her coura3e in the face of invasion. her
magnificent art; the second section documents contemporary Belgium. filled with
poverty. misery. and loss of hope; the final part pictures Rexists and Rexist leaders
assembled at numerous meetings. with smiles on their faces again and clean clothes on
their backs. as in the good old days: Rex has obviously changed the world for them. as it
will for the rest of Belgium.
'For this chapter. 1 have especially used as references: Leon Degrelle. Revolutions des
ames (Paris, Les Editions de France. 1938), and La Message de Rex (Brux., Rex Editions,
1936); Jean Denis, Bases doctrinales de Rex (Brux., Rex Editions, 1936), Principes rexistes
(Brux., Rex Editions, 1936), and La Ligne generale (Hrux., Rex Editions, [1935-377]); Jose
Streel, positions rexistes (Brux., Rex Editions, 1935).
6See biographical note on Streel, below, in chapter of Rexist press.
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only "sterile parce que c'est immobile,"? Rex was constantly evolvin.g and always
active. "Rex est ... surtout action," Streel contin.ued. 8 A good Rexist, therefore, was not
only deeply religious and a believer in the Catholic creed and the holin.ess of the
Eucharist. but he was also an enlightener, a saviour, a militant and audacious apostle of
his faith.9 He was totally devoted to the collective whole'of the movement. for real
devotion ta Rex meant repudiation of the "I" in oneself for the "we" in the movement, 10
"REX a appris a des centaines, des milliers d'hommes a ne plus vivre pour eux, mais
POUR UN IDEAL COLLECTIF, a consentir pour lui, al'avance, taus les sacrifices, toutes les
humiliations, tous les herolsmes."l1 Devotion entailed utter and total obedience to the
leaders of the movement. "Autorite et obeissance, organisation methodique, travail
incessant, devouement total, si c'est cela que vous voulez, venez a REX" cried Degrelle. 12

Rex movement of the young:
Rex's youthfulness cut across all generational l1nes. No matter how old
individual members were, the movement-itself was still characterized by youth, by "son
rythme, ... son allegresse qui eclate dans toute son action, meme aux moments les plus
douloureux, ... ceUe faim de vivre, ... ce goOt de faction, ... ce desir de transformations
profondes qui exige un detachement du monde dans lequel on vit."13

. Rex movement of unity:
.
Though. based in the Catholic religion, Rex claimed to ignore religious

~

boundaries, as it did those of class and culture. Rex wanted a unified country which
?Jose Streel, p. 8.
aJose Streel, p. 11.
9Josse Allin, 'pretre, "Le Rexiste," in Btl. Jan . 4,1935, p. 24.
10Degrelle, Le Message de Rex, p. 5-6.
11 De grelle, Le Message de Rex. p. 6.
12DegreHe, "Rex monte a. Bruxel1es," in Rex, Mr. 22,1935, p. 32.
13Streel, p . 17.
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would include all equally, whether believers or non-believers, workers, peasants, or of
the middle-class, Flemish, Walloon, or German.

"Revolution des Ames:"
Unity was to be achieved by viewing every being and every t.p.ing in its
essence. in its Ame.Rex believed that a return to a belief in Ame. would bring back to
the Belgians a faith in themselves as a people, in Belgium as a fatherland. and in life
altogether. Since everything had Ame. everything was important and Rex revelled in
every detail of life: in love and marriage, motherhood and childhood, death and birth,
country and city, town and cathedral.
By appeali.ng to the root of human beings -- their soul -- Rex would unite all
people in peace. Rex's revolution would pring out the "Ames" in the people, for this had
been lost to them.

La, est la vraie revolution: apporter un peu de lumiere dans ces esprits, .
Ie redressement dans ces Ames; moins douter de soi; dompter l'imparfait;
se reI ever vers Ie meilleur, et vers Ie beau, et vers les autres; respirer
enfin son Ame .14
Rex's revolution was spiritual and mystical. then . The soul was a cure-all and a1:1'
inner force which led one through all trials. The soul was an inner force which would
enable all kinds of feats of courage.
L'essentiel est d'avoir; au fond.de · ~on coeur, une grande force qui
rechauffe et qui pousse en avant, qui renoue les nerfs defies, qui
fait baUre a. grands cou~s Ie sang las, qui met dans lesyeux pesants
de sonimeil.le feu qui brOle et qui conquiert.... Alors, plus rien ne
coOte, la douleur meme devient une joie, car'elle est un moyen de
plus d'elever son don, de purifier son sacrifice.15

"\,

The Rexist state;

14Degrelle, Revolution des ames. ([Paris ?L Les Editions de France, 1938), p. 155 .
l'Degrelle, Revolution des Ames. p. 6.
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Rex negates the concept of the individual and replaces it by that of 1a personne
humaine. The human persons which make up Rerist society are organized into three
.natural communities, the community of the family, the community of work, and the
community of the nation. These are hierarchically superimposed one upon another,
each being an outgrowth of the former. Within this framework, the role of the Rexist
state is to supervize, to "diriger, surveiller, stimuler, contenir" these communities. 16

Most of the actual planning and organizing is left to organizations within each
profession. 1?

The community of the family:
The family in a Rexist society is a being itself, with an !me and rights of its own .
Children are the defining element of a family -- a married couple without children is
more olan intrigue against the State's well-being than anything else, as is divorce,
Which, at any rate, is illegal -- and the State must recognize that the ideal family is a
large family, and must promote its growth through rigorous propaganda campaigns
and favorable laws. <Rexist philosophers do not consider infertility or medical
problems which might prevent child-bearing, and do not discuss adoption.) The State,
for instance, should make sure that every family has a house of its own, with a
reasonably-sized yard for c-hlldren to play in, and a large kitchen-living room to
enable the middle-class mother who canriot afford a maid to watch her children while
-

-

~

she cooks. 1S The State should also make sure that a father's salary be proportional to
how many children he had. And a family vote must be established so that every parent

16Denis, Principes rexistes. p, 121.
1"1 shall elaborate on these in my discussion of Rexist corporatism, below.
18Denis, Principes rexistes, p. 198-200. Denis does not specify who should fund the
building, nor does he' take into account, as he criticizes cramped apartment buildings.
that Belgium is one of the most populated countries in Europe yet also one of the
smallest, and that a great part of her land is productive farmland. Where is the space
for all these single family, garden-surrounded houses to come from?
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of a famille nombreuse (four or more children) receives an extra voice. Since having
children is the primary duty of a husband and wife towards the society, contraceptive
products are, of course, illegal in a Rexist state. Furthermore, the woman who
undergoes an abortion deserves capital punishment, for, not only has she murdered a
human being, but she has also committed a crime against the society of which she is a
member (by depleting it of a citizen and by committing an immoral -- and therefore
detrimental to the common good -- act).
In a Rexist society, the State's main purpose is to maintain morality, for morality
is what ensures the pure existence of la personne humaine. Since the family is the root
of all other communities, and since its morality is the baSis of sOcietal morality, it is the
family which defines the duties and laws of society as a whole. ' The State's main
purpose, therefore, is to protect the family against the evils of society, evils which are
found in the street, in publicity, pornography, entertainment, prostitution, and even
in the wQrlql1ace.
A child's innocense must be protected from anything that is odious in any way,
whether it be a turned over garbage can or nudity in pUblicity or film.19 In fact,
anything sexually explicit should not be allowed, for the morality of society is at stake.
To eradicate pornography, the worst kind of sexual explicitness, the State must
collaborate with the professional organizations of those specific spheres which
dispense the evil, Book ~d magazine sellers must decide what makes ,tJornography on
"

"'\.

paper (this being very simple; since "tout ~omme normal s'en rend tres bien compte"),
~d the S~te must seize all outlawed works and punish all recidivists. 20 In the film

industry, a State controlling commission made up of experts from the field must oversee
censorship, but recognized cinematographic organizations must be in actual charge of
19C1eaning up the streets of garbage and offensive publicity should be the job of La
Ligue des Fami11es Nombreuses. since it is children who are most in danger of
corruption from these evils. [Denis, Principesrexistes. p. 1161.
20Denis, Principes rexistes. p. 121.
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what to allow and what not to allow -- following the guidelines of pornography, films
with admission limited to those eighteen and over, and family films (for all ages).
Prostitution, a danger to the morality of all of society, cannot be directly
elliminated. However, since it results from male-female inequality and a loss of female
dignity, it can be attacked indirectly. Male privileges in regards to sexual offenses
must be taken away, and a woman must be supported by law in her complaints of sexual
abuse of any kind. In addition, the eradication of pornography in all spheres of the
public voice would eliminate a dangerous hindrance to a woman's sense of self-respect.
Lastly, every effort should be made to reinforce the family, which is the initiator of all
morality, and to provide some kind familial atmosphere for homeless girls. 21 In the
work place, too, a woman's dignity must be protected -- this, by strict separation of
sexes wherever possible. Female and male workers' changing facilities must be at
opposite ends and in totally disconnected parts of the ·building. If men and women must
work together, women's dress must follow strict rules of modesty, a separate entrance ·
i.nd staircase must be provided for them, and the common work area must be open to
the critical gazes of passers-by.22

The Rexist woman:
In its contract with society, the Rexist state's primary function is to protect the
weak: women and children. 23 Thus,. though Rexist rhetoric makes man and woman
equal, this, to us, is an old-fashioned type"of equality. The Rexist woman is'deified as
queen-mother of the household, while the Rexist man is her chivalrous guardian.
Nevertheless, the Rexist woman has some suprising privileges. Not only is she
respected before the law, but she has the right to vote. "Si on conserve Ie suffrage
21 Denis, Principes rexistes. p. 1·-H-45. Denis is not specific about what what sort of
replacement for the family should be provided.
22Denis, Principes rexistes, p. 148.
23Denis, Principes rexistes. p. 147.
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universe!, nous voulons que la mere ait une voix comme Ie pere, parce que nous
voulons temoigner notre respect ala mere. C'est la mere qui sauvera Ie pays."24 She
does not, however, have the right to run for political office (at least not for national
ofnce),2' because neither does she have the physical strength or courage to withstand
the treacherous in-fighting that goes on in Parliament, nor does she have the material
possibilities of knowing the needs of all different kinds of constituents. 26 "Oui, je
l'arfirme, une part active ne peut!tre prise par les filles d'Eve, sans entamer fortement
leur personnalite, leur coeur et meme leur devoir."2? A woman's duty is to her'
children and to her family. Thus, though limited work opportunities for women do
exist -- "ouvriere, employee, vendeuse," if unskilled, other jobs, if more skilled;29 once
she is pregnant, a woman must leave her job immediately.29 This will cause her no
financial burden, since her husband's salary begins to rise after the third child is
born. (Money for the raises comes from reductions in salaries of bachelors and
childless couples.>30
Though restrained in her emotions (she must have "un visage calme.at
souriant" and must never show her troubles),31 and though always concerned about
24Degrelle, speech atCourtrai, Nov. 2,1935, as quoted by Legros, p. 126-27.
25Rex did seem to a:110w women to enter politics on a loealleve!, at times. See, for
instance, the local newspaper Rex-belles which lists Jeanne Brasseur, a middle-aged
widow and tavern-owner, as a candidates for the·1938 elections. Perhaps the fact that
she was a widow made her candidacy acc,eptable, since she probably had grown
children and, therefore, fewer family obligations. [Rex-belles, Oct., 1938, p. 21.
26 Annie Loicq, "Les femmes e~ la politi que, " in Rex, Dec. 14, 1934, p. 18: Loicq dtles not
specify what these possibilities are that women lack and, presumably, men possess. In
addition. she speaks of different classes of constituents. when Rex is negating the very
idea of classes.
27 Annie Loieq, "Les femmes et la poHtique," in Rex. Dec. 14.1934, p.18.
28"La femme et Ie foyer," in Le Pays reel, Jan. 8,1939, p. 6.
29Female supervisors are installed in every factory in a Rexist state. They act as a
liaison between management and female workers, and keep close tabs on the health of
their female workers. especially watching for pregnancies. [jeanne Tournier. "La
famille, 1a femme ... et l'enfant [sic): surintendante d'usines," in Rex. Ju . 4.1937. p . 281.
30Denis, p. 98.
31 "De simples gestes ... qui vous feront almer [siel," in Le Pays reel. Jan . 15,1939, p. 6.
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propriety. the Rexist woman is feminine. The fact that she had to dress modestly in the
work place does not mean that she should not wear flattering clothes. As
advertisements in the Rexist women's magazine, Votre Bonheur,32 and in the special
sections for women in Rexist newspapers -- "La femme et Ie foyer" in Le Pays reeL for
instance -- prove, clothes exist which can be feminine yet practical, which allow a
woman to bathe her child in the morning and look presentable in town in the
afternoon. 33
The Rexist woman's femininity, then, is maternal. and her true calling is
motherhood. f~r. after all. "quatre a. six maternit.es sont indispensables a. une femme
normale pour eviter certains desordres [!]"34 Consequently, her true place is in the
home. Yet within the domestic sphere she has quite a lot of power. She is "gardienne
du foyer."teacher

or Catholic morality to the young. and. since children will bring

their values with them to the society as they become adults. preserver of societal
morality.35 Her vote. therefore. is a vote for the family; it is to make sure that
representatives get elected to Parliament who will enact pro-family legislation.
Likewise. while the husband ultimately controls the family's finances. the wife
controls all daily household expenditures. And were the husband to be absent from. the
family or to die. the wife would take over his familial duties; that is. she would gain
ultimate control over all the funds of the community of the family, and,would act as
representative for the family whenever'necessary.36
Such is the community 'of the family. At final view, ~xcept fo~ the 'unu'?ual
aspect of female suffrage. it is basically a traditional Catholic family . Female

32As advertized in the "La femme et Ie foyer" section ofLe Pays reel. Ap. 2,1939. p. 6.
33Rexist press carried drawings and fashion notes on these easy-to-make dresses. along
with al1 sorts of articles on tips for personal care, child upbringing, and cooking for
the family.
34 Denis. Pri~cipes rexistes. p. 206, One wonders where M got his medical information I
3'Annis Loicq, "Les femmes et la politique," in Ru.. Dec. 14.1934, p. 18.
36Denis. Principes rexistes, p.193.
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deification as protectoress of the family and of morality and the focus on children was
nothing new in the Catholic world. Equal but separate spheres for men and women was
a phenomenon Which, if beginning to fade in the early twentieth century, was
certainly prevalent in the nineteenth century. Its use by the movement is one
example of Rex turning to history for its plans for the future. Rex might have called
itself a revolution, but this revolution was more retrograde than new.

The community of work and corporatism:
If the community Of the family is the innermost ring of the three-ringed Rexist

. society, the community of work defines the middle ring. "L'entreprise est la cellule
6conomique comme la fami11e est cellule sociale."~? Moreover, if the family is the
domain of the woman, the work place is that of the man, since this is where he spends
most of his time. Although within the entre prise workers each have their .own tasks-metiers -- they are united in producing "la m6mereuvre."38 And just as the family has
a life and rights of its own. so the community of work has boundaries and privileges
which must be maintained and protected by the State. Because the State is really only a
supervisor, a liaison for negotiations with the work world must exist. In the
community of work, corporative organizations take oQ. this function.
Rex defines corporatism as "tout simple~ent une do-ctrine recherchant une
organisation economique nouvelle dan;'laquelle,contrairement a. ce qui se passe da~s
Ie 1iberalism~, Ie capital sera subordonn8 au travail:;39 As ~xtensions of the ai}eady
existing pre-corporatist "organisations professionnelles de toute espece,"40 (a concept
which enforces Rex's theory that it evolved as part of a historical continuum)
3?Streel, Positions rexistes. p. 26.
38Streel.Positions r~xistes, p, 27.
39Saint-Germain, p. 208 . The author refers here to hypercapitaiisme. or financial
capitalism, inherent, apparently. in liberalism, and which puts money (an abstract
concept) before work (the product of des personnes humaines) .
40Streel, p. 29. Streel does not specify which organizations.
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corporative corporations4 1 vill reestablish "la hierarchie sodale ... la dignite et .. . la
responsablilite personnelle."42 They vill bring order and solidarity to industry
without hindering persona1liberties. For. in a corporatist system. while organization
ensures that what is produced is for the social good. each worker can still work for his
own immediate benefit. Corporatism thus combines "fonction sociate" and
"personnalisme."43 Corporations perform another public function by acting as
qualification judges. They only bestow the title of practitioner of a metier (as opposed
to unskilled work) on those who are worthy of it. thus saving society from inept
professionals, and orily on native Belgians. thus removing the threat of take-over by
,

foreigners. 44 In addition. they make sure that preparation for entering a profession is
thorough. by demanding lengthy apprenticeships and "stages" in the specific field of
worK.45
Corporative professional organizations. as self-contained communities, are
highly structured. Local sections are represented by larger and larger groups in a
hierarchy of sub-groups. Though initiated after the elections of 1936, Rex's
Confederation Agricole Rexiste (C.A.RJ will serve as a good example of this
hierarchy.46
Rex's aim. in establishing such an agricultural organization, as defined by
Amand Geradin already before the elections, was fourfold. 4 ? Rex: wanted, first, to help
farmers become proprietors by providi~g low-interest loans payable over

an ~x:tended
""\

period of time, and .by ex:emptihg buyers of smaJ.I properties and farmers with loans

41 These are not to be confused vith business corporations.
42Denis; La Ligne gE!1lerale, p. 42.
43Denis, La Ligne generale, p. 38.
44Denis. La Ligne generale, p. 73.
4509n1s. La Ligne generale, p . 73.
46The example is tak~!1l from the "Statuts de la confederation agricole rexiste" published
in m, Oct. 23,1936, p. 22.
41"!1 faut sauveI' l'agriculture." in m Jan . 31. 1936, p . 13.
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,
from having to pay certain taxes. Second. Rex wanted to protect its farmers against
foreign competitors and big trusts by encouraging higher local production through
the use of modern materials and methods (these to be made available. again. through
credit). Third. all of these services must be controUed and implemented by a
corporative organization. And finaUy, the savings of farmers must be protected by a
"regime .repressif," i.e. one which will make it an offense to exact unnecessary taxes
from the peasantry. These were the aims. Since Rex never came fully to power. it is

.

.

impossible to know whether they wo'uld have been effective . But since the movement
didn't seem to concern itself much with that side of things. it went full steam ahead and
formed its agricultural corporation,
C.A.R.'s hierarchy consists of a Section Centrale. a Conseil Suoerieur. several
Section d'Arrondissement. and man)" Section Cantonale. each with its own leaders and
functions. DegreUe chooses the directors of the Section Centrale and approves the
nomination of lower officials. The Section Centrale acts as a liaison with other Rexist
organizations. specifically the Confederation rexiste du travail (formed on July 19.
1936)48 and the Front populaire of Rex (the organization in charge of movement
propaganda; see below. chapter on Rexist press and propaganda), as well as with the
Belgian Parliament in general. for which it must research various agricultural issues
and present relevant legislation. Within the agricultural corporation. it collects all
dues, controls·the treasur~es of allC.A.R.'Sub-group.s, and creates and organizes all the
services offered to C.A.R. members. It edits its own agricultural newspaper an~keeps
tabs on pertinent articles in other Rexist newspapers. It also publishes agricultural
and recreational journals for its members, and organizes educational congresses when
needed.

48The Confederation was set up as a general organization to protect workers' rights.
improve the intellectual. moral, and social standards of worker populations. and to
imbue workers with a sense of solidarity as they work for the general good. [SaintGermain. p. 1721.
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Seven of the directors of the Section Centrale are chosen by that body and
approved by Degrelle to form the Conseil Superieur. They are Rexist Parliamentarians
expert in agricultural matters and meet once a J;1lonth to discuss topics selected by the
Section Centrale. though they too may make suggestions. The council is a consultant
orga.njzation within the corporation. It ~oes the leg-work for research needed to be
I

done by the Section Centrale. examines and makes suggestions on proposed agricultural
reforms, and acts as a mediator between different agricultural interests.
The third body. the Section d' Arrondissement, is the equivalent of the Section
Centrale at a lower level. It is made up of representatives of all the cantons within the
arrondissement. Its leaders are chosen by all representatives and are approved by the
director of the arrondissement council (his own nomination approved by Degrelle) and
by the Sectlon Centrale. They meet on their own once a month and make reports to
their superiors once every three months. They conduct research on local agricultural
problems and suggest appropriate reforms to the Section Centrale.
Finally, under them fall the Section Cantonale from all over the country. Every
Rexist farmer is a member of his Section Cantonale. The body appoints a President, one
or two Vice-Presidents. a treasurer. and a secretary, all of whom are first approved by
both the Section d'Arrondissement director and the Section Centrale. These leaders
meet every two weeks. while the entire body must only come together once a year. The
.
committee's functions are those of the arrondissement on a smaller scale. In. addition
.
members must recruit other members, propigate Rexis~ press and thought, an?
encourage use of Rexist services. They must also organize themselves
into
recreational
,
and sport groups for entertainment. Though subject to the Section d'Arrondissement.
they may appeal directly to the Section Centrale with problems.
Corporative organizations, then, group together workers and leaders of one
profession. They are hierarchically structured and geographically decentralized,
although individual farmers may appeal directly to the corporative directors. (One can
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imagine, however, that he would be sent back to his local committee before his
concerns would be acted upon.> Their functions are social within the movement. and
political outside of the movement. They create a self-contained community for their
member farmers, and act as their representatives before the nation's Parliament and
Executive. In the context of political checks and balances, they are a check on
Executive authority.

The community of the nation:
Corporative bodies are a crucial part of the overall structure of the nation. They
are one of three Systems which- make up the State, Parliament and the Executive being
the other two. Rexist society is, as defined by Rex, liberal-authoritarian. It takes the
element of order-- consented to by the people because it is for the common good -from dictatorship, but continues to allow for individual initiative, as in a liberal
society.49 Control doesn't mean nationalization: "L'Etat do it m6me contrOler la f~i1le
et chaque personne en particulier, mais il ne dolt pas les nationaliser."50 This,
especially, in light of the fact that nationalization is a Socialist and Communist concept
and, as such, completely antithetical to Rex. (Of course. there is an awfully fine line
between control for the common good and control for the sake of control.

Re~ist

philosophy is vague enough to avoid commenting on this dail'gerJ
The only person who seems to be 'able to walk the tight-rope between
-dictatorship and "good" control is a king, for a king is the representative of aU")he

49S aint-Germain. p. 209.
'0Denls, La Liane g(merale. p. 91 .
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people, an emblem of an e~tire nation and, therefore, of unity.,1 The contract between
king and people is a natural one, founded on patriotism and mutual love.
Le Roi c'est l'element d'unite, de continuite splendide. Celui qui
dans les moments difficiles, quand une decision d'importance dolt
etre prise, peut et doit poser a. son peuple la question de confiance
~us forme de question d'atta.chement et d'amour.52
Monarchical power emanates from the people, for "la puissance appartient au peuple et
Ie pouvoir appartient au Roi."'3 The king can take large liberties in his actions and is
in fact responsible for h~sh punishment when necessary. but he is not all-powerful
and is not in direct control of every function of the State. With the advice of private
industrial corporations: he appoints-various corporative councils to represent the
community of work before the State. (Note that since the king in a Rexist society
chooses the corporative councils, the very bodies which will counter his power, he
must always be benevolent and must never harbor wishes of personal aggrandisement
-- a very utopian and rare situation.) The king also chooses ministers to advise him on
different political issues. These career politicians (as opposed to specialists in the area
of a department who have little or no political experience) must have an affinity for
good behaviour and for exemplary composure: "Ie ministre doit etre un homme qui
physiquement en impose a. son entourage.",4 Though balanced out by the corporative
councils, the king and hisministers nevertheless sit above them in the hierar.chy of
the State. One of the most important powers of the king and his ministers is to decide
which questi!>ns are beyond tb,e competence of corporative councils and must'""'ee
resolved by referendum. (Referendum is also. of course. a way of giving voice to the
51Rex's monarchism came from Charles Maurras and his Action francaise movement.
Though Maurras himself was condemned by the Church in 1926. his theories continued
to strongly influence many Belgian students after that date. including those who later
formed Rex. The exact relationship between Action francaise and Rexist ideology is
unfortunately beyond the limitations of this thesis, and would be a fascinating topic for
a later article.
J. Carlier. "Vers 1a 'reforme de l'Etat," in Rex, Aug. 21, 1936, p. H.
'3Denis, Bases doctrinale de Rex, p. 29 .
'4Denis, Princioes rexistes, p. 55-56 .
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whole population at once.) Neither the king, nor his ministers, nor even Parliament,
however, initiate legislation: it is the corporative councils at the State level (those
appointed by the king) which draw up the laws.
In following with Rexist emphasis on hierarchy, legislation becomes official
only after having ascended through many levels of selection. Proposals for legislation
are submitted to the councils by the corporative association of the profession
concerned. The corporative councils then screen the proposals and prepare first drafts
of laws. Their version is in turn passed on up to a Conseil d'Etat, "... sarte de commission
juridique superieurei charge de la toilette juridique du proret et de sa coordination avec
la legislation existante."55 Only once it has been successfully subjected to the scrutiny
of this committee can a proposed law be ratified by Parliament and implemented by the
appropriate ministry.
The Parliament in a Rexist state, then, is rather minor. Although it is a body
elected by absolute universal suffrage and is, therefore, directly representative of the
people, it has been greatly reduced in number and in function. Its only roles are to
pass.budgets, ratify laws, and control the general politics of the State by acting as a
check on the Executive. 56
Punishment of crimes is left to a separate judiciary body. The role of this
"Justice humaine"57 is pedagogical:.to teach the populace, through example. about the
consequences of illegality .. Capital puni~hment ought frequently to be used. for it is
"une simple operation chirugi'Cale" which cleanses s~ciety of an

unne~essa.ry1vil.58

55J. Carlier, "Vers la reforme de fEtat," in Ra. Aug. 21. 1936. p. 13.
56Car10s Leruitte, "Pour un corporatisme liberateur," in Ra Feb. 28, 1936, p. 13.
Leruitte writes that corporation leaders should not be members of Parliament. for this
would be spreading politics into non-political realms (as the politico-financiers had
done). The Status de fa Confederation Agricole Rexiste. however, specifically mentions
that the seven members of the Conseil Superieur are Parliamentarians interested in
agricultural matters. [See abovel. Such contradictions are frequent in Rexist
philosophy.
'7Denis, Principes rexistes, p. 62.
'SDenis, Principes rexistes, p. 62.
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In gene.ra1"chaque verdict [doit depasserl toujours par sa valeur exemplaire et
preventive les individualites qui font leur objet."59 The judiciary, too, has its own
corporative organization, a Chambre judiciaire with representatives from all levels of
the nation's magistrature as well as from the assemblies of lawyers, attorneys, clerks,
etc. 60 Like any other professional corporation, the Chambre ;udiciaire has full control
of its own workings and remains totally independent of whatever regime is in power -thereby preventing blackmail or corruption of one of the most important lawenforcing bodies of the Rexist nation.
This diversification of duties and assigning of tasks to expert committees allows
the Rexist government -- the king and his ministers -- to concentrate on more all- .
encompassing issues. The government must sustain the unity of all classes, religions,
and cultures within the nation. It must engage in a foreign policy always favorable to
national interests. It must promote tourism from within through education, and from
without through propaganda. It mu~, especially, uphold "une BONNE ADMINISTRATION,
econome, expeditive, disciplinee, tout entiere devouee au bien commun."61 For the
government represents the State, the common good of the State, and the national unity
of the State. And on a broader scale, the government also represents the nation. 62 As
such it is, in essence, the emblem of patriotism.
Rexist patriotism harkens back to the past, specifically to the revolotion of 1830,
when all of Belgium, no ma.t ter what claSs, religion, or culture, came together to fight
for independence. (Rex, of course, only sees the united part of the tevolutionind
ignores the fact that it was sparked by a resurgence of the liberalism begun in the
French revolution, an event which Ret categorically condemns.) It is the State's role,
59Denis, Principes rexistes, p. 62.
60Denis, Principes rexistes, p. 67.
61Denis, Bases doctrinales de Rex, p. 30-31.
62Here, I am defining the State as the bureaucratic and political structure within the
nation, which is the larger, more abstract entity which holds not only the State but also
the concept of patriotism and, if existent, nationalism.
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or rather, the role of the military and of community groups supervized by the State, to
im.bue patriotism -- appreciation of the value of submitting to order and authority to
'uphold the common good -- in the hearts of young Belgians.63 Both men and women
must devote one year of their early adult life to community service: men, in army
training, women, in community help (notice the traditional gender roles). For all
citizens must, at some point in their lives, experience commonality by being reduced to
"un strict commun d~nominateur."64 That is, they must realize that everyone is a
personne humaine and has an ame. This concept of commonality does not, however,
preclude the natural hierarchies defined in Rexist philosophy, e.g. the system of
professional corporations, where each committee answers to the professional
assoc1ation(s) above it. While being reduced to total equality with co-trainees teaches
appreciation of the" common" part of the common good, hierarchical order is the only
way to assure that citizens and citizen-groups will work for the "good" of the common
good. In their one year of service, then, young Belgians learn
... ce que c'est vraiment la discipline, ce que c'est que 1a hierarchie,
ce que c'est materiellement que la responsabilite d'un grade, ce que
c'est que la so1idarit~, simplement humaine, ce que c'est que l'esprit
de corps.65
Rexist patriotism also appeals to the sentimentality of all Belgians, young and
old. There is an "EquiHbre myst~rieux entre un sol et nos forces secretes fhumaines]'''
'w rites Degrelle. 66 Ju~ as every being, ~ving or non-living, has an !me. so the love of
every a.me is necessary for true
, patriotism, for "C'est cela aussi, la pierre. Ie fe'$.et
. ia
toile transfigures par Ie genie de notre peuple qu'il faut regarder, pour retrouver la

63The military is autonomous in a Rexlst society and is solely responsible for national
defense . Parliament and other government bodies have little if no say in military
matters.
64Denis, Principes rexistes, p. 70.
6'Denis, Principes rexistes, p. 70.
66Degrel1e, Revolution des a.mes. p. 13.
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Patrie .. ."6? Rexist patriotism. therefore. binds all Belgians. no matter what class.
religion. or culture. into one whole. Yet it does this. it affirms. without hindering the
individual developments of different peoples. In Rexist society. there is cultural
autonomy within political unity.
Cultural federalism is Rex's answer to cultural individuality and need for selfexpression. Cultural federalism gives Flanders and Wallonie (and. to some extent. the
German-speaking areas in the east) the autonomy they want. without threatening the
splitting up of the nation into different states. In cultural federalism. each language
group has its own ministry of education. of culture. and of other specifically
indigenous areas of interest. All official transactions are performed in the original
language of the- area (flemish in the north. French in the south. German in a small
part of the east). except for Brussels. where both French and Flemish should be used.
Children in schools learn only their native language. for. Rex argues. a worker in the
south of Belgium has no opportunity to speak with someone from the north anyway.68
The State must encourage each culture to propagate itself, though only within the set
boundaries of its geography. Once established in this system. Rexists insist, the Flemish
will soon realize the magnificence of national unity and will discard their thoughts of

separatism and of political. as well as cultural. autonomy.69
Rexist philosophers hesitated to call their partriotism nationalism -- in fear. it
seems, of being compared to the contemporary Fascist and National-Socialist forms of
~

nationalism. ' Legros dared to use the term but carefully qualified it: "Si 1'on veut. c'est
du nationalisme. parce que c'est une ideologie de la patrie. non au sens pejoratif du mot
6i'Degrel1e. Revolution des Ames. p. 107.
68This philosophy ignores the possibility of mobility and assumes that everybody stays
in place . It is based on the ideology of the everlasting and never-changing Rexlst
community. one in which everyone wishes to remain,
69Saint-Germain. p. 206. This is a questionable assertion. especially in light of the 1936
VNV-Rex agreement which failed precisely because the Flemish nationalists. VNV.
came to the conclusion that Rex would not support it in its efforts to form its own
Flemish state. (See the second chapter on chronology. following) .
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[probably an allusion to dictatorial German and Italian types of nationalism] mais avec
une juste notion de la hierarchie des valeurs." 70 Rex was aware of this comparison
and constantly asserted its originality. The Rexist professional corporative association,
for example, "ne sera rien comparable au fantOme de corporatisme cree en Italie ou en
Allemagne; Belges nous sommes, Belges nous resterons ... "?1 Rex always denied being
dictatorial and did not allow any kind of violence in its political action (even Rexist
security forces were forbidden fro.m carrying self-defensive weapons).?2 Aware of
being accused of HiUerian or MussoHnian kind of dictatorship; it made special effortS to
deny the charges: "Nous ne sommes ni en Alle.magne, ni en Russie. ni en Italie, ni au
Mexique .... Nous ne voulons pas de dictature, ni avouee, ni camouflee.

L~

peuple,

souverain, doit choisit ses mandataires en toute Hberte."73 Though order, cleanliness
("propete," in the general and specific sense of the word), and authority govern Rexist
society, they do not and will not lead to dictatorship.74 (On the other hand, there is a
fine line between the two which Rexist philosophy does not ad.mit. If order and
authority can exist separately from dictatorship in theory, in practice they rarely do.>
Yet Degrelle and the Rexist movement were nevertheless fascinated by both the
HiUerian and the Mussolinian State and did, in fact, keep up relations -- even if
clandestine -- with both regimes. A briefstudy of these relations, as well as those
between Rex and Spain follows.

70Legros, p. 232.
71 Carlos Leruitte, "Le Rasse.mbIe.ment populaire de Liege Ie 9 fevrier 1936," in ~ Jan:
31, 1936, p.l).
?2Since the war and his experience as an SS officer, Degrelle has lauded both Hitler and
fascism, the first as a genious and the second as a saving ideology whose influence still
reigns today (though he doesn't specify) . IDegrelle, Hitler pour 1000 MS. p. 2271.
13Raphael Sindic, "Pour une democratie libre et propre!" in Rex, Jan. 31, 1936, p. 18 . Of
course. Rexist writers find the trick useful and themselves accuse their enemies of
espousing totalitarian tactics, e.g. "Chronique du totalitarisme: un totalitarisme
anonyme et sans grandeur" on Pri.me Minister Van Zeeland and his cabinet, in
Ju. 4, 1937, p. 7.
74Daye, p. 20.
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Rex and the Third Reich:
Hiller came to power in January, 1933, when Rex was not yet a real movement
and Degrelle was still worlting for the AClB. There could not have been an immediate
impact on Rex, therefore, but there could have been a long term impact. By the time
Rex had become a movement and, later, a political party, it had had time to observe the
new regime in Germany and to absorb or reject elements from Nazi ideology and
practice.' As will be discussed in the next chapter, Degrelle himself was fascinated by
the way HiUer 'came to power through a "legal" coup d'etat. Though it is really only
during and after the war that Degrelle openly expressed his admiration (or even
passion) for the Fuhrer, in the development stages of the movement some influences
were alS9 felt.
Through the efforts of the Reich delegation to Brussels, a few Rexist leaders did
actually come into can, tact with Nazi leaders before 1940. Only a few months after
HiUer's coming to power, Degrelle and two of his journwst colleagues were invited by
the delegation to visit Germany and to write a feature article on the new regime in the
Rex editions journal Soirees. In Berlin between April 29 and May 3,1933, the three
journalists met with M. Braun von Stumm, press counselor to the Reich ministry of
foreign affairs, who undoubtedly gave them the tour and anwered the appropriate
_ questions.?5 Though there doesn't see~-to be any evidence that Degrelle openly
"\

applauded the Nazi regime in these early years, the fact that the German delegation
took the initiative in organizing the excursion proves that Degrelle must have, at least,
given the impression of thinking favorably of the system. Yet. in 1933 Rex as a
movement did not exist. and the Reich regime saw mUe point in supporting a lone
journalist like Degrelle who, even if sympathetic, had no power. Only onc.e Rex had

i'5Emile Krier, "Le Rexisme et l'Al1emagne 1933-1940: une documentation," in Cahiers
d'histoire de la seconde guerre mondiale (Bruxel1es, CREHSG, 1978:5),p. 178.
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declared itself political and had started publishing Le Pays reel would the Reich renew
its ovations towards Degrelle.
Though these advances were purposely restrained in order not to thwart Rex's
possibilities for power by angering the Belgian government too much, the German
government did welcome prominent Rexist leaders intO its country. On August 12, 1936,
the Brussels industrialist and financial consultant to Degrelle, Gustave Wyns, met with
von Stumm and other propaganda officials to discuss the sale (at an "among friends"
price) of German printing machines to Rex -- in which effort he failed. In late
Summer-early fall of that same year, the Rexist senator Xavier de Hemricourt de
Grunne made a visit to Germany to observe their educational system. The reason why
the only government official he met with was a Dr. Holthofer, press director for the
mining association of Essen, remains unc1ear.?6 Pierre Daye, another Rexist
Parliamentarian, was Hitler's guest of honor for the Parteitag in 1936, and later
(begining December 8,1936) led a series of conferences in Berlin on "Rex et revolution
de la politique beIge."??

-

But it is Degrelle's trip of September, 1936 which received the most publicity at
home. Between September 2:; and 26 Degrelle, his wife, Gustave Wyns and his wife, and
Pierre Daye met in Berlin with Otto Abetz, director of French and Belgian affairs in the
office of Dienststelle Ribbentrop (later the foreign ministry), von Ribbentrop, and,
finally, Hitler himself.?8 Discussion foc~Sed mostly on Belgo-German affairs,
.

"\

specifically a,bout setting up a meeting between Hitler and Belgian King Leopold to
arrange the giving back of the German-speaking Eupen-Malmedy region to

16Krier, p. 182.
??Krier, p. 183.
?8Degrelle at first denied having made the visit to Berchtesgarten, but then, under
pressure from press attacks withi.n Belgium, he admitted to it. The admission was
undoubtedly one of the reasons for his downfall in 1937. (See next chapter).
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Germany.i'9 The Rexist group also.came away with 250,000 RM,80 a sum which could be
used only within Germany -- not a problem for Rex, since Gustave Wyns entertained
close relations with Otto Abetz and with Dr. Max Winkler, director of the press supply
association, Cautio, under the Reich ministry of Propaganda, and directed both as to
how he wished the money to be disposed of. 81 Later that fall; DegreUe met with
Goebbels, though it is unclear what the exact intention of the visit was.
Reich support for Rex was only intensely sustained between 1936 and 1937,·that
is, during the years when Rex was thriving and looked like a profitable aUy for the
Nazi regime. 82 After the failure of DegreUe in the 1937 elections and after the
dissolution of the accord between Rex and the flemish nationalists, Reich monetary and
political support drastically diminished. DegreHe's capabilities as the Belgian politician
of the future were doubted, and when DegreUe once again visited Germany in early
1938, he met with no important officials. 83 Only the war would return Nazi support to
Rex

mfull force.
Rex, then, was backed politically and financially by the Nazi regime. 84 What

about ideologically? There were obvious similarities between Rexism and Nazism. Both
wanted order and were authoritarian (if not dictatorial), both were anti-Communist,
both were

populis~

(claiming all act..ions were for the common good), and both were

19Krier, p. 184. The fact that Hitler suddenly made Degrelle an official represe1tative
of the monarchy is puzzling. Did he really think that the .king would concur with
DegreUe's plans, let alone listen to his advice? At least in this instance, Hitler lacked a
flair for etiquette in foreign affairs.
eODegrelle still denies ever having had financial relations of any sort with the Reich.
[Charlier, p. 174].
81 Krier, p. 181 & p. 186. Under pressure from Gustave Wyns, Wi.nk1er also raised for Rex
some 30,000 to 35,000 RM among private friends in 1936-37. [Krier, p. 1861.
82See next chapter for the chronology of these events.
83Krier, p. 192.
84Dr. Winkler seems to have been able to collect among private circles some 30,000 to
35,000 RM extra for Rex. [Krier, p. 1861.
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corporatist. But the race factor vas not an element in pre-war Rexist ideology, whUe
the Catholic Church ~.
Though Rex did talk. a lot about the supposed Judeo-Communist plot underway in
Belgium, it did not have a systematic program of anti-semitism comparable to the Nazi's,
and was not expressed until the late '30s. Rex's anti-semitism was more economic than
racial. Rexists believed that the State should have an official policy of anti-semitism in
order to protect Belgian workers and to prevent spontaneous and violent anti-semitic
accurances.
11 y aura un antisemistisme d'Etat raisonnable, humaiil et juste ou
ily aura un antisemitisme incontrolable, capable des pires exces ....
Ce n'est pas parce qu'on aime ou qu'on n'aime pas les jUlls qu'U faut
s'occuper d'eux; c'est parce qu'lls risquent de provoquer des perturbations economiques, sociales etmorales, prejudiciables au Bien
Commun. 85
Of course, anti-semitism is anti-semitism, no matter for what reason. Yet; in talking
about ideology and ideological influences, distinctions have to be made. The fact that
Rex waited so'long to formulate its ideas on anti-semitism seems to imply that it did not
initially consider anti-semitism an issue, and only drew up a proposal because it felt
pressured by the contemporary situation (specifically, anti-semitic policies in
Germany) to come up with an opinion.

..

Whereas Nazism opposed established religions, Rex was founded by one -Roman Catholicism -- and, though separa:ted from the establishment of the Church, still
operated within the 'context of ,its ideology. From the very beginning, Rexist a$ic:1es
denounced Reich policies tovards the Church, and attacks continued up until the
war. 86 It was'only during,the war that Rexist anti-semitism became more overt. 81

85 Jose Streel. "Antisemitisme d'Etat," in Le Pays ree1.1an. 31. 1939, p. 6.
86Etienne, p. 111.
81Discussion on this subiect is beyond the limitations of this thesis. I await with
anticipation to read what Mr. Convay has to say about this issue in his soon-to-bepublished dissertation on Rex during the var.
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These two factors especially, as well as the threat of invasion by the
increasingly powerful Reich, separated Rexism from Nazism. This is not to say that
Degrelle and Rex were not greatly influenced by the'regime, They were, But one
cannot go the next step to say that pre-war Rex was simply Belgian Nazism,

Rex and Mussolini's Italy:
Neither can one say that Rex was the Belgian twin of MussoHni's Fascism. As
with Nazism, there were ideological, political, and financial relations between Rex and
Fascist Italy, In fact, Rex felt more of a correspondence with Italy than with GerPlany,
These can easily be explained by the simple fact that MussoHni was less of a threat than
"

Hitler was. Degrelle himself admits that "le Duce n'avaint pas la moindre idee d'une
expansion aux depens de la Belgique .... Mussolini ne s'interessait qu'a la Mediterranee
et a l'Mrique .... Iilternationalement,la collaborariotn italo-belge etait sans
problemes."88 Italy was also Latin, and since France had lost its favor with the Rexists
with the advent of the leftist Front Populaire and the pact with the USSR, Italo-Belgian
latinity could be seen as a barrier against a German cultural invasion ,89 Furthermore,
as a Catholic, Mussolini was respected among.qu.ite a few Catholic circles in Belgium,
and very important for Degrelle was the fact that the Duce had good relations with, if
not actu~lly controlled, the Vatican. Mussolini was able, it seems, to prevent a
_condemnation by the Pope of Rex, as requested by.the Cardinal Van Roey in December,
"'\,

88Charlier, p', 178.
89£tienne, p. I H. The idea of a cultural threat was probably fairly sincere since,
though friendly with the ReiCh, Rex still wanted to keep its political and cultural
autonomy, (During and after the war, Degrelle repeatedly justified his relations with
Hitler as a way of assuring Belgian autonomy within a New Order Europe,) PUZZling
about this theory, outlined by Jose Streel in an article in Ru on AprilS, 1938 is that it
excluded the non-Latin, Flemish Belgians whom Rex so much wanted as allies, and
thereby made Rex appear more like a Walloon movement than a Belgian one, True,
Streel wrote the article in 1938, after the failure of the pact with the Flemish
nationalists (see next chapter), but it is doubtful that the idea of brotherhood in latinity
was a new theory, It is more likely that Streel simply overlooked the inconsistency
with Rexist ideology -- easy to fall into, since Rex really was more Walloon than
Flemish .
'
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1936.90 In his interview with Jean-Michel Charlier, Degrelle describes the event in
dramatic detail: how he telephoned the Duce immediately upon hearing about the plan
(how he heard, he does not teU us), how Mussolini told him to come directly to Rome,
how the former then settled the affair by simply ordering the Vatican not to act upon
this rumor, how Degrelle was then escorted to the Vatican. in Mussolini's private
!imosine, and how nobody ever found out about the trip because Degrelle was flown to
France by an Italian military plane and then made his way to Belgium secretly. 91 No
matter whether this account is accurate or not, it seems that the Duce cared enough
about having Degrelle as an ally to protect hiin.
Formal relations between the two leaders began directly after Rex's success in

1936. with an invitation to Degrelle from Mussolini. DegreUe claims to have spent "une
huitaine de jours passionnants. presque familiaux. puisqu'il m'a annonce lui-meme la
naissance de ma rille Anne. a. qui fai donne Ie prenom de sa derniere fiUe

a. lui."

Eight

days is an unusually long time for an importantpolitica1leader like Mussolini to spend
with a "brand-new" political leader like Degrelle. and one wonders where all of the
fatherliness associated with DegreUe went. if he deemed it more important to visit the
Duce than to be near his wife at the imminent time of birth .92 At any rate, however
formal or close. a friendship between the two was established from 1936 on: "j'avais
aussit6t trouvee.n Mussolini un ami veritable qui m'a toujo·urs conseille. guide,
m'offrant spontanement de mepreter de'l'argent." affirms Degrelle. 93 As will be
~

,

disclJssed in a. later chapter, Mussolini al1ow~d Deg-relle to make some speeches on Turin
radio in January, 1937, after the Rexist leader was denied radio-time in Belgium.
Between 1936 and 1937 (that is. ~hen Rex was at its height) Rex also received much
90Charlier. p. 176.
91Charlier, p. 177-78.
920f course, it was still not the custom for the husband to be on-hand at a birth itself in
1936, but, nevertheless. one might expect such a professed father as Degrelle to at least
stay in the same country where his wife was.
93Charlier, p. 175.
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financial support from the Italian Fascists -- about 2'0.000 FB per month. or a total of 19
million FB.94 Mussolini seems to have been somewhat of an advisor to Degrelle on how
to manage relations with Hitler. as well. and, hating the Germans. according to
Degrelle. forwarned the Rexist leader against their powers -- warnings which. as seen.
Degrelle ignored. The friendship was most likely reinforced by the alliance between
Germany and Italy which began to develop in September, 1937 when Mussolini visited
HiUer in Germany. and became concrete in the pact on May 22.1939. 95 For. uRex
wanted to keep on good terms with HiUerian Germany. it would have to stay especially
friendly 'with the Reich's major ally.

Rex and Spain:
As for the other Latin country with sympathies towards Rex, relations seem to
have been 10v-key. Degrelle supported franco and saw in him one of the great
conquerors of Communism. After aten-day 'visit with the Spanish leader in February,
1939. for instance. he wrote an article-1n Le Pays reel entitled "Larin des Rouges."96 In
1937-38 he used the Spanish civil war to bring accusations against the Belgian
government for its military support to the Republicans. Degrelle claims to have been
named "no. I de la Phalange de l'exterieur" by the Phalangist leader Jose Antonio Primo
de Rivera in 1934.91 but, though some Rexists were part of the French Fascist Drieu La
Rochelle's forces in the Bale~ric islands:98 there were no organized Rexist troops in
,

'

.

~

94 Degrelle's.assertion that the' money vas spontaneously offered seems exaggerated.
Intermediaries like the Count Galeazzo Ciano probably repeatedly asked Mussolini on
the Rexist leader's behalf, The figure of 250,000 FB per month is one noted in Ciano's
agenda of August, 1931'. The second figure is that of Count de Grunne who wrote of two
million FB per month over a period from August, 1936 to April, 1937. [Krier, p. 183-84J.
95Robert Demoulin, "La Pre sse liegeoise et la politique italienne du 25 septembre 1937 a
la signature du pacte d'acier du 22 mai 1939," in Michel Dumoulin and Jacques
Willequet, Aspect des relations de la Belgique. du Grao.d-Duche de Luxembourg et des
Pays-Pas avec !'Italie: 1925-1940 (Bruxelles, Istituto italiano di cultura, 1983). p. 125 .
96£tieno.e, p. 116. .
.
9?Degrelle, Hitler pour 1000 ans , p. 64.
98£tieno.e, p. 116.
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Spain. (Rex didn't have an armed brigade of any sort until the SS-WaUonie in WWIU
There is no evidence that Rex received financial support from Franco either.
Relations, then, were rather distant before the war. 99

Conclusion:
What can one say about Rexist ideology and other Fascist ideology? It is evident
that Degrelle and other Rexist leaders were fascinated by Nazism and Italian Fascism,
and that they did have contact with the propounders of these doctrines. But whether
the Rexists, or at least Degrelle, had an in depth knowledge of either ideology is
questionable. First of all, DegreUe (and probably other Rexists as welD did not read
either German or Italian before the war. Then again, not many people read Mein
Kampf anyway, and since Rex insiste9 that its ideology was new and, in the beginning,
denied having relations with the Nazis, there was no compelling reason to study Nazi or
Italian Fascist writings. Like everybody else, Rex learned about the two regimes
through the press and through observation. It had a fairly peripheral understanding
of the ideologies and COUld, therefore, borrow from them without much thought as to
what the implications of a certain section were, or whether the particular ideology
made any sense for Belgium.
Rex was attracted by 'the trappings of Nazism and Italian Fascism -- by the

a~thority, the order, the hierarchy, and"aU the dramatic stagings whiCh symbolized
"'\.

these aspects (a podium for DegreUe, for instance, with other leaders behind him on a
lower step and the crowd far below them both, suggesting a hierarchy of authority) .1O?
Rex then tried to incorporate this paraphernalia into its own ideology, all the while
insisting that it was original. yet not making much effort to disguise the acts which

99Not so after the war. Franco welcomed a wounded Degrelle who was trying to escape
the allies in 1945, gave him a false passport. and probably supported him financially .
Degrelle stiHlives in Spain .
100S ee chapter on De grelle , section on him as orator, below,
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were distincUy Nazi and/or Italian Fascist. The Rexist arm gesture, for instance, was an
.a rm thrust forward with a hand open and facing downward. Rex described it as a "geste
du bras tendu dans Ie signe du serment et ... Ia main ouverte dans Ie signe de la
fraternite."101 Rex was trying to make the gesture uniquely Christian and Rexist, but it
was obviously drawn direcUy from the Nazi salute.
Thus, I would argue, Rexist ideology learned much from Nazi and Italian Fascist
ideology. But it learned not in an academic way, but more through osmosis, as it were.
through observation and casual borrowing of their dramatics and rhetoric. Perhaps
one of the reasons for Rex's failure (and there are several) was because it did not take
the time to consider the real basis of all the external appearances of Nazism and Italian
Fascism. and did not make the effort to truly adapt their ideology to the Belgian
situation.

.' .

101 Degrelle and Denis. Rex. Renaissance de la Patrie (Brux .. Editions Rex, 1940), no page
numbers.
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Chapler three

•••
ChroaololY: ReI in Parliament

Having outlined Rexist ideology, I now continue with the narration of events.
The first chapter discussed Rex in its pre-phase (when still but a group of students at
L'Ayant-Garde and then at the ACjBl, Rex in its first phase (from when Degrelle took
over Rex editions to when the group broke with the ACjBl, and Rex in its second phase
_(from the break with Catholic action up to the coup de CourtraD. Courtrai marked the
beginning of the third and most important phase of Rex: when it turned from being a
non-political protector of the Church to becomin.g a political attacker on_ ~e Catholic
Party, a guardian against corruption, and a defender of mo.ra1ity. In this phase, Rex
would break off from the Catholic Party for good and would f.arm its own political
movement-party.1 Elements of this phase would last throughout the rest of Rexist
history, butthe glories of Rex would end with De grelle ,s electoral failure in 1937.
Phase four, then, is the period spanning 1937 to the German invasion on May 10, 1940 -the perio4 of Rex's downfall.

In preparation for the elections: the scandals:
The decision to enter formal politics was a very rushed one. The success of
Courtrai lead directly into a massive, pre-election propaganda campaign against
Catholics, first, and against other established parties, later. One may well wonder at this
sudden declaration of politicization. It SQ,ems unlikely that Degrelle would have been so
- foolish as to ~ntentionally postpone political preparation until the last moment. Of
course, it is true that he managed to take the country by storm with his amazing
propagandistic talents. Yet six months was really a very limited time in which to
inform the public at large (not just already loyal Rexists) about a totally new political
party. The decision must have been a last minute one, then, prompted by the success at
1I refer to Rex in Parliament as a movement-party in defference to Rexist rhetoric.
which rejected the very institution of political party as societally separatist and
i.nsisted that Rex before 1936 and after 1936 was the same, that it was simply acting
within another sphere, a political one.
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Courtrai and Degrelle's own impatient ambitions for the movement. For Degrelle EM
taking a tremendous risk and he must have been extraordinarily self-confident and
visionary to make the attempt. If Rex had lost the elections or received much less than
it did. it would have been ignored as simply one of the many other extremist parties
whi~h

were gaining ground in mid 1930s Belgium. But the Rexist leader did have a

fondness for the grand and. once he had set his mind on something, he could rarely be
dissuaded from it. By December. 193'. he was quite sure about wanting to make his
movement into a movement-party. Rather a show-off as he was. he was determined to
use every personal skill he had to make his movement succeed.
Since propaganda through scandal-raising seemed to be his and the movement's
forte, Rex soon launched into a series ofvigorous attacks upon the Establishment.
Though many of these cases exposed genuine problems with the operation of the
nation, their purpose vas, most definitely. to draw attention to the movement and
gather supporters. Judging from the results of the elections. the technique was quite
successful.
On November 11. 193'. Degrelle organized a huge gathering in direct response
to Courtrai. It was to be the first of a long succession of meetings attac.k.ing politkofinanciers. politicians who. beside their necessary political ties. held immoral
affiliations with
quarter. 2 Degrelle. as usual, planned the event very
. the financial
.
well. Hls very choice of the day was clever; for. being Armistice Day, almost all·
..~

.

Belgians would have a holiday 'and would be more inclined to attend the meeting
(though it was, in any case, held in the evening). In addition. th~ Rexist leader had had
the meeting very well publicized and on the said day the Brussels Palais des Sports was
stock full. "Le succes etait complet. Rex et son Chef recueiUaient une ovation inconnue

21.0 1934. En had published a few short notices about politico-financiers in F.rance, as
this one: "THIVRIER. depute sociaIiste, possede deux chateaux a Montassiege (Allier) et
un troisieme chateau ala Motte-Beuvron." [lila politi que au ra1ent1: Place aux pauvres."
in Rex-Vlan , M.r. 30, 1934. .00.12, p. 11 J.
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en Belgique jusqu'alors pour un mouvement politique," wrote Legros optimistically.3
The audiences paid an entrance fee (probably between S FB and 10 FB) and the total sum
collected apparently covered the 100,000 FB budget allotted for the occasion by Degrelle,
with a surplus of 7000 FB, as well!4 Though it is virtually impossible to estimate how
many Rexists were won over on this one day, one can assume -- in view of the heat
surrounding the Courtrai affair, and judging from the increasing popularity of Rexist
mee,tings -- that Degrelle's dramatic and emotional performance certainly worked its
charms on a fair amount of the attending petit peugle.
Degrelle must have been urged on by this success, for he continued to expose
scandal after scandal. The distinction between political man and financial man was one
that all Rexists adamantly upheld.

Le politique et Ie financier sond deux hommes differents: s'ils se
confondent, celui-ci a toutes chances de temporter sur celui-l3,: la
sincerite des idees disparait et, 1a faiblesse humaine aidant, des
compromissions tentatrices risquent de faires succomber bien des
bonnes volontes ..5
Alongside the whole campaign against politico-financiers. the campaign against big
capitalistS. in general. followed logically. Jean Denis called "l'homme d'affaire" the
most repugnant bandit of his era.; a man who. undoubtedly. also had political dealings
and who regularly usurped industrialists and "Ie petit peuple travailleur" for his own
profit. 6 Such men ought to be dealt with: harshly: "Hyenes puantes et tepugnants
"

chacals. Et va us savez Ie moyen dont on se d6barra.sse des hyenes et des chac~"?

3Usmard Legros, Un Homme. un chef. Leon Degrelle (Bruxelles. Editions Rex. 1938). p.
129.
•
4Degrelle made this claim in his interviews with M. Charlier. However. he also
confused this meeting with a series of six meetings he held in 1937 -- Les Six Tours de
Rex: so one must be wary of his assertions. [Jean-Michel Charlier, Leon Degrelle :
Persiste et signe: interviews recuei11ies pour la television francaise par ... (Paris.
Editions Jean Picollec. 1985). p. 104. (See note 27 for dollar equivalents).
'Jacques Saint-Gemain. La Batai11e de Rex (Paris. _ _ .1937). p. 33-34.
6Jean Denis. La Ligne generale (Bruxelles, Editions Rex, [1935-19377]), p. 83.
7Denis. p.84.
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Early in 1936. Rex began attacks against Socialist party "banksters." as the
vrongdoers soon came to be caUed. By january 31. 1936, Rex vas carrying long articles
vith bold headlines like "Le brigandage des politiciens socialistes un scandale: les 3000
millions de la banque du travail. Des pires moeurs de banKsters a la capitulation devant
la Haute-Firiance."8 It called on yorkers of all classes, poor but free, strong in their
truth and belief in the justice of their cause, to demand immediate changes. 9 "11s
doivent balayer les preJuges ... " which meant, litera.1.1y, that they were supposed to go
out and symbolically sweep away corruption by sweeping the streets in front of
Parliamentl~ 0 (See plate 3 in appendix.> Rex continued its attacks against the Socialist

party for several months. summoning grass roots action through mUltiple
advertisements and articles on the subject in its newspapers.
At the sam,e time, it moved into more specific attacks on the Catholic party and
its affiliates. On February 21. 1936. on the front page of Rex. DegreUe disclosed his next
important discovery of corruption -- the agricultural organization, Boere"nbond. 11
Here, he accused the Boerenbond of usurping its control over farmers' savings by
using the money for totally non-agricultural and. indeed, scandalous purposes. 12 In
particular. he accused it of having figured out a devious plan, so that it could borrow
money from the Banque National at 3 % interest, but then seU it back at 6 % interest,
thereby taking in a considerable profit. 13 The campaign succeeded ~n alienating a
' .\

8Degrelle. in Rex. Jan. 31. 1936, no.', p. 1.
9Degrelle. in Rex. jan. 31. 1936: no. S. p, 7.
10DegreUe, in Rex. jan. 31. 1936. no. S. p. 2.
llSaint-Germain, p . 20-22. This was a kind of nation-wide corporative agriculturalassistance organization formed in the early 20th century by the Abbe Mellaerts. under
the auspices of the Catholic party. The Boerenbond assisted peasant-farmers and small
landlords in all sorts of agriculture-related issues and, besides acting as a bank for
their savings. established special services. such as agriculture-case courts, for its
members. The fact that from its inception it held strong ties with the Catholic party
was undoubtedly infl,u encial in Rex's decision to act against it.
1208gre11e, "MM. Rapport. Brusse1mans et van Dievoet sont servis. Voici des documents
terribles sur Ie Boerenbond," in Rex, Feb . 21. 1936 . .0.0.8, p.1.3 &. S.
13Saint-Germain, p. 124-127.
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considerable part of the peasantry from the Catholic party, many of whom w~nt over to
Rex. 14
The Boerenbond affair was part of a long string of attaclcs against the Catholic
party, attacks which had begun, in essence, with the coup de Coutlrai. As the weeks
went by, Rex's language became more and more violent in its attacks. The February 7,
1936 issue ofBu., for instance, carried an extensive, full-page, bold-lettered battie cry,
as it were, against the party:
L'offensive des. pourris [term used for the banksters] contre Rex
bat son plein: bombardements a coup de droits de reponse dans nos
journaux, bombardements a coup de proces, Segers, Balthazar,
Philips; bombardementsacoups de sale tees anonymes! Ils voudraient
nous terroriser ounOU5 affamer! Nous les attendons et nous les
defionslll S'ils veulent la bataille, ils l'aurontl S'ils ne 1a. veulent pas,
ils l'auront quand m6me! Us sont les enllemis du peuple. Us ont bu
son sang, exploite son travail, insulte sa misere. L'heure est venue
ou Us vont payer! BELGES! Rassemblons nous lous arlour de REX
pour la bataille deseperee des honn6tes gens contre la dictature des
politiciens-bansters! 11s nons ant ecrase pendant 10 ansI Ca suffit!
Prenons nos balais, nos fouets, et nos fourches! Chassons-lesl Pour
un pays libre et propre, pour nous $8.uver. pour blUr I'Etat Nouveau.
uni55Ons-nousl 15
If Rex's intention was to alienate the Catholic party. it certainly achieved its goal. On
February 21. Minister of the Interior and President ofthe Union Catholique. M. Hubert
Pie.r1ot. forbade all collaboration of party members with Rex. 16 In its usual manner.
Rex responded by simply turning the situation around to make it look (in its own press,
that is) as if it had taken the initiative. Jean Denis declared."in the next issue of Rex,
that the mov~ment had stayed within the party only for purposes of aggrandizmg it;
but, once the Catholic party had rejected Rex's advances, the latter had no reason to

•

remain 10yal.1? A final and official break was in order. therefore, wrote Degrelle: "REX

14Saint-Germain. p.l28.
I'DegreHe. in ~ Feb. 7.1936. no . 6. p. 4.
16Legros. p.133.
1'7Denis, "Faut-i1liquider Ie parti catholique," in Rex, Feb. 28,1936. no. 9. p. 8.
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de son cOte NE VOlT PAS LA POSSIBILITE DE S'ENTENDRE AVEC I.E PARTI CATHOLIQUE
[sicJ."18
The split and the general ambiguity surrounding the growing Rex movement
was especially weH represented by l'affaire Segers. Sometime in late Winter-early
Spring of the year, Degrelle had published an inflammatory pamphlet against the
Catholic leader, appropriatedly entitled "Jaccuse M. Segers. Jaccuse M. Segers d'~tre
un cumulard, un bankster, un pillard d'epargne eta un liche." Understandably
enraged, the accused filed a case against DegreHe for defamation of character.
However, this only resulted in his ouster from the party and a court plea in Degrelle's
favor on May 8/ 19
One may well wonder why the court gave such an important victory to the
Rexists. Couldn't they have forseen its implications? They were obviously performing
their jobin the expected, unbiased way, but one might have expected that, considering
the circumstance,s, they would have decided that a motion in support of Segers,
however wrong. might have been a crutia11y important political move. The conclusion
that emerges seems to be that the real threat of Rex had not yet dawned on all Belgians.
Either they supported, in relief, what the movement was doing -- the country X.M full
of corruption, after all-- or they simply did not believe that Rex could achieve any
kind of leadership position in the political scene. At any rate, the court decision' being
handed down barely two weeks before the May 24 elections had a great impact on voter

.

~

turn-out in favor of Rex. If Rex had gotten dd of Segers, it 'Would get rid of other
incitors of political vices, it would clean up that body of law-makers. 20

18Degrelle, "REX luttera seul aux elections prochaines," in Rex, Feb. 28, 1936, no. 9,
p. 16-17.
19Legr05, p. 151. The case vas tried before the tribunal court of Bruxelles.
20Jean-Michel Etienne, Le Mouvement celiste jusqu'en 1910 (Paris, Librairie Armand
Colin,'1968), p. 62.
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Specific election propaganda:
The scandals uncovered by Rex were made public not only in Rex. but. starting
0.0.

May 3. also in a new daily, Le Pays reel. In March, 1935, Mgr. Picard had already

'predicted that, should Degrelle realize his dream and begin publishing a daily
newspaper, "personne au monde ne peut prevoir a quai 111'emploiera."21 The daily
added to the weekly Rex. allowed Degrelle to literally bombard readers with
propagadistic material. And, since Rexist press had been carrying Rexist propaganda
from the outset, the election campaign merely required an intensification of past
processes. a2 Degrelle wrote artic1es exposing scandals 0.0. front and back of~ and
throughout Le Pays del and Action rexiste. a special campaign paper appearing only
during the pre-election period. 2S 1..0. addition, propagandistic phraSes would appear i:n
bold letters and enc10sed in thick-lined boxes at random throughout the various
publications. They would say things like "REX dit la Verite!"24 (obviously a reference to
the lying occuring at top government levels),oor "Rex ou Moscou" (for, in spring 1936,
Rex accused almost all of its enemies of beUlg figureheads of the Communinist regime
in th°e USSR).25 Rexist newspapers presented their candidates, as well. and often with
photographs in addition to short biographies 0..0. their accomplishments as private
persons and as Rexists. 26 Propaganda ploys extended into non-press areas as well. Rex
started producing litUe insignia and gadgets that were disti.ncUy Rexist -- carried its
name, usually. The January 31 issue of Rn. advertised a whole series of such items: Rex
~

-------------------,
21 Mgr. Picard in a letter, dated March 13, 1935, to his Cardinal, Mgr. Van Roey, quoted in
Giovanni Hoyois, "Monseigneur Picard et Leon Degrelle," Revue gtneralebel&e, Nov.
1959, p. 87.
22Legros, p. 1.f6 .
23Legros, p. H8.
24Rn., Feb. 21, 1936, .0.0. 8. p. 8.
a'Robert Brasi11ach, Leon Degrelle et l'avenir de Rex (Paris, Librairie PIon, 1936),
p.499.
26S ee, for example, the short article by Roger Dessart, Chef de REX-Huy, nominating
Amand Geradin for the Huy-Waremme position, in "Prelude a la campagne electorale."
in ~ Feb. 7,1936, no. 6, p. 13.
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insignia for 2.'0 FB, Rex "fanion" (small flag) for 3.00 FB, Rex arm badges and Rex
stamps (these last, in packages of 1000) also for 3.00 FB, Rex blotters (100 at once) for

10.00 FB, and Rex card-game for 2.00 FB.2? With such an assortment of useful objects,
and with such reasonable prices, one can imagine that the sales were many in this
period of rising Rexist popularity.
Degrelle also increased the number of speaking rounds he made. travelling
from province to province. proclaiming the Relist revolution. The meetings were
always advertized and reviewed in great detail in Rexist press. They all followed the
same, basic format of befote. some more orgahized and elaborate than others. On
January 31. for instance. Rex published the schedule for a weekend-long reunion to be
held at Liege. On Saturday February 8, at 7:30 pm. the cadres actifs and Front Populaire
would come together to hear reports from local Relist groups of Huy-Waremme,
Verviers and Liege. An hour later, Degrelle would speak at a general meeting and
would ceremoniously hand over the Rexist flag to a representative of the OugreeSclessin section (probably some kind of welcoming ritual for a newly formed group).
At 8:00 am Sunday morning all would convene at the Cathedral to hear a mass for peace
and in remembrance of those dead at war. This would be fol1owed by. first, a meeting
on the "Doctrine et Programme de Rex" at 9:30 am, then a "dIner democratique [sic]" at
1 :00 pm. accompanied by the "creation du chant du Front Populaire de Rex," and.
(mally. after a pause, a "Me~ting monstJ.e avec Carlos Leruitte [Rexist leade.r] et LEON
"'\.

DEGRELLE:" 2.8 The grand scald o! this meeting is reminescent of the one that.was
supposed to take place at Charleroi in 1934. Due to lack of tiPle. however, Degrelle gave
most of his speaches in the context of evening meetings only tw'o- or three-hour long.
The campaign in Flanders, which started after the one in the French-speaking part of
the country, was characterized by this type of meeting. Perhaps this was deliberately
21Rex, Jan. 31. 1936, no . 5, p. 7. 1 FB =S .03384 (1936) ... S .267 = 26.7 ¢ (1984)
28Carlos LeruiUe, "Le Rassemblement populaire de Liege Ie 9 fevrier 1936," in Rex,
Jan. 31. 1936, no. 5, p. 15. The towns listed are all within the privince of Liege .

. 57

planned this way because Degrelle did not speak Flemish. though it seems more likely
that pressing time was the real factor involved. 29 At any rate. Degrelle's enthusiasm
was in no way hampered by the circumstances. On January 31. 4000 people came to
hear him in Antwerp; on February 3. 1200 came to hear him in Brugge. Rexist accounts
of the first meeting claimed that despite continued disruption by Communist
infiltrators and prolonged police non-action against them. "il .o'en est pas un sans
doute qui ne sen tit au gmenter son respect pour cette force jeune et saine. reflechie
mais ecrasante, qu'estREX" (note the forcefullanguage).3 0
Degrelle's personal eagerness and the Rexist press' para1lelling enthusiasm and
over-confidence in reportin'g the various propaganda events evidently won over a lot
of voters. whether discontented with the present regime, in search'of an allencompassing doctrin~. or simply easily persuaded by colorful rhetoric. Writing
shortly before the elections, Raphael Sindic foresaw that "... tous les hesitants
viendront a. no us et avec eux. nombre de socialistes et quantile de liberaux" (and
Catholics).3 1 Though an exaggeration. the statement does describe. in a broad sense.
the playing out of the events in Spring 1936. Degrelle and his followers performed
really rather extraordinary feats of propaganda in the six months that lapsed between
Courtrai and the May elections. feats which resulted in a vi1:tual repeat of the earlier
£2.!UL this time not only against the,Catholic party, but against the whole country,
\.

29These speeches in Flanders were presumably in French, (I have not come across any
references to translators or interpreters being on hand.) Of course. it is possible that
Degrelle learned a speech in Flemish for the occasion; yet this seems unlikely, since his
style was based so much on spontaneity, It is no wonder, then. that Rexist support was
weak in the north --,besides the fact that the Flemish, if extremist, were separatistextremists. in line with groups like the VNV (see below on the Rex-VNV pact).
30"Leon Degrelle parle a Anvers," in &tL Feb. 7, 1936, no. 6, p. 5.
31Raphael Sindic, Rex deYant l'opinion catholiQue (Bruxelles, Eds. Rex, 1936), p, 34.
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The elections of 1936:
The Rexist party won 11. ..9 % of the national vote on May 24. 1936. 32 Out of
2.362,4~H

eligible votes counted. it received 271."91. Out of ZOZ deputes seats in the

Parliament house. Rex won 21 seats (in addition to twelve seats in the senate). The
greatest number of representatives concentrated in one area were in the Brabant and
Liege provinces. returning 6 and:5 seats. respectively. Other provinces returned
between 1 and 3 seats. (See plates" and , for map and chart.> Similarly. the capitals ot
the two important provinces. Brussels and Li6ge. each voted in the most deputes within
the province. with :5 and 3. respectively. These reSults are not surprising. since the two
towns were centers of worker and middle class population. In comparison to the other
parties. Rex did quite well. It received the most votes of all the dissident extremist
parties (Communist and Flemish Nationalist) and just one percent less than the Liberal
party. which came in with 12AO% . It drew its votes especially from the Catholic party.
but considerably. also. from both the Socialist and the Liberal parties. 33 Though Rexist
success was understandably greater in Wallonie and Brussels. the 7 % (out of 1001.
regional voting percentage). i.e. over 72.000 votes. it obtained in Flanders must not be
overlooked. especially since this represented half of Vlaam.sch Nationaal Verbond
(VNV) returns ui the region. 34 In addition. what 21 representative~ meant for Rex was
more than what it meant for other. more popular parties. because the counting system
used (the Hondt system) assigned more ~ats per votes counted to stronger parties; thus.
.
the Catholic party was given ohe seat
less than 11.000 votes. while Rex had to obtain

,

!or

about 1.3.000 seats to be eligible for one seat. 35 That is. 21 deputes represented more

32Voting is obligatory in Belgium. About 901. of the population votes. The statistics are
taken from Roger E. De Smet. Rene Evalenko & William Fraeys. Collection de Science
Politigue: Atlas des Elections Belges 1919-195.. CBruxelles. Institut de Sociologie Solvay.
Universite Libre de Bruxelles. 1958). p. 10 & p. 1+-15; and from Etienne. p. 53-56.
33Etienne. p. 57.
'
34Etienne. p. 58 .
3'Etienne. p. 53-5".
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votes for Rex than it did for the established parties. (1 Rexist seat equaled 1.18 Catholic
party seats. for instance.)
Where did these votes come from? Who voted for Rex. anyway? Dividing the
results by linguistic region. Flanders. as mentioned above. brought 7% of its votes to
Rex. Wallonie. 1'.1%. and Brussels (officially bilingual). 18.5%.36 Looking at them from
the class point of view. and though specific statistics are not available. one can
generalize that Rexist supporters were as before the elections mostly merchants. small
artisans. professionals. petits bourgeois. and farmers. with a few aristocrats as wel1. 31
The linguistic and'class composition of the Rexist movement didn't really change after
the elections; it was essentially more of the same. It was the age factor which redefined
Rex in 1936. Because most Rexists were still too young to enter Parliament in 1936.
Degrelle had to go scrounge around for aIde! supporters to represent the movementparty. Having been a mouyement de gOneration before 1936. it now became a
-movement of split generations. with older. more mature Rexists as leaders or
Parliamentarians and younger Rexists grouped into shock troops of various sorts. The
dichotomy WOUld. later on, cause internal problems within the movement. as Degrelle
found he had to assert more and more authority on his sometimes disorderly and
unserious forces.
The sudden switch to official politics must. indeed, have caused confusion for
"

many of the younger Rexists who had joiO.ed in a vision of adventure and utopian. anti~

establishment change. For. waSn't running for elections. even if separate from'the
Catholic party. and even as an official non-traditional-party movement-party.
nevertheless joining the enemy? Wasn't it deceiving the very revolutionary base of

36£tienne. p. 57.
31Leg1'os. p. 166. There is no evidence that many clergy belonged to Rex. especially
after Rex entered politics. I did. however. come across an article on "Les Rexistes," in
BuJan. ~, 1935 (p . 24) by a "Josse Allin. pretre." (See chapter two, note 10,) Alzin was
not a regular journalist of Rexist press had, whatever his connection with the
movement, it must have been an exception .
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Rex? How much adventure would there be in a stuffy old Parliament, especially ~ince
they. the young blood. would have no control over what happened within? It is evident
that, once entered into traditional politics. Rex was forced to become more traditional
itself, and Degrelle was forced to exert more authority -- paternal, perhaps -- over the
young lyc6e or university students vho still constituted a large part of his following .
Though it had always been hierarchically organized, I would argue that, once in
offic~al

politics, the hierarchy vas accentuated even more. Perhaps this was one of the

reasons why Rex started to lose impact dras~cally' in 1937. and why many qf the
Rexistes ~e la premiere heure left. beginning in late 1936.

Reasons for Rex's success:
Ironically, anti-Rexist propaganda helpe~ Rex almost as much as its own
propaganda, for it informed the entire country about the threat. It wasn't only regular
and chance readers of Rexist press and posters who knew about Rex, everybody knew
about it. On the one hand, the attacks upon the movement dissuaded many who might
have been attracted to its flashiness and idealism, especially once it was categorized as
dictatorial. On the other hand, the publicity must have drawn a fair amount of curious
and potential'supporters to Rexist meetings and press. Those not so stable in their
beliefs might then· have been seduced by Rexist dramatics and rhetoric.
Anti-Rexists appr.oache4 Rex with'Rexist tactics; that is, through accusa~ory and
.

""!a-

angry speeches and through the press. All opposing factions were united in accusing
Degrelle and Rex of being a "danger fasciste et dictatorial."38 The Catholic party, in
particular, having the most axes to grind with the dissenters because of the brutal
politico-financier scandal episodes, retorted with equally harsh charges: "Le but
veritable du mouvement rexiste est l'aneantissement du parti cathoUque.le

58Legros. p. 149.
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renversement des institutions et l'instauration de la dictature."39 Legros claims that
the established parties' intense concentration on an anti-Rexist campaign was at the
expense of their own political programs. Once they realized that they had no programs

to fall back on as comparison-propaganda to Rex, they reverted to insult as a campaign
ploy, Which, says Legros, were "symptOmes evidents de 1a defaite."40 What Legros
chooses to ignore, being biased and an affirmed Rexist himself, is that the parties had
every right to return like insult for like insult. (Politics by the 1930s was no different
from today: in the heat of the campaign. one tends to exaggerate and become
aggressive.) The three big parties may not have iterated specific programs, yet
everybody knew what they were. for they had been in use for years. As for the Rexists.
they were not so good at setting forth programs themselves, their campaign being
based more on pointing to problems in the present system than on proposing solutions.
However. the combined efforts of all traditional parties against Rex proves that it ~ a
threat, and a serious one.
Specifically anti-Rexist press often copied Rexist press format. .lYQu. for
instance. was identical to ~ and concentrated on personal attacks on Degrelle and
other prominent Rexists. It was founded by Catholic activists of the Uege area. a Rexist
stronghold. and ran weekly from March 26,1936 to June 11, 1936.41 Anti-Rex. another
election-period anti-Rexist weekly. was published from March 26. 1936 to May 29,1936.

,

" .

More long-term and post-electioilopposition papers
. included
. the Communist La Voix du
.

Peuple.42 Antidote (a weekly ~ defense of public liberties. based in Liege. ~nning
from Sept. 13. 1936 to Dec. 17.1936). and Vigilance (bi-monthly, published by a group of

39Saint-Germain. p. 100. Their choice of words was more controlled than Rex's, of
course.
40Legros, p. 150.
41 Information on anti-Rexist press was taken from Legros. p. 150-51. and Etienne.
p. 128-30 &p. 190.
42Legros. p. 222 .
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anti-fascist intellectuals, appearing from Apr. 1, 1936 to Nov. I, 1936).43 The already
established L'Independence beIge (directed by the banker and big industrialist, J.-E.
Solvay, from November 1936 on) took the lead in anti-fascist press after the elections.
What was most unusual for Belgium was the violence involved in these antiRexist attacks. ReI had not engaged in any violent acts so far -- the few scuffles
occuring at meetings were not initiated by Rex and were not preplanned or organized
-- so the response was surprising. As leader, Degrelle was the main target for these
assaults. The most famous one occured on September IS, 1936 at Seraing, a mostly
Socialist town on the left bank of the Meuse, near Liege. Because his meeting had been
banned by the town, and because he knew that, if he tried to enter the town by usual
routes, he would be stopped, the ReIlst leader (determined to speak and always full of
ingenious ways to get around barriers to his actions) decided to make his entrance on a
barge down the river and deliver his speech through a microphone! All went fine
until shots were suddenUy fired from the banks, where Socialist and Communist grou ps
had gathered to hold a counter-meeting to Degrelle's. Three Rexists were wounded,
including the local chef of Rex-Liege, M. Willems. Degrelle, invincible, survived the
attack unharmed.44 Such incidents repeated themselves frequently during the
movement's lifetime, and Degrelle suffered a few injuries, though never serious ones.
Rexists and historians have had different theories on why the movement
'.

'.

succeeded. Degrelle himself gives credit to his own imagination and stamina (during
-

~

the campaign he often gave up to six lectures per day!),'" as vell as to Rexist
youthfulness. "En un an, sans appui de quiconque, a force d'acharnement, de sacrifices

"3Etienne. p. 190.
44Saint-Germain. p. 176 and Etienne, p. 128-29. One Government: minister considered
the Seraing occurence serious enough to order his wife and children to take refuge in
the house if DegreUe·vas killed. He apparently feared an ensuing street war. [Legros.
p. 186-871. If Legros's claim is correct (he doesn't cite sources), the incident points to
the growing tension evolving within the country around Rex.
4,£·Lienne. p. 62.
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et de foi, nous avions. a quelques mi1liers de jeunes gar~ons et de jeunes filles.
revolutionne toute la Belgique."46 His formula for success included political flair, a
sense of action. inventiveness. and fear of nothing. 4? "La victoire est a ceux qui
veulent et a ceux qui croient,"48 Legros associates Rex success not only with its
innovative propaganda te~hniques, but also with the contemporary, politically vacuous
situation. one in which the established parties concentrated so much on inner politics,
on working together. that they ignored the national problems of social. religious and
linguistic peace. With its call for unity above class. religious and language differences,
Rex appeared "comme une delivrance.;'49 "Et, c'est ainsi que l'electeur degoute
n' hesitait pas a donner a Rex la faveur de son vote. Pour lui. Rex apparassait comme un
mouvement revolutionnaire anime d'un ideal, conforme aux aspirations du peuple ... "5 0
Etienne notes that the resolution of the Segers case in favor of Degrelle. just two weeks
before the elections. vas a big push for the movement (Rex vas doing good things for
the society), as was the dicision by Parliament to increase its size from 187 to 202
deputes (seen as a selfish move to keep itself very much in pover )51. Etienne focuses
more on Rexist propaganda techniques acting in a favorable framevork of inner party
disunity and loss of identity due to prolongue coalition policy-ma1ting. 52 The Catholic
party vas split by language. political leaning (conservatives versus Christian
Democrats), and class differences. he vrites;
it took on party qualities only in questions
,
\

of the Church. and acted as a unit only at election time. Liberals had to contend with
•

"'\.

J

in-fighting between anti-c1ericists. demanding a return . to lay-controlled schools.
and
.
more moderate advocates of Church-controlled education. Even the Socialist party. of
46Uon Degrelle. Hitler pour 1000 anS (Paris, La Table Ronde, 1%9), p. 45.
4?Degrelle, Hitler. p. 41.48Degrelle. Hitler. p. 46.
49Legr05, p. 164.
'OLegr05, p. 165.
51Etienne, p. 62.
5ZEtienne, p.60-62.
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all the parties, the strongest, was generationally split between the old guard, under
Emile Vandervelde and Louis de Brouckere, and a new group of activists, lead by Henri
de Man and Paul-Henri Spaak. 53 In comparison, Rex was unified and young. It drew its
forces from the nation's youth, and, in particular, from Catholic youth. To them, who
had been brought up and educated in very religious institutions, and who had gone on
to Catholic action, the disunified, disorganized and old Catholic party seemed to hold no
openings for their activism.54 Rex's vitality and cohesiveness, therefore, could easily
have appeared as the answer.
As for economics, Etienne continues, Rex was a political movement, not an
economic one. Therefore, economics piayed less of a role in its rise to power than it did
with other fascist movements of the 1930s. Belgium QM suffer from the Depression, but,
by 193', the economy was on the rise again, with higher production and lover
unemployment figures recorded (see plate 6 for chart).55 Nevertheless, it is true that
the recovery effected parts of the middle class -- retailers, in particular -- later than
other classes. By 193'-36, these sections olthe economy were still strUggling and were,
as a consequence, more likely to be resentful towards government policies. In addition,
even if the standard of living was ameliorating, remnants of the psychological impact
of the depression were still evident. 56 Many we~e still searching for guarantees of _
economic stability. Rexist newness and promises of a better life (even without
' -,

programs ouUined) must have seemed hopeful.
"'\

What to me seems even'more important, however, was the fact that Rex was the
Opposition. In election years, when a society is disgrunUed with political processes and
in need of a change, whatever the Opposition is offering always seems better. 24.67% of
Belgians were obviously unsatisfied with things as they were before 1936. 6.06% found
'3'£tienne, p. 60.
,4Etienne, p. 60.
"Etienne, p. 58-59.
,6Etienne, p. 59.
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an answer in Communism. 7.12~. in Flemish nationalism (VNV). 11.49%. in Rex.'? 1936
saw the rise of extremist groups. in general. Rex happened to be at the top. It was at
the top. I would argue, because it was the most all-encompassing. VNV, for obvious
reasons. interested only Flemish Belgians. Communism. though it did not carry the
ovedy negative overtones it did (and still does) in this country. was still Communism.
an arm of the USSR. and not so appealing to devout Belgium. Rex. on the other hand.
was for ill of Belgium and had Catholicism. or. at least. Christianity. as the very
foundation of its philosophies . .Thus. though it seemed to be proffering new ideas. these
were only a reinterpre.tation of old. familiar ones. To vote for Rex in 1936 was! to

11,49% of the population. to vote for forgotten ideals. to vote for the return of a longedafter vision of the good old days.

Rex in Parliament:
The election of 21 deputes and 12 senators was just as unexpected to RexistS as it
was to the rest of the country. Rex had immersed itself so completely in the fierce
campaign that it had lost sight of what was to come next. (This, ironically, was the
accusation Legros and other sympathetic historians of Rex made about the three big
parties.> Once it had got its representatives into government, it didn't really know what
to do with them! As Pierre Daye, a Rexist leader, put it, "puis ce fut, pour nous, Ie dur
"~

..

travail d'organisation, en profonde~r ."'8 Degrel~e was e~en more frank:
'.
,
,
Us ignoraient tout de cette taverne [Parliamentl. Us n'y avaient
meme jamais mis les pieds .... Pour nos vingt-et-un deputes reXistes
c'ewent donc l'avance mystet'ieuse, doigt sur la gachette du fusil,
parmi la brousse 0'0 i1 faut s'attendre a. tous les traquenards et a. tous
les coups de canlilles. 59

"'\.

57£tienne. p. 53.
58Pierre Daye, Leon Degrelle et Ie Rexisme (Paris. A. Fayard etCie., 1937), p. 14.
59Degrelle, "Rex au padement ou huit jours chez les betes [sic}," in Rex, July 3, 1936,
no. 27, p. 1.
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As a .result, Rexist tactics within Parliament were essentially no different from those
without. They were based more on violent attacks than constructive programming.
From the beginning, Rexist representatives acted as a block against the established
parties. The old parties were Dourris and characterised, in typical Rexist fashion, by
deformities of all kinds. Degrelle continues, in the article already cited above, this way:
.. .Ie mastodontesque Brunfaut.la t!te convulsee, essayait de renverser Ie service d'ordre, Ie vieux Vandervelde, avec son nez ignoble en
flamme de bougie, brandissait son cornet acoustique .... Les Rexistes,
Raphael Sindic en t!te, se defendirent comme des sangliers, a. coups
de crocs. 60
Once in Parliament, Rex found every preteXt to find fault with the system as it now
stood (they had not, as yet, rejected the institution of Parliamentarism itself).
Nos Rexistes doivent s'attendre a tout: aux injures les plus basses, aux
traquenards les plus odieux et m6me, un jour ou l'autre, a. des violences
sanglantes. 11s doivent s'attendre, par dessus Ie marche, A PERDRE
ROYALEMENT LEUR TEMPS dans cette baraque OU nul travail n'est
possible au milieu des luttes actuelles des partis, seul element qui
compte la-bas. 61 .
Rex-Parliament interaction was a race for who could keep ahead of whom. If
Rex made accusations, Catholics, Liberals and Socialists would team up to devise some
way of getting back at it. A good example is the Sindic case. In July 1936, Degrelle
received a tip from ~ ex-Catholic minister about corruption within the ~
d'epargne. the national savings bank for les petites gens. (The bank apparently had
under-the-desk contracts with big capitalist firms, an action which contradicted the
original reason for its founding.) Degrelle chose his best speaker in Parliaine1:t.
Raphael Sindic. to expose the scandal in the the next session. On July 10. at 2 pm. after
the order of the day had been taken care of. the President of the Chamber. M. Camille
Huysmans. turned the podium over to Sindic. But the scheduled Rexist speaker was not
there. Neither was he there at 2:15 pm. and his Rexist compatriots were so stunned that
60Degrel1e, "Rex au parlement ou huh jours chez les betes," in ~ July 3. 1936, no. 27.
p.3.
61 De grelle, "La sale bolte du Parlement." in Rex. no. 28-29, p. 3.
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they did no even think to choose someone else to take the stand and stall for time.
Huysmans closed the session. Barely ten minutes later, Sindic arrived; but it was too
late. 62 As expected, Rex reacted with fury. But even violent articles in Le Pays reel
couldn't stop the country from pointing its finger at the movement in ridicule. 63 This
time, Parliament had won one over Rex. Unprepared to conform to Parliamentary
politcy-making procedures, Rex in Parliament was more of an annoyance than a true
and constructive opposition party.

Rex makes political moves;
This did not mean, however, that Degrelle did not mean to bring changes; on the
contrary, change vas all 'he wanted. But he seemed to lead his movement into political
moves more for the sake of getting attention and collecting supporters, than to create
steps towards effective reform. Having learned the propaganda routine, he seemed
.
unwilling, 01' unable, to find new ways. His and the movement's actions after May 1936,
,

therefore, were not very different from before. They were carried out more for

.

tactical reasons (to improve Rex's,standing) than as means to fulfill some moral goal.
An example was Rex's support of the strikers in June 1936. On the ,UI-'of this
month, strikes broke out on the docks of Antwerp. Rex denounced them as Socialist and
Communist incited and rebuked the government for its passivity in the matter. On June
"

14, however, the strikes were taken up by miners in Liege and transformed into a
.

'

,

.

~

general strike. To everybody's amazement, Le Pays reel of June.!' published an article
in support of the strikers' demands for a forty- hour week, paid vacations, and a
minimum salary of 32 FB per week. 64 In following weeks, Rex organized soup kitchens
for the strikers and vacations with Rexist families by the sea and in the country for

62Etienne, p. 124-25; and Ladriere and Pfeiffer, p. 75-76.
63Ladriere and Pfeiffer, p. 75-76.
64Etienne, p . 117-18.
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some 8,000 children of strikers. 6, Degrelle and his wife were featured prominantly at
these various charity events for the strikers. One must note that. if the Socialists had
perhaps supported the Antwerp protests, neither they, nor the Catholics and Liberals
concurred with a general strike. Rex's support of the strikers on June 15, was another
way of opposing the three big parties. Furthermore, Antwerp was in Flanders and was
not a base of Renst support. Liege, on the other hand, was a Renst stronghold, and Rex
had to support the city's workers in order to keep its standing there.
The next political move caused even more of a fuss within, as well as outside of
the movement. Since the beginning, Rex had quietly avoided any confrontation with
Flemish nationlist groups, especially those in Parliament, and had, in fact, worked
towards a mutual agreement between the two sides. On October 8,1936, Rex announced
an accord with VNV. Because negotiations had been kept secret until that date, the pact
came as a great shock to the country. Rex avowed that Prime Minister Van Zeeland had
been briefed on the talk and had given his approval to them. 66 Rex-Flanders leader,
Paul de Mont, had indeed informed Van Zeeland during the months of August and
September about Rex-VNV discussion, and the Prime Minister may even have responded
favorably to the attempt at linguistic unification,67 but from there to endorsing an
official ReI-VNV alliance is a far step. For an accord of the tva strongest extremist
organizations in power was a serious danger to the. Belgian Parliamentary system. Rex
claimed the pact.was the beginning of a cultural fed~ralism which would settle the age~.

old differences 'between F1and~rs and Wallonie.68 VNV defined.Rex as Walloon

65Degrelle, Le Message de Rex , p. 10; and Legros, p. 167.
66Le Pays reel, Apr. 9,1936, as quoted by Etienne, p. 99.
6
.
?Legros, p. 203.
68Writing sometime between April and June, 1937, Pierre Daye seems truly optimistic
about the prospect of unity. He claims that VNV has finally come around to the idea of
"l'unite nationale beIge, qu'ils avaient souvent refetee jusqu'alors, et ont admis de ne
plus mettre en cause la monarchie." He is confident that "ce probleme ... semble done
resolu." [Daye, p . 180.1 One wonders how he could realty believe that VNVwould
surrender its Flemish nationalism so easily.
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nationalist (which it was not) and, therefore, compatible in the fight for nationalist
autonomy.69 Rex, surprisingly, accepted to turn Rex-Flanders over to VNV in the near
future; VNV accepted Rex's federalism, while affirming that,this did not negate the
concept of a Dietsland. the GroBdeutschland of the Flemish (though the contradiction is
blatant). 10
In actuality, the purpose of the pact was more to keep mutual tabs on each other
than to from a working partnership. VNV nationalism was simply contradictory in
every way to Rexist nationalism, and neither party was willing to budge from its stance.
Their only commonality was their ardent, violent anti-communism, anti-establishment
and authoritarianism. Yet, within this context, they were vying for power. True,
acting together, they could form more of a block against, both, the three traditional
parties and the Communists in Parliament, but they had been voting the same way all
along anyway,and 37 deputes against 17:5 was no better than 21 or16 against 17:5. 11 But,
if they were officially working together, then they could make sure the other did not

get out of line; VNV, especially, could slowly recoup its sale control of rightist extremist
opinion in Flanders. Fortunately, the agreement existed only in theory and lasted
barely a year. On June 2', 1937; Star De Clercq, leader of VNV, wrote in his newspaper
Volk en Staat that, though he still respected Rex and its leader, he had been misled by
DegreUe's overtures, that Rex was not going to support Flemish political autonomy, and
",

that, therefore, the agreement vas useleSs.?2 Rex's political ploy had once again failed.

.

.

.

~

But Degrelle didn't giv~ up. Instead, he decided to assemble 250,000 RElxists in
Brussels in a great propagandistic show of force. On October 22, however, three days
69Etienne, p. 99-100.
10Etienne, p. 100.
11Etienne, p. 101. Daye stresses this aspect of the pact. Rex wanted an enforced, antiMarxist Right against a coalesced Left (Rex defined all non-Right parties as Left). With
an alliance with VNV, it hoped to achieve that end. "De cette maniere, Ie pays serait
rentre, par un detour assez inattendu, dans la vraie conception pariementaire: deux
partis seulement, Ie Gouvernement etl'Opposition ... " (Daye, p. 187-881.
?2As quoted in Etienne, p. 101.
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before the appointed day, the meeting was forbidden by the government.?3 In his
usual stubborn way, Degrelle simply ignored the decree and called for the meeting to
take place, as planned. Only, now, he ordered all Rexists to calmly and quietly join the
rest of the ceremo'ny at the tomb of the unknown soldier -- it being the day of
commemoration for the WWI battle on the Yser river -- and to then attend the
scheduled mass at the St. Gudule cathedral. It certainly was calm and quiet at first, for
on October 25 only 3,000 to 5,000 showed up at the tomb.?4 At the end of the mass,
however, some fighting broke out as Degrelle, perched out of a high-up window in a '
building opposite the cathedral (draped with a large Rexist flag, no less) encouraged
his followers down in the street to resist police attempts to disperse them. Rexists and
anti-Rexists blew the whole incident out of proportion. Le Pays reel wrote that the
police had been brutal and that M. de Gronne had been "egorge," when he had only
been slightly scratched. The other side nick-named the Rexist meeting the '~marche
sur Btuxelles," an allusion to both Hitler's and Mussolini's marches.?; At any rate, the
demonstration to end all demonstrations resulted only in Rex being mocked at, once
again, by the entire country. At this point, the only way Rex could save face was by
returning to the one tactic that was guaranteed to work: speech-making.

?3Etienne, p. 119-21: and Legros, p. 189.
,
~
14250,000 waS, in any case', a ~ta11y unrealistic number: perhaps, again. only a figment
of DegreUe's over-zealous imagination.
?5Etienne, p. 120. DegreUe claims that general Chardonne of the great Chasseur
ardennais had written him a note a few days before the event and had offered his
troops in support of a coup d'etat. Since, according to Degrelle, "presque tous les
gendarmes etaient rexistes; quatre-vingt-dix pour cent au moins l'etaient. comme
presque toute l'armee retait" (extremely doubtful. in light of the fact that the army was
most loyal to the king and that the ling was in no way a supporter of Rex). success
seemed possible. Yet, peace-loving as he claims he then was, Degrelle refused, for
"c'etaint dans la legalite et Ie libre consentement du peuple que je voulais gagner.
Jetais sOr de Ie convaincre et de me hisser au pouvoir porte par lui. Pourquoi recourir
ala force materielle alors que je disposais de la force supreme, celle de la conviciton?"
[Charlier, p. 1371.
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Degrelle seemed to realize this -- at least for a while -- and started into
marathons of speeches, such as Les Six lours de Rex,76 which were a tremendous
success. But the thirst for greater things quickly drew him back to secret dealings and
political moves. Degrelle claims that. once Rex was in Parliament. he had begun
fostering a close relationship with the two leaders of the Right in Flanders and
Wallonie, respectively. Gustave Sap was well respected among Flemish nationalist
circles as director of the popular Flemish newspaper Sta.ndaard. 77 And Comte
d'Aspremont-Unden was. in Degrelle's words, "Ie grand chef morale de la Droite
conservatrice" in Wallon'ie.78 Together with Degrelle, they apparently worked 0.0.
preparing the country and Parliament for a smooth take-over by Rex. Though one
must be wary of Degrelle's retrospective interpretations of events, it is obvious that by
Spring 1937 he had gained enough confidence in his ability to conquer to put the legal
putsch plan into action.

-

0.0.

,

March 7,1937, Le Pays reel announced that the Rexist depute from Brussels,

M. Alfred Olivier, and all his seconds had resigned, and that Degrelle would run in their
place. 79 The Rexist chef wanted to use the elections asa referendum ofRex's
popularity, or so he said (one might speculate on his personal intentions in putting
h.imself up for elec~ons after having sworn off Parliamentary life):80
C'est parce que'je sentais que je tenais les atouts en main, malgre la
campagne feroce que menait 'con'tre moi Ie regime tout entier, que
je decidai au printemps de 1937 de lo1cher mes chien.5, de braver Ie
r.egi~e lui-m6me et de provoquer, par un 'coup de theatre une espece "'\.
de rUerendum national. Referendum veut dire consultation popu-

16See below, chapter 0.0. Degrelle as orator. for details 0.0. this series of orations.
11Charlier, p. 141.
18Charlier, p. 142.
19Wim D3.nnau, Ainsi Pacia Leon Degrelle (Strombeek-Bever, Editions Byblos s.p.r.l.,
1973),vol. V, p. 135. At the time, seconds were elected to the legislature at the same time
as representatives, so that, if the depute should for some reason leave his post, his
second would take his place. Frequent and troublesome elections could thus be avoided.
80Dannau, vol. V, p. 135 . See discussion 0.0. this issue below, i;l1 the chapter on Degrelle.
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laire. Done democratie. Done legalite. 81
DegreUe saw the capital as "Ie coeur. Ie pouls. la voix du pays;" whatever it thought. the
country thought. 82 How Rex could realistically think that it could win -- "nous etions
convaincus de gagner," recollects Degrelle -- or even give a good showing is hard to
understand. 83 Several unexpected occurances did work against it, however. First of all.
Degrelle had gone in expecting to be opposed by three different candidates, one from
each of the three big parties. Yet, in a Parliamentary session at the end of February,
the three parties, as well as the Communists (Degrelle claims they instigated the whole
thing), all endorsed the same candidate, Prime Minister Van Zeeland, also a lively and
competent speaker.84 Degrelle rode over this first blow and launched into one of the
fiercest campaigns in Belgian history so far. For, since 1936. Rexlst tactics were no
longer novel. andanti-Rexists knew that the only way to combat Rex was on equal
footing; that is, by engaging in the same kinds of confrontational and. sometimes.
violent campaign strategies that Rex used. Both sides, therefore, held meetings
(Degrelle did another marathon of oratory with Les Huits jours de Rex. i.e. eight days of
attacks on the government, from Apri14 to April I! ). distributed posters all over the
city. and used the press to its utmost possibilities. Trying in vain to stay ahead in the
propaganda part of it, Rex used mocking and joke-making as a tool-- a return to the
pranks of L~uvain days. It even put up mock anti-Rexist poster~. with lines like.
'~Camarades!

Restez toujours fideles a votre programme ...La dictature du proletariat doit
"'\.

·6t.re instauree, tous a l'action.lriomphe de 1'Internationale communiste ... Contre Ie
patriotard Degrelle, votez Van Zeel~nd."8' A further hindrance came on April 9. when.
in response to DegreUe's statement on April 7 that if Malines (th.e seat of the cardinal)
81 Charlier. p. 143.
82Charlier, p.143.
83Dannau. vol. V. p. 139.
84Charlie:r. p. 144.
8'Dannau. vol. V. p. 141.
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was against Rex it wO.uld have already said so. Cardinal Van Roey forbad all Catholics
from either voting for Rex 01' not voting at all. 86 This was essentially the last turn of
the sword for Degrelle. for. Catholic as it was. Belgium was not going to go against its
cardinal's word.
On April 11.1937. Van Zeeland won an overwhelming victory. carrying 275.880
(75.89%) out of 363A40 votes cast. Degrelle came away with 69.242, 01' 19.0,% of the vote
-- the figure including Rex and VNV supporters, who had formed a coalition for

th~

election. In additio.n, 18.358 blank votes were' cast. As compared to 1936. when Rex had
obtained 53,382 vo~es in Brussels. Rex actually gained in 1937. But now that VNV was .
included in the count, we must make the comparison to Rex plus VNV in 1936. i.e. some
75,000 votes. In that light, 1937 represented a loss of about 6,000 votes. 81 This may not
seem very much, as, in fact, it wasn't, but in the context of Rex's expectations. it was
significant. Rex had not only not won. it had actually lost voices. The referendum had
ended up being a referendum 1n favor of the traditional democratic parties. and not of
Rex.
The reasons for Rex's defeat included not only the single opposition candidate
and the cardinal's declaration. but, also, Rex's new style of propaganda. Belgians did
not appreciate the mocking and, instead. found the lack of seriousness valid 'proof that
Rex was not Parliamentary material. 88 The fiasco of the October 25 gathering, the
\

discovery that Degrelle had secretly met with Hitler end of September 1936 (even
.

~

.

though nothing important ca.nle ou~ of the encounter)89, as well as the Rex-VNV pact
which suddenly put two very authoritarian groups in alliance, alienated possible Rexist
supporters. Degrelle alone had not suffered a blow. his whole movement had.

86£tienne, p.137.
81£tienne, p.137-38 & chart on p. 178.
88£tienne, p.139.
89£tienne, p. 111.
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Rex, of courSe, tried to get beyond the defeat as soon as possible. An article by
Degrelle in Le Pays reel was entitled "Le 'Moustique' n'a pas ete ecrase! REX, renforce
par cette lutte titanesque, va repartir a l'assaut, plus ardent que jamais."9 0 Yet the
situation could not be reversed. The failure of the staged elections marked the
beginning of the fourth and final pre-war phase of Rex. Rex had been defeated a first
time and, from then on, would lose more and more support.
In November, 1936, after an

appar~nt personal

argument with Degrelle, Robert

de Vroyla.nde du Bois, a past chief editor of Rex, left the movement. The ex-Rexist's
rebuttle to Degrelle and to an anonymous article published in. the November 10, 1936
issue of La Pays reel which made all sorts of outrageous accusations against him, was
cruelly sarcastic. 91 In a pamphlet appearing shortly after his resignation, he
described Degrelle this way:
On sait que ce glorieux individu ...ne se sent a l'aise que dans Ie purin
qu'il deverse a. jet continu sur taus ceux qui ont commis l'impardonnable crime de ne pas Ie considerer comme un' comprime de toutes les
perfections imaginables. 92
Similarly, Xavier de Grunne, a Rexist senator, separated himself from the movement on
December 10,1937. His reasons for leaving, however, were more personal than antiRexist. De Grunne had made declarations against Parliament which were not in line
with Rexist doctrine, and Degrelle and he both decided that it would be better if he
broke off from the movement. 93 He did>however, continue to serve in Parliament as
an ind~pe~dent senator (without party affiliation), and remained an outside s;)pporter
.
.
afRex until the war. Raphael Sindic, on the other hand, left Rex in anger in 1939. In

90As quoted in Dannau, vol. 5, p. 228-29.
91Robert de Vroylande du Bois, Leon Degrelle Pourri (Louvain, Les Editions Lovanis.
1936)
92de Vroylande, p. 11.
93Xavier de Grunne,Pourquoi je suis s6par6 de Rex? (Wesembeek-Ophem, X. De Grunne ,
1937)
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his pamphlet stating the reasons for his resignation, he wrote about disorder ~d lies
within the movement:
I1 regne a Rex une atmosphere trouble, faite de mystere, de duplicite,
d'intriges et de mensonges, atmosphere a laquelie on risque de s'habituer a la longue, mais qui est empoisollnante pour ceux dont les
poumons manquent d'habitude. 94
Although in his introduction he did afrum that the tract 'Was not a personal attack
against the Rexist leader. 95 he did accuse Degrelie, especially, of usurping and wasting
Rexist funds and Rexist supporters. wlio 'Went out on a limb to earn these funds; of
inconsistency in his doctrines, or, rather" of having no real doctrines atali and only
beliefs which fluctuated with public opinion; of entering avidly into politics, ~ter
declaring that Rex 'Was apolitical; of ruining the movement's possibilities of achieving

its original ideal; and, finally, of striving for personal dictatorship. "M. Degrelie veut
une dictature persannelie, sans programme bien d6fini. capable de s'adapter au jour Ie
jour aux circonstances qui se presenteront."96
By 1939, then. Rex had been rejected. not only by enemies, but also by former

friends. Degrelle had become too dictatorial, it seemed. and the origillal ideologies of
the movement had disappeared under a storm of accusations against whoever came in
the 'Way and under a fury of propaganda. By 1939, Rex seemed to act more for Rex as an
end in i~lf. than for Rex as a means to'Ward moral reform and national unity. As a
result, those 'Who had believed in Rex the,first time round. in 1936, and those 'Who had
tried to believe in Rex again, i~ 1937, found that Rex 'Was not "follo'Wing its inte~tions
after ali. In local elections on October 18. 1938, though the three big parties had lost
votes as compared to 1932 elections, Rex, responsible for the losses, had nevertheless
already received considerably fewer votes than in 1936 (a drop from 18.72% to 10.90%
in Brussels, for instance) . In the Apri12, 19391egislative elections, Degrelle finally
94Raphael Sindic, Pourguoi je Quitte REX (Bruxelles, Editions du Sanglier, 1939), p. 3.
9'Sindic, p. 2.
96S'ind'lC, p .8.
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received a seat as d6put6 for Brussels, but Rex, in general, sunk into near invisibility.
What few faithfuls remained returned 103,821 votes out of 2.338,437 cast, only 4,43 %, as
compared to the 11,49 % of four years before. Parliament now held four Rexist d6putes '
and four Rexist senators (as opposed to 21 deput6s and 12 senators in 1936).
As war became immjnent. Rex supported the king's reaffirmation of Belgian
neutrality and constantly objected to seeming tendencies towards alliances with the
allies against Germany. For Rex, neutralism was to be of the strictest kind, for only
thus would invasion by either side be prevented. Neutralism, however, quickly
.
changed to passivism after Reich troops enter Belgian territory on May 10, 1940 (an
event which surprised Rexists greatly, for they had firmly believed that neutralism
would keep the peace). During the entire eighteen-day military campaign against the
Germans. Rex kept demanding surrender to the invading forces, which, it declared,
could never be overcome anyway. By August 1940 when Degrelle. miraculously
returned alive from imprisonment in France. got permission to start up Le Pays reel
again, passivity, in turn, became collaboration. For the -n ext four years, Degrelle and
Rex, though slowly drawing apart. would each in their own way work closer and closer
with Nazi occupation forces . In 1944, DegreUe would be honored with the Ritterkreuz
and would be complemented by Hitler with "Si j'avais un fils, je l'aurais aime tel que
vous."9?
"

The story of this collaboration must be left to a separate work.98

9?Etienne, p. 171.
98M. Martin Conway of Oxford University, Oxford, England, is presently writi.ng a
dissertation for the Doctorate of Philosophy on this subject.
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Cit_per four

UOD

lie,roUe

As I have discussed in the last chapter, phase four of the Rexist. movement
began with the 1937 elections. Rex in this period was not only fading fast and far, but
Degrelle was sepa.ra.ting himself more and more from the movement. There were
specific reasons for this: his background, his character. his personal ambitions. It is
necessary. therefore. to take a look at where the formost Rexist leader came from. what
he was like. and what were his goals. This chapter is a brief window into Degrelle as a
person, as a politician. an orator. and a writer.

BiogGphical chronoloav:
Leon Degrelle was born on June 15. 1906 to a middle-class family of comfortable
means in the southern Belgian town of Bouillon. He was the fourth of eight children
(the eldest son having died before Leon's birth) and was named after his paternal
grandfather. The Degrelle family can be traced back to the 16th century Ardennes.
bordering between France and Belgium. Leon's branch of the family had moved to
Gonrieux. then to Solre-le-Chiteau. near Maubeuge, France. in the 1800s. before
Edouard, his father, set up shop as a brewer to the chiteau of Bouillon and became a
Belgian citizen -- the family had, until then, always been citizens of France. On June 12,
1895; Edouard married Marie Boever, from Laroche, on the Luxembourg side of the
Moselle river. Mme. Boever-Degrelle c~e from a long line of doctors -- respected
citizens of the community -- and her own father had long been -involved in ~local
I

Catholic Party: at first, in campaigns against liberalism in the late 1870s, and then, as
head of the local Party organization. 1 His position would later on greatly influence the
young Leon. Degrelle describes his father as a well-off, yet modest and honest man;
like others,

1Usmard Legros, Un homme. un chef. Leon Degrelle (BruxeHes, Editions Rex, 1938),
p.28.
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Lm]on pere 6tait un bourgeois, et Ie notaire ou Ie m6decin etaient
des bourgeois. Mais ils saluaient en passant devant leur porte Ie
forgeron et Ie tanneur, parce que Ie forgeron et Ie taD.neur, comme
eUI, gagnaient leur vie, et avaient beaucoup d'enfants, ils etaient
honn~tes et travailleurs. 2
So the young L60n grew up in a stable environment, with, undoubtedly, a
considerable amount of attention paid to him - since he vas the oldest son -- but
attention limited by the rules of strict Catholic upbringing. Indeed, not only did he
attend primary school at the CoUege diocesain de Bouillon, run by secular priests, but
his mother brought all her children to mass every morning and held daily evening
prayers at ~ome before the family statue of the Virgin Mary.S The boy's early
education was only briefly interrupted by the Great War. In 1914, as the German
armies were moving across Belgium, the Degrelle family (and most of the rest of
Bouillon) fled across the border to Sedan, only to return to. their native town when the
French city began to be attacked itself. Degrelle later recounted in rather elaborate
(and, often, gruesome) detail his impressions of the flight south and the four year
occupation.4 As a quiet and meditative eight-year-old boy, the experience was
obviously quite shocking and memorable, though life soon returned to more normal
conditions, as he continued the daily school routine. 5 At twelve, he switched to the
Institut Saint-Pierre, in Bouillon, and, at fifteen, was sent off to the Jesuit College de
Notre-Dame-de- la-Paix at Namur, 91 kilometers ~o~th of Bouillon. Having always been
,

somewhat. unhappy at school. the young Degrelle soon found comfort in his literary
.

exploits at.

~

.

the College. He read avidly -- even secreUy.late into the night, with the.

help of a flashlight and a blanket, says Pierre Daye -- and excelled especially in

2Leon Degrelle, as quoted by Brassillach. Leon Degrelle et l'avenir de Rex (Paris.
Librairie Pion. 1936). p. 478.
3Legros. p. 33-42
4Pierre Daye mentions this unpublished work, written in Degrelle's adolescence, in his
Leon Degrelle et Ie rexisme (Paris, A.Fayard et Cie., 1937), p. 35-46.
'Legros, p. 33-42.
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rhetoric. perhaps already a sign of his future career.6 His peers and teachers didn't
think favorably of him. yet nevertheless stood in awe of him: "Ils raiment peu
pourta.nt. car iIs sont deconcertes par son caractere si entier. Eleve espiegle, vif.
spirituel. it agace parfois et fascine toujours par sa. facilite et son abondance
litteraires."? Degrelle completed his second latine (roughly equivalent to our
secondary school) and decided to stay an extra year in Namur. in order to get his
candidature en ohilosoohie et lettres. Unfortunately. the end of the year did not bring
him success. After failing his candidature exam. he opted for a drastic move and
enrolled himself at Louvain university to prepare for a doctorate in law . He
successfully finished his first three years of study there. passing exams for philosophy
and letters, art and archeology. and philosophy according to Saint Thomas. 8 After this
initial sucess. however. he nevertheless failed to complete his degree. though this time
because of extra-curricular activities.
No matter how applied a student Degrelle was. his efforts were usually diverted
to some sort of journalism. Writing had been one of his favored pastime from early on .
As an adolescent. he had had several pieces published in various journals. including a
reflective one about All Souls' Day in L'Avenir du Luxembourg. a conservative journal
begun parUy under the auspices of his mate~nal grandfather. 9 It is at Louvain.
however. that his writing career really took off. Soon after entering the university. he
'\

had joined Nouvelle '£guipe. a writer's group directed by Yvan Lenain, and had become
~.

6Daye, p. -49. .
i'Legros.p. -43. Rexist biographers of Degrelle disagree on the leader's psychological
state while in Namur. Daye writes that the Bouillon student was prone to frequent and
severe depreSSions. Legros. on the other had. refutes these and says that they were
only usual. adolescent crises. out of which. and with the help of his strong religious
faith. Degrelle always managed to lift himself: ".. .les traits dominants de sa nature
etaient la joie et la volonte," [Legros. p. 16.1 One wonders why neither of them ever
ventured to· ask Degrelle himself; after all. he was alive at the writings. At any rate.
both authors characterize the student as a loner in his thoughts. however happy or
melancholic they may have been.
SDaye. p. 50-51.
9Legros. p .50.
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its secretary. Around 1927, Degre11e also began supporting himself by writing at n'trIe
Sieele, a we11-known Catholic journal with offices in Brussels. (He would continue to do
so until he became head of his own publishing house at the AClBJ More importanUy,
in 1927, he became director of the student newspaper, L'Avant-Garde, and launched his
career not only as a prolific and regularly-published journalist, but also as a leader -- a
career which would continue to develop, first, at the Cahiers de la Ieunesse Catholique
(Giovannni Hoyois, director). then, at Les Editions Rex (AClB) and Les Presses de Rex.
Though a loner as a child, immersed in whatever books he could get his hands
on, Degrelle had aJ.ways had visions of himself as a leader of social cha;nge. "En outre,
la justice saciale vivait en moi parce que vivait en moi la passion de 1a justice tout court
et l'eian vers la fraternite que Ie Christ a apportee aux hommes," 10 Indeed, he had
developed his ideas on how to bring about such changes from early on, and he waited
only for the right moment to declare them to the world around him and to put them into
action, An opportunity for the first arose when he began writing for the journal n'Sieele and, specifically, when they publishe.d his series of articles on "Les Taudis" in

1929. While exposing the sometimes horrendous conditions of worker slums in several
prominent Belgian towns, he also articulated some of his theories on social change,l1
Established political parties weren't paying attention to the workers, he argued, and the
Catholic Church was too closely tied to political and capitalist powers -- especially those

,

'\

in the Catholic Party,- even if technically distinct from the Church -- to be trusted by
the workers, ' It was no wonde~, therefore, that most of them lived "en dehors de toute
vie spirituelle,"12 Yet, if anything, it was religion which would make the difference, It
was up to Christianity to turn the situation around. to bring back the faith in a mystical

10Jean-Michel Charlier, Leon Degrelle: Persiste et signe: interviews recueillies pour la

television francaise par Jean-Michel CharHer (Paris, Jean Picollec, 1985). p . 65.
11 Because I was unable to get hold of a copy of "Les Taudis," I am relying on my other
readings for information as to its contents,
12Leon Degrel1e. as quoted in Charlier. p, 58 .
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and awe-inspiring religion to the Belgian people; though, a Christianity emanating not
directly from the Church, but, rather, from her lay activists:
La religion devait redevenir pure,' se liberer de ses compromissions,
ramener tout a sa mission strictement divine. C'etalt aux lalcs chretiens a retrousser leurs manches pour petrir la p4te temporelle. 13

Degrelle's strong Christian upbringing and education undoubtedly steared him
towards this goal, but it was Mgr. Picard and the AClB which transformed a vague
intent into real action. · In a relationship of student-teacher with the chaplain, he was
~ght that social

change through Christianity and lay action meant Catholic action,
-

,

His months at the Cahiers de la Ieunesse Catholigue gave him the opportunity to refine
his rhetoric of social change under close pedagogic supervision. Yet the supervision
did not prevent him from pursuing his own visions at the same

time. By 1928-1929, his

purely apostolic career had acq~ired more and more political characteristics. As he
himself declared,
Avingt ans, je voulais, je 1'ai dit, je Ie repete, me vou'er totaieinent
a une vie d'apOtre.l Mais ma situation etalt deja, quand meme, assez
compliquee parce que ma vie apostolique etait melee aussi -- que je
Ie voulusse ou non -- a un certain nombre de positions extrareligieuses. 14 .
This may be so, but however much the infringement of politics on his religious mission
seemed inevitable, DegreJIe atso deliberately 'brought on politization of his actions. His
attacks on politicians in "Les Taudis" -verecertainly intentional, as were those on the
"

Mexican leftist regime. The story of the latter is interesting as a case study.
•

•

"'\.

I

In 1929, a year after President Obreg6n had been assassinated, Degrelle wrote an
article for ~ Siec1e denouncing the cruel treatment ofCatholic5 by the Mexican
government and praising the act of the assassin: "A chaque nouveau Torral, nous nOU5
ecrierons de tout notre coeur: bravo!"15 This, of course, caused a scandal among leftist
13Charlier, p. ')0.
14Charlier, p. 6"1.
1'Jean-Michel Etienne, Le Mouvement rexiste jusgy'en 1910 (Paris, Librairie Armand
Colin, 1968), p. 13.
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circles in Belgium and Degrelle was challenged to go see for himself. Unexpectedly.
perhaps, but with determination. Degrelle did set out at the end of the year for Central
America (using a pseudonym for safety, Paul Nanson, a 28 year old doctor).16 One may
well ask just what his actual motives were in acknowledging the challenge. Was it
adventure that sent him on his way? VI as it his Christian faith? Was it a political" move?
All three seemed to have played a role, though the first two served as base for the third.
Degrelle yearned for the new, for the exciting; and, as a strong believer, he felt a bond
of brotherhood with the oppressed Mexican Catholics. But, most of all, he had visions of

,

himself saving the world.

Nous serions bien tOt, nous, jeunes revolutionnnaires de 1'Europe
qui naissait, les porteurs du veritable socialisme, recon citian t l' ordre
indispensable de 1'Etat et la justice sociale, dans la collaboration des
c.lasses a.rtificiellement et criminellement dressees l'une contre
l'autre par Ie marxisme et, tout autant, par l'hypercapitalisme. 17
Degrelle probably saw himself as the new conqueror of Marxist evils. An investigatory
trip to Mexico, commissioned by a leading Catholic newspaper -- u'rrw Siecle (the
Italian newspaper, L'Avenire d'Italia, also paid him in advance for articles) -- could
only enhance his chances at making a name for himself within the Catholic world.
Thus, with a f~ade of active faith (a f~ade which, granted. had its genuine
counterparts on the inside) and with a longing for thrilling adventure. Degrelle's

16Etienne,. p. 13. Legros, p. 95. He is the~ supposed to have received two grants fQr
translation of his no"tes on Me~ico in English and Spanish, respectively. The llJnds he
collected he used for a speedy sight-seeing trip north through the United States and
into Canada. [Degrelle, Mes Aventures au Mexigue (Louvain, Editions Rex. 1933), p. 80811 Though most historians of Rex note this trip, Martin Conway, a present-day
historian of the movement, doubts it ever took place. His argument is supported by th!,
fact that no specific references to the journals who published the articles have ever
been found. [Letter from Martin Conway to me, dated 17 Feb .. 1987].
17Charlier. p. 48. One must be careful not to assign Degrelle's later theories on these
early events, for. no matter how much he has convinced himself that his ideas
remained unchanged from day one. they did evolve over time. Thus, what he recalls
may not actually have occured exactly as he thinks. Here, however, I think one can
safely assume that his dreams of a youthful world-changing revolution had. at least
vaguely. already emerged at an early age. These would later become more refined. as
they became more specific and inflammatory.
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hopes for recognition could become true. Apostolicism was certainly no longer the
only purpose he had in lire.
Back in Louvaill in early spring 1930, Degrelle's apostolic-political career
received a big push from his appointment as director of Les Editions Rex (though his
education suffered, since, after passing the first exam for his doctorate in law, he failed
the second and never bothered to retake it>.iS Here, finally, was the chance he had
been waiting for to let the world know about his theories for social change. The
relationship with Mgr. Picard now transformed itself into a true partnership, with
Picard as director of the entire ACjB organization and Degrelle as director of its branch
of propaganda. Equipped with refined theories and rhetoric, as well as a founding base
"

of co-workers and co-believers (drawn from L'Avant-Garde days and Cahiers writers),
Degrelle vas ready to become a leader of social change. 19 As head of his ovn
institution, he certainly exercized much control. yet this control was still qualified by
ACjB rules; that is, the purpose of propaganda was apostolic. Involvement in politics
was alloved only for religious purposes.
Ce qui importe, disait-illDegrellel. c'est de s'int6resser aux proble-

mes politiques de chez nous, d'etudier, d'assurer la penetration
chr6tienne dans Ie pays et les mesures a. prendre pour assurer Ie
redressement material et moral d'une Patrie que la Charite et la
Justice nous imposent d'aimer et de servir. 20
This was not an alien phenomenon to Degrelle, and apostolicism remained an integral
part of his theorization throughout the pre-var period. However, the weight,it carried
~

in relation to 'politics in the miSsion for social transformation changed over time ,
Before 193<{, apostolicism held a higher position in Degrelle's mind than politization.
The books he published were on rather subdued subjects, and, if political, not
18Etienne limits Degrelle's trip to about one month, January-February 1930. In Mes
Aventures au Mexique, however, Degrelle writes about three months in Mexico,
folloved by unspecified weeks in the north American continent. [Degre11e, p. 80-81 J
19Future Rexists already at the Cahiers included men like Albert Fasbender, Georges
Buquet, Charles d'Ydewalle, and Jean Denis. [Legros, p. 80-811.
20Degre11e, as quoted by Legros, p. 82-23.
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outrighUy so. I.n 1930. for instance. he compiled a, short volume on his experiences at
Louvain and at L'Avant-Garde in Les grandes farces de Louvain. Here. he continued his
presentation, begun earlier in leunes plumes et vieilles barbes de Belgique, of the
many pranks andjokes he and his companions engaged in as students. 21 Though the
anecdotes included attacks on various politicians. the intent and main body of the b?ok
",as not expliciUy political. Even his travel analogue on Mexico avoided any thoughtout attacks on the goverment. 22 It is more a romantization of "'hat must have been a
not all too lu~rious trip than a political tre~se on the evils of Marxism and the glories
of Catholicism. Degrelle also kept the journal Rfi. more apostolic than political. Before '
1934. the tiUes varied between Rex: Toute la Vie des Lettres and Rex: Toute la Vie des
Catholigues. Rexist propagandists were emphatically reminded:
N' oubliez pas non plus que votre premiere arme, votre grande
arme, est Ii priere.! Chaque matin, Ie propagandiste de Rn doit
demander a Dieu de benir son travail et tout notre mouvement.!
Soyez tiers de votre mission. Vous collaborez a Une oeuvre qui ne
veut que la rechristianisation de la Belgique. Vous etes les ouvriers
de 1a premiere heure et des temps difficiles; vous etes, par excellence, des apOtres modernes ... 23
Whereas before 1934. Rex was a tool of the ACjB, after the split. it vas a tool for
itself. Propagandists nov spread not only the Catholic Word, but also the Rexist Word.
The message to the troops vas different: "... Tout ancien militant de l' A.C.J;B. doit etre
membre actif des organismes d' Action'Catholique existants. Mais EN MEME TEMPS [sic J it
"

doit etre 'de Rex'."24 Degrelle was nov h~ad not only of a publishing house, but also of
"\

a nev movement -- for, as outlined 'above (chapter one), by 1934, Rex had become a
movement. Once released from the confines of the ACjB; Degrelle freely politicized his
movetitent until, at Courtrai, he openly declared it political. By 1935, the balance had
21 Leon Degrelle. feunes olumes et vieiHes barbes de Belgigues <louvain.l'Avant-

Garde, 1928)
22Leon Degrelle. Mes Aventures au Mexigue <Louvain. Editions Rex, 1933)
23Amand Geradin. "Coin des propagandistes." in Rn. no. 22, Sept. 9.1933. p. 14.
24ReneJurant, Jean Denis, Roger Saussus. "Aux anciens de l'A.C.J,B: Pourquoi. nous vos
anciens dirigeants. no us sommes Rexistes," in Rn. no. 40, Oct. 12. 1934. p. 9.
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most definitely been tipped. Cou.rtra.i marked the end of the supremacy of apostolicism
and the beginning of the supremacy of politics in DegreUe's theories on social change.
Politics was no longer limited to religious issues. Politics was engaged in for the sake of
politics -- Rexist politics.
In these early political stages, Degrelle saw himself primarily as leader of a
movement, not as politician per ~ This is why he chose not to run for election in 1936.
He wanted to direct the stage from above and remain outside the petty workings of the
Parliamentary system.
Pour Ie redressement total, il taut la mobilisation de l'opinion
publique.! C'est la que REX [sic Jveut faire la grande et salutaire
besogne. C'est la qu'est la v6ritable offensive.! Et c'est pour cela
que j'ai voulu rester moi-meme a ce poste capital et essen tiel du
combat, laiSS3.11t sur Ie front partiel et momentane du Parlement
un groupe de Rexistes sacrifies a l'avance. 25
By 1937, however, he was willing to.thrown himself whole-heartedly into the political

.scene. He wanted to direct from the inside. DegreUe had long been fascinated by the
way Hitler "legally" came to power and secretly longed to do the s~e. He, too, thought
he could get to the top by popular acclaim -- or, at least, make it appear so. The 1937
election was certainly planned as a propaganda move for the Rexist party-movement in
general, but it was also the next step for DegreUe. DegreUe was a tricky politician. He
watched his career very closely, careful not to make too large steps too soon. As
specific events occured~ he figured out exactly how they could serve his personal
career. He wanted·to lead the' .q.ation. This was an extravagant goal, but one w~ch he
seemed determined to reach. Looking back at this attempted "legal" coup, one might, at

first, think that DegreUe had, once again, really played his cards right. AU odds
pointed towards a close race, even when faced with one candidate, M. Van Zeeland,
instead of the expected three, and it was only the Cardinal's -declaration ex cat11edra
which ruined his chances, But. not only vas Van Zeeland an unusually charismatic
2'Degrelle, as quoted by Jacques Saint-Germain, La BataiUe de Rex (Paris, __ , 1937).
p.160-161.
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politician. Degrelle.as £tienne so astutely points out, had also been too ambitious in his
endeavor. 26 He was not swept into power because he simply did not have the support.
The ~any who had voted for his party in 1936 had believed in Rex's newness, in its
promises. But. as the year went by. and Rexist rhetoric and propaganda contained only
ridiculing of the establishment. -- "[pJolltiquement. Ie ridicule ~e toujours ... " -- only
seditious attack after seditious attack. they lost faith. 21 Degrelle had miscalculated,
had, indeed. made a fatal mistake. No matter how many thousands he might have
attracted to his meetings. his personal popularity on these occasions could not win
Brussels over to the Rex movement. Degrelle did not lose in 1937. his whole movement
did. An.d though he was able to get a seat in Parliament in the 1939 general elections.
this personal success did not imply a Rexist success.
One might wonder just how much Rex ~ Degrelle. He did, of course, form the
movement initially and did mold it, in its early years, according to his ideals. He made it
political, Ja started it in Parliament, Jut tried to have it become the ru.ling party in 1937.
Up to 1937, then, Degrelle was indeed Rex; his personal success m~ant the movement's
success. Yet 1937 marked a turning point in the movement. For. I would argue, not
only did it not collect the vote of confidence it had expected, but its leader, for the first
time, put his own career before the movement's career. 1937 represented the point at
which his personal ambition began taking over the movement's goals. Indeed, he had
first wanted to reach ultimate power witiiin Parliament by getting himself elected to all
- ~
seats, one after the other (i.e. dnce elected, he would resign, and then run and get
elected to the next seat, and resign. and so on until he could declare that he had the
support of alD.28 Though this plan would never have worked -- and was just another
example of Degrelle's "megalomanie," his lack of any sense of proportion -- it

26£tienne. p.139.
21Etienne, p. 139.
28£tienne, p.133.
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exemplifies his impatience for pet'Sonal power.29 In other words. after 1937. Degrelle
was the leader of Rex. but Rex was Rex. the party-movement. and not synonymous vith
Degrelle. Having reached a peak in its growth. the movement had developed an
identity of its own. Its philosophies and rhetot'ic might still be those of its leader (as. in
fact, they vere), but its life cout'Se would not puallel that of Degrelle's.
The pattern of the movement's development was cyclic, and waS controlled by its
leader only at the outset. Degrelle had created the movement in 1933-1934. Degrelle
would recr~ate the movement after the plummetting of the 1939 elections and the
turmoil of the outbreak of war. Then, once it had again reached a str~ngth of its own. it
'Would branch off and evolve separately. unrelated to its founder's personal political
developments. After 1941, Degrelle devoted all his energies to the Legion Wallonie and,
purposely, it seems, ignored the movement back home. Having travelled the path from
movement leader to political leader. he nov became military leader as well (or. rather,
pt'imarily). At the end of the 'War, Degrelle and his movement vere condemned
separately. He. as a collaborating military leader; it, that is, Rexist vartime leadet'S. as a
collaborating movement. Both had run their cout'Se separately. The movement died out
on its own. left 'Without support and leadet'Ship.
(Degrelle lives a comfortable life in Spain. He owns a luxut'ious villa on a
hillside, filled 'With expensive antiques and an array of books. many on Rex and Redst
'. \

Degrelle.l

Degrel1e as orator:
Everybody agrees that Degrelle vas a forceful speaker. In fact, it vas his
speaking skills along vith his innovative propaganda techniques vhich really von
him public recognition in 1935-36. Degrelle seems to have had the ability to entrance
his audiences. Listening to the Rexist chef vas more like undergoing a religious
29Etienne. p. 32.
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conversion than attending an inteUectual or political lecture. In his introduction,
Pierre Daye relates how he first met Leon DegreUe, when arranging a publishing
contract with Les Presses de Rex in January 193'. The chief editor seemed like just
another publisher. "Je Ie confesse, cette premiere rencontre avec Leon DegreUe n'a
pas marque d'une f~on extraordlnaire dans ma memoire,"30 Three months later,
however, Daye took his chances and went to hear the Rexist leader in his first big
public meeting in Brussels, at the Cirque Royal (May 1. 193'). The results were
astounding: "Cette fois, je m'en souviens, je me sentis impressionne. Quel feu dans la
parole de ce jeune gar~on, queUe conviction, queUe force dans Ie raisonnement! Je
sortis en chant6 ... "31 Degrelle was

an: actor and cerlainly had a way with words, though

critics accused his speeches of having no worthwhile content. The New York Times
made him out to be a kind of imcomprehensible nimcompoop:
As he speaks, he gesticulates without any special relation to what
he is saying, flinging his arms forward and backward and raising
and lowering them in movements long practiced before mirrors ....
He does not win his hearers by the soundness of what he says but
captures their hearts with sentimentality.32
Degrelle had obviously caught on to the importance of image-politics.
The beginnings of Leon DegreUe's speaking career are almost synonymous with
the beginnings ofhis political career. He ha~l. of course, often given stimulating _
speaches to his L'AYant-Garde colleagues, enticing them to their many farces. IDs first
,

public address, however, vas at Charleroi, in 1933, a rather minor speech in support of
.

'"\.

several radio'stations whose air-time had suddenly been cut by the government. 3S In
the ensuing months. Degrelle frequently stood before small groups of local Rexist
supporters and educated them in a passionate voice about Christian morality and how
SOnaye. p. 7-8.
31naye, p. 8.

32The Nev York Times, Jan . 25,1937, p. -4:6. Pierre Daye, of course, found perfect
harmony with the speaker's gesticulations. "Quels gestes magnifiques, amples, facHes.
justes! Eloquence l1aturel1e [sid avant tout." [Daye, p. 2-431.
33Legros, p.117-118 .
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Rex was going to rejuvinate it. In February 1934, he tried his luck in Brussels and spoke
at a gathering of 1,000 at the "salle de la Madeleine" about a program of national
reform. 34 He planned the Charleroi meeting in October 1934 because he was
encouraged by these small successes. What ended up in a fiasco was to have been the
first meeting of a really magnanimous scale, where Degrelle's audience would suddenly
have been enlarged from several hundred to several thousand listeners. This last event
having failed, it was not until April 21, 193' that Rex managed to organize its own
grand meeting -- at Namur, with F~ther Laffineur, on the theme "Catholiques,
reveillez-vous," a phrase which appeared frequenUy in Rn before and after the
meeting. 35 On May 1, as Pierre Daye recounted (above), Degrelle moved into the capital
once again, this time to rent the huge Cirque Royal and to speak, along- side Father
Laffineur and the weU-known writer, Pierre Nothomb, on "Le salut du peuple."36 All

4,000 places were sold. (Prices ranged from ,0 FB for reserved seats to 2 FB for aisle .
seats or standing room.>3? The success of the event must have proven to Degrelle that
he could now hold meetings on his own, without the crutch of such famous men like
Nothomb, for, from then on, he was the only featured speaker at the great gatherings.
From then on, also, as the meetings became more and more frequent and more and
more elaborate, Degrelle's language became more and more flamboyant. Courtrai made
him famous throughout the nation not only because of his clever engineering of
manoeuvres (getting '300 followers infiltrated inot the hall) but also because of his
"\

language. Huge crowds of Rexists and simply curious people now c~e to see and hear
him. On November 11, 193', he rented Brussels' Palais des Sports, a building which

34£tienne, p. 23.
3'Usually, enclosed within a square of thick, dark lines, as, for instance. it appeared
within an article by Mary Mace. 'Taction m~onnique," in Rex, no. 49. Dec . H. 1934,
p.15.
36£tienne. p. 27.
31Legros, p. 142.
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cquld hold at leaSt 12,000 people. As usual, Rex prepared for the great event with
frequent advertisements, such as this one:
Le 11 novembre aura lieu a. Bruxelles, au Palais des Sports, Ie plus
formidable meeting que des catholiques auront jamais donne en
Belgique. 11 groupera en effet 2'.000 auditeurs. Ce meeting geant
sera signe: REX. Sujet: Debout, les vivantsl 38
The whole presentation was dramatic, as was the speaker's oratory. A military march
served as prelude to his discourse. Then, when Socialist groups who had gotten in with
false Rex cards (much as the Rexists had at Courtrai), began clamoring and playing
their own "I.nternationale," he shouted o~t with vehemence but co~plete contz:-ol,.
Si on croit nous empecher de parler ...on se trompe, un rexiste ne
se 1aisse jamais vaincrel.."{And, after more disruption'] Je recommencerai tant qu'll faudra. Nous resterons ici jusqu'au matin s'll
Ie faut. Ceux qui veulent m'empecher de parler sont des hommes
qui pretendent agir au nom de la liberte. Les perturbateurs qui
veulent interrompre seront expulses
(as, indeed. they were. by "gendarmes" and "service d'ordre).39 Following. came along
eulogy to those dead Cor Belgiuoi.in the 1830 revolution. and a questioning of whether
the ideals they had fought Cor had come true.
Comment se Cait-il que Ie monde ne soit pas chretien. que la famille
et la morale soient bafouees? [asked Degrelle. He concluded with] ....
11 n 'y a aucune force au monde qui nous detournera de notre chemin
parce que c'est pour la verite que no us luUons. Nous nous sommes
juds de sauver notre peuple./ Nous sommas soutenus dans notre
action dans tous les coins du pays. Rev~illez-vous si vous avez du
sang d~s les veines.l Debout les vivantsr'0
"

It is undoubtedly this kind oC engaging' talk which attracted so many Belgians
to
"').
,

I

the new political Party in 1936 {and which. as the language became too violent,

l8"Rex." no. 41. Oct. 11, 1935. p. 32 .. The 25.000 figure was obviously an exaggeration.
The hall probably held from 12.000 to 15.000, and a few thousand more attempted to hear
from outside. [Etienne. p. 123J.
39 Jean Ladriere and Robert Pfeiffer, L'Aventure rexiste (Bruxelles, Pierre de Meyere,
1966), p.36. The authors do not make c1earwhether the "gendarmes" and "service
d'ordre" were the same thing. It appears that Rexist meetings were protected both by
official police forces and by their own "troupes de choc." [Degrelle, as quoted by
Ladriere and Pfeiffer, p. 371.
40Ladriere and Pfeiffer, p. 38-39.

92

susequently sent many old or prospective Rexists away in 1937 and 1939). The Brussels
meeting was followed by other such gatherings, until early 1937, when Degrelle found
a new tactic, six meetings in a row! The Six lours de Rex. as they were named, took place
again at the Palais des Sports and covered the expected, already iterated topics: "Les
scan dales et la revolte des citoyens," "Rex reconstruira.l'Etat," "Justice sociale. Paix
flamande," "La jeunesse. Les valeurs morales de l'Eglise," and "Au-dela des partis: la
Patrie."41 As with the single meetings, these too filled the Patais and overflowed into
the street outside.42 Whatever he did, Degrelle always seemed to manage to gather a
crowd around him, whether of supporters or enemies.
Theatrics characterized Rexist meetings. Audiences were seated in orderly rows
of chairs, standing room was sectioned off so as not to block passageways. The hall was
arrayed with large red, black and white Rexist flags and vas brightly illuminated by
stage lamps. Banners carrying messages in French and Flemish strung the walls, e.g .
. "Les parties, c'est la haine ..... or "... Rex Vaincra'" Aisles vere kept clear by blueuniformed order-keeping forces, especially the central one, to allow the procession of
the ~ a grand approach. Degrelle vould deliver his speeches from a podium several
feet above the crOWd, standing, vith groups of his young supporters behind him. in
order, at attention, Renst style (women on one side, men on the other, arms crossed,
listening intently to their mentor).4! The leadervouldspeak forcefully,
enthusiastically, actively. He would have a microphone at his disposal, though his
"\.

voice seemed to carry without it. To borrow from Daye again.vho admired Degrelle's
oratorical mannerisms so much:
41Ladriere and Pfeiffer, p. 84. The sixth evening vas given over to "Un magnifique
gala artistique." lLadriere and Pfeiffer, p. 841.
42Etienne, p. 123.
43Tb,is d~scription is my interpretation of several photographs ofRexist meetings
found in Degrelle and Denis, Rex. Renaissance de la Patrie (no page numbers). Though
the plates are not dated, I think one can assume the format was the one employed from
early stages on. The description, in
of the 1934 Charleroi meeting which never
took place mirrors these pictures almost exactly. (See plate 7) .
.

m
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Des mots a. tout Ie monde, mais des traits tpres, ironiques, lances
d'un organe sonore, metallique, si puissant qu'un jour ou, devant
douze mille ~uditeurs, les fils des haut-parleurs avaient eta sabotes
et coupes, Degrelle put continuer a. parler durant une heure sans
que ron perdU, aUl derniers rangs, une syllabe de ce qu'll disait. 44
No matter haw accurate the description, it still gives an impression of what Degrelle
must have sounded like; strong and authoritarian to those who liked him, violent and
dangerous to critics. The forcefulness still remains today. Even when having a normal
conversation, he speaks loudly, gruffly, to the point where it is almost unbearable to
hear.45

Degrelle as writer:
Besides being an orator, Degrelle was, of course, chiefly a writer. His early, pre-

1936 writings cover a wide variety of subjects, with Belgium as the only common
denominator. In 1928, while still at L'Avant-Garde. he published both Les flam in gants
and Ieunes plumes et vieiUes barbes de Belgique. The first stressed the need for mutual
understanding between the historically antagonistic cultural communities of Belgium.
The second, on the other hand, was a comical representation of the student journalists
at Louvain and various Catholic leaders, here made out to be Turksj46 Being
independent and young, Degrelle was able to seek out adventuresome topics for his
articles. His journalism did, in fact, often bring him to far-off lands. In 1929, still a
student, but ~ow also ~ewly-appointed associate eoitor at ~ Sit3cle, his seri~ of

44Daye, p. 242.
45De Wilde, "Au ban de la SS," pt. 8 of television-series L'Ordre Nouveau, RTB-Fran~ais,
1983. P. de Vos, "Leon Degrelle, par Leon Degrelle," taped interview, 1976.
46PierreDaye righUy notes that Degrelle will later use this love of laughter as a
political tool. beginning with his farces at Louvain and continuing with his scandals as
part of the Rex movement's tactics. But it is doubtful that the litUe book had any
premonitory intents. !Daye, p. 52] Because I have not been able to get hold of these
tracts, I am relying mosUy on Etienne' 5, as well as other historians', descriptions of
them. [Etienne, p. 12. Daye, p. 521.

94 .

articles on "l'Opera Ferrari" took hi.m to ltaly.41 January 1930, 'as mentioned above, saw
him off to Mexico for another set of articles for xxtmt~. Once settled as director of
"Les Editions Rex," Degrelle's travels were restricted, though he didn't stop writing or
publishing his works. -In 1930, he published both a collection of poems -- fIvers
enflammes." as Etienne calls them -- entitled Les tristesses d'hiver.48 and Furore
Teutonico. a commentative tract on a hot issue of the times. Louvain universityGermany relations.49 Shortly therea.fter, Les Taudis was published in: book form (see
above). In 1931. "Contre l'incineration; va-t-on, chez no us, rOtir les morts?" (a tract
against cremation and its freemasson promoters), as well as Meditations sur Louis
Boumal. an admiratory eulogy to one of Degrelle's fovorite authors. appea.red.'O
Thus. even when head of the AC]B propaganda. wing and. then, of his own.
evolving movement. Degrelle continued to turn out pamphlet after pamphlet. book
after book. fAll this. in addition to his newspaper articles!)'1 After Rex had definitely
turned to politics. however.

Degrelle'swriti~gswere

almost solely political. They

consisted either of attacks on parties or party members. such as Taccuse M. Segers.
I'accuse Ie ministre Segers d'!tre un cumulard. un bankster, un pillard d'epargne et un
4?This first trip to the Italian state deeply influenced him.. He encountered fascism for
the first time and began speCUlating on the different uses ,of Catholic action . [Etienne,

p.131.
48£tienne, p. 12.
49The university's rector, Mgr. Ladeuze,':Was bei~g accused of dangerous ~ro-German
tendancies because he refused to authorize the installation of a new, Ariglo-fa~ring
portal-tablet inscription, "furore teutonico diruta. dono americano restituta." Degrelle
sided with the rector.against the anti-clerical accusers. [Etienne, p. 121 '
50Louis Boumal was a young Walloon poet who wrote mostly on Wallonie, and whose
romantic and sentimental style Degrel1e admired and imitated. Boumal died at an early
age in the First World War.
.
51 Degrelle may have been a prolific writer, but he had no qualms about reusing
material. Many of the supposedly original articles by "great authors" which appeared
in Rexist newspapers were actually a patchwork of bits and pieces from other articles
or works by the author (the patchworking being done by Degrelle himself). Degrelle
even reused his own writings. The beginning of Le Message de Rex. for instance, is
repeated word for word in the chapter entitled "Champs" of Revolution des ames. (See
quote for note 55.) No wonder he was able to turn out so much writing: half of it was
c'u t and paste!
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l!.che (sic) (1936). or of handbooks to his movement. his Le Message de Rex. for
instance. written in September 1936 as an explanatory pamphlet on his new political
movement-party.
Degrelle's writing style has not really changed over time. It only got more
extreme as the movement entered the political realm. Degrelle uses essentially the
same style for his books as for his journalism. He writes very fluidly. often. as in Mes
Aventures au Mepgue. almost stream-of-consciousness-li.ke. IUs not the language of a
great intellectual, and the grandiloquent phrases followed by many suspension points
are mostly for effect. Though he would undoubtedly deny it. it seems that his concern
is more with the sound and appearance of the text, than with content. 52 Legros. an
admirer, describes it so:
L60n Degrelle ecrit d'un jet, spontan6ment, sans se corriger. Ses
oeuvres refletent l'harmonie de la nature qui !'inspire profond6ment.
Toutes les ressources de son talent viennent de ses ascendances et .
des puissants paysages ardennais qui vivent dans son ime.53
Usten. for instance, to his description of Belgium in his opening paragraph of Rex.
.
Renaissance de la Patrie:
Un fleuve qui descend entre les coUines blanches ou les lins vers
la mer; des quais endormis sous des g6raniums a Bruges; les ardoises
d'une vieille abbaye du Brabant; des chevaux de maraichers pres
d'une borne patinee par les hivers: une femme. sa denteUe ou sa
hotte: les on des maisons d'une grand' place. tout nous rappelle ,
-- berge, pierJ;'es. visages, eaux que convient les mers du Nord Ie passe magnifique et d6bordand,de notre peuple ... On ne nous a
pas improvises ·h ier. 54
His ardent patriotism ~ come through very well. and the language is very 'lyrical.
But, once one has read severa! examples ~f his writing, one has read them all. After a
while, it gets boring.

52Such a statement could be used to describe not only his oratory, but the whole
movement itself!
53Legros, p. 76.
"'Leon DegreUe and Jean Denis, Rex. Renaissance de 1a Patrie (Brux .. Editions Rex,
1940), no page numbers.
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Degrelle doesn't differentiate betveen political and non-political language.
This is because Rex is primarily a movement -- it entered politics only because it was
the only available route towards recognition -- and, specifically, a mouvement des

&mn. Therefore, wherever he can, Degrelle includes a paragraph or tvo of sentimental
phrases in his political pieces, serving as reminder that emotion, sentiment, ~ must
govern all other aspects of life and social action. Le Message de Rex was written in
September 1936 for old and new Rexists as an explanation of the new Rex partymovement. The bulk of the thirty-o'ne page pamphlet covers Rex attitudes on the usual
questions, Rex finances, workers, the people's rights, Belgium as a nation, Communism.
dictatorship (a denial of its merits). The first tvo chapters, however. introduce the ame
part of the movement. "Calme et douleur du soir" describes two idyllic lovers watching
and listening to the sounds of a summer evening, and compares this pastoral scene to
..... la route OU les autos arrachent Ie sol avec un crepitement de pluie tenace ... des
lumieres brutales. des visages vides, des yeux sans tOle ..... 'w hich inhabit the real
vorld." In 'Tame rexiste" (chapter two), Degtelle begins with a narrative of a recent
Rex meeting at Liege and uses it to move into a discussion of .lin. "Mais ce qui emanait
'par-dessus tout et qui fait vraiment la valeur des assemblees rexistes, c'etait celle
qualite de ftOle, celle vibration, ce don total d'une assistance, cette volonte de placer
par dessus tout, un ideal dans son desinteressement Ie plus absolu."56 Degrelle also had
"\

no qualms about mixing this kind of peaceful tone with loud, often vioJent outcries.
The last chapte~ of Le Messye 'de Rex is filled with phrases like
it faut agir et PRENDRE PART!. (sid.! Soit pour Ie redressement
audac1eux et complet du pays par Ie programme, la mystique et les
chefs de REX.! Soit pour la revolution du front commun, a la sauce
des Soviets. (sic) Ce sera Rex ou ce sera Moscou.! L' heure brutale
est arrivee OU it faut bien faire son chou. 51

"Leon Degrelle, Le Message de Rex (Brux., Editions Rex, 1936), p. 3.
,6Degrelle, Le Messaje de Rex, p. j.
,1Degrelle, La Message de Rex, p. 31.
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In summary, then, DegreUe's writiJlgs are numerous aJld varied, especially in
the early years. His laJlguage is both lyrical aJld extreme aJld, frequently, repetitive. It
seems that he wrote each of his pieces in one fell swoop, without taking much time to
revise, the aim being that it should all emaJlate directly from the soul, without
hindrance.
Degrelle continues to write today, apparently, though his works may not be
published in Belgium. 58

58Telephone interview with John Darnton, correspondent for The New York Times, on
Nov. 2:5,1986. These are mostly autobiographical, concentrating on the war years.
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Chapter fin

•••
Rexist Press

If Degrelle was the Rexist movement only until 1937, Rexist press ~ the
movement throughout the history of Rex. Degrelle himself declared at a meeting in
January, 1939 that "[c)'est par 11. presse que nous devons retourner Ie pays."1 Indeed.
Rex started out as a publishing house and the press was always an intergrai part, if not

a definition, of the movement. It is out of the press that the movement evolved,
through the press that it developed. and by the press that it was sustained. Its ups and
downs were signals
. of movement well-being
. . or setbacks. This final chapter is .
therefore devoted to the press as the most important unifying aspect of Rexism.

Press History:
Before 1930. Les Editions Rex had published the Cahiers de la Ieunesse
Catholigue. various pamphlets on Catholic subjects and an occasional book or two.
Their scope was too limited for Degrelle. He wanted to catch the attention of all Catholic
youth. if not of all Catholics. Les Editions Rex ought to disseminate literature having to
do with Catholic actuality as well as Catholic issues. he said. Soirees. a weekly guide to
movies, radio and travel. appeared for the first time on October 10, 1931. It was
sponsored by the Action Catholique. the Catholic cinema association. the Catholic radio
association. the travel agency Dux and Les Editions Rex. 2 Though tech.n ically not
owned by Rex editions -- and. therefore-",pot officially controlled by Degrelle -- Soirees
was published
by Les Editions Rex
and was edited by a close friend of Degrelle'!.and a
,
'
future Rexist ieader. Jean Denis. In effect. Degrelle directed the operation. And in
April. 1933. when Les Editions Rex bought out Soirees, Degrelle actually directed the
magazine, though still with Jean Denis as chief editor. Soirees was geared towards the
family -- the most important social unit in a Catholic society -- with articles on spiritual
1Leon Degrelle. as quoted by Jacques Lacomblez, "Leon Degrelle chez les rexistes
d'Etterbeek," in Le Pays reel. Jan. 12. 1939, p. 3.
2Jean-Michel Etienne, Le Mouvement rexistes iusgu'en 1910 (Paris, Librairie Armand
Colin. 1968), p. 15.
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matters as well

as information on entertainment events. 3 It averaged from 80 to 120

pages, 32 of which were devoted to listings of and commentaries on the week's radio
programs -- apparently a first in Europe. 4 Propagandist and salesman that he was,
Degrelle made sure every issue had a full-page picture of "une actrice magniflque" on
its front page. As he told a questioning Cardinal Van Roey, "Eminencel si je mets votre
visage en premiere page, je vendrai vingt mille exemplaires de moins que si je mets
une jolie fille.'"

The magazine was a hit. it seems, and collected some 10,000 FB to 12,000

FB each week. 6
Proof that Degrelle was the true director, of the magazine is the fact that he was
able to

use Soirees to advertise Les Editions Rex, which was, after all, only one of the

many sponsors of the journal. On September 30, 1932, the first issue of Rex appeared as
a four-page monthly insert to Soirees. Subtitled "pour que les catholiques lisent." it was
at first restricted to advertisements for Rex edition books 'and journals." Within a short
time, however, it began adding b.ook excerpts, book revues and commentaries. Rex
expanded so much that, on January 1. 1933. it detached itself from Soirees and was
published as a full-fledged. sixteen-page, bi-monthly, literary review with the title
"Rex: toute la vie des lettres." The new Rex had quite a following from the outset: its
circulation increased rapidly fro~ 25,000 in January, 1933 to 37.500 in Decembe~. 1933. 8
In ~ubsequ.,nt months, the journal's various titles reflected the evolution of the
' .'.

move~ent.

On March 22, 1934, as Rex was becoming more political and had se~rated
,

from. ilie ACJB, Degrelle fused Rn anc:( YWL a purely political newspaper, into a new,'
32 page weekly. As mentioned earlier, there were also financial reasons for the fusion;
3Jacques Saint-Germain, La BataiUe de Rex (Paris, __ ,1937), p. 69.
4Jean-Michel Charlier, Leon Degrelle: Persiste et signe: interviews recuei11ies pour la
television francaise par lean-Michel Charlier (Paris, j. Picollet, 1985). p. 68.
'Charlier, p. 68.
6Charlier, p. 68. This is equivalent to about $ 2,500 to $ 3,000 (1984 $)
?Etienne, p. 16.
8Etienne, p. 16.
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publishing the two together was cheaper than each separately. The title

"~ex:

toute la

vie des lettres" appeared on the front, "Vlan: toute la vie poHtique" on the back. Having
a double front page, so to speak, was a simple way of catching not only the eye of the
reader, but also that of the passer-by lookipg at the paper from behind! It also proved
that Rex still saw literary and political issues as distinct and equal in importance.
Though articles on each were intermingled with each other. one type did not
necessarily draw more weight than the other. On October 12.

193~,

the title of Degrelle's

journal was again "Rex: toute la vie de~ lettres." on the front. and "Rex: toute la vie
catholique." on the back. only to change once more to "Rex: l'apostolat: les lettres. la
cite." on both front and back. by february 22.193'. Then. starting around October,

193'. the title "Rex" alone appeared on front and back.
Rex was obviously looking around f~r the rig.ht phrase with which to define
itself. Although it did suddenly find itself independent after its expulsion from the
ACjB in January,

193~.

Rex nevertheless tried to stay on friendly terms with the

Church. Omitting the political part of the title would perhaps somewhat soften the
Church's heart. "Rex: l'apostolat.les lettres.la cite" encompassed most of the
characteristics of the specific Rexist movement that was emerging. Still strongly
apostolic. Rex was committed to apostolicism through the written word. and was
developing an ideal of bringing reform to the body politic and to society as a whole. La
,

rut could refer to the ~o1ic Celestial city. .to a people unified into a cite. 01' to--.. the
rights of citiZenship of one living in a cite. Although not ali aspects of cite may have
been addressed at one time. the word's many implications were a decided advantage.
Finally. "Rex" by itself identified the movement as a movement: one which cut across
all lines of class. religion and cultural background. By this time. Rex was Rex, and the
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single word was enough to define it. 9 The movement had found its base, a very wide
base which covered all facets of society, without having to differentiate between them.
The word "Rex," at this point, took up a quarter of the front page, and, as the movement
became more and more political, individual article tiUes became bolder and bolder,
often filling up another half of the page, as every effort was made to catch the reader's
attention, Chief editor of the paper dl,Jring this period of transformation was Amand
Geradin, replaced in August, 1934 by Robert de Vroylande. Degrelle, of course, as
director of the entire establishment, remained backbone of all operations.

YliJL the political twin of an. was the realization of another of Degrelle's
dreams. Like Ru., it began as a bi-monthly, appearing on alternate Saturdays with that
publication. By early February, 1934, YlAn. was published as a weekly, but was never as
successful as Rex, drawing a maximum of only 9,000 copies per week in December,

1933.10 YlJ.n.followed ReX closely in format, so that fusion of the two papers in March
simply meant binding two like elements together. Hubert d'Ydewalle was the official
director, but Degrelle was in ultimate control. Robert de Vroylande! Camille Jordan and
Raphael Sindic took turns at the job. as well.11
There were other minor and short-lived early Rexist publications. Foyer. first
.published in April. 1933. was. as the name suggests. an entertainment magazine for the
family. A young Rexist by the name of Guido Eeckels was in charge. Unfortunately. his
sometimes risque choice of serialized novels caused the newspaper some problems. so
.

.

~

that. when the movement hit financial hardship in 1934. fuvtt·was one of the first
Rexist publications to go.

~

edited by Roger Saussus and also initiated in 1933. tried

to make up for the not so apostolic leaning of other Rex publications. As with ~ its
9Notice, too, that Degrelle chose an opportune moment to reduce the title; in less than a
month he would make the first grand statement of Rexist politization at Courtrai.
Identical copies of Rex were simultaneously published in Flemish, as Rex-Flamand. and
in German, as ReX-Allemand.
10!tienne, p. 16.
l1!tienne, p. 16 .
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life was brief and unsuccessful. 12 Soirees itself was replaced on January 1. 1936 by
Rex-Illustre. The illustrated magazine lasted only until May 6,1936. however. by which
time the other major Rerist papers had become parUy illustres themselves.
During election time, a number of new newspapers would start up. For the
October 16, 1938 provincial elections, for instance, Rex-Audeuhem and Rex- Iette
appeared monthly from July to October, and Chant-clair (later Chant-glorieux)
appeared hi-monthly from June to October.13 Similarly, Le Salutdu peuple came out
just for the 1939 campaign. 14 It is the 1936 elections. however. which had the greatest
impact 0.0. the Rexist press. For these elections. two new organs of the press were
founded. L' Action rexiste was an educational monthly which lasted only from January
to May. Le Pays reel. however. managed to last until May 1940. Hubert d' YdewaLle was
its chief editor until his resignation from the movement in June 1937; although.-as
always. DegreUe made all the decisions. -As the first Renst daily. Le Pays reel was able
to saturate the country with Rexist propaganda. giving the movement the final push

necessary to win 11,49% of the vote on May 24, 1936. The paper started out with a
morning and evening edition. as weH as severa110cal editions: beginning in
September. 1936. a Flemish version. De Nieuye Staat. was also published under the
direction of Paul De Mont, head of Rex in Flanders. 1, As could be expec.ted, once the
Remt movement began to decline, so did the var~ous editions of Le Pays .reel. If
circulation for the -main French-language version was about 97,000 -in-Octobet 1936, it
-

.

-

~

12Etienne. p.IS.
13It is unclear how long other section newspapers lasted. The term mensuel or bimensuel at the top of the front page might mean that they were issued only during
election time. or that they came and went as local financial situations dictated (since
each section was responsible for its own press and propaganda). Rex-helles. for
instance was a four-page monthly whose October. 1938 issue was devoted solely to Rexist
candidates for the upcoming elections -- with photographic portraits and biographical
notes. but vhich must have continued to cover local events afterwards. since it vas
advertised in Rex. Jan. 4.1939, p. 2.
14Etienne. p. 6S.
1'Etienne. p. 69.
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had sunk down to no more than '0,000 by the end of 1937, and to barely 18,000 by

1939.16 (Even less economically stable, local papers undoubtedly ceased publication
completely when financial hardship set in.) Similarly, the number of pages fluctuated
with the movement's rise and decline. In June, 1936 Le Pays reel was six pages long, in
December twelve. The increase proves that Rex was thriving during that year. But by
May, 1938 it was only four pages 10n8, although two more pages were added later that
summer; by this time, the Rexist movement had lost much of its popularity and was
searching for a new plateau of stability. It remained at six pages (eight on Sundays)
throughout the first half of 1939 until, by late August, it was again reduced to four
pages -- this time, apparenUy, due to the imminent war. The price per issue in 1936 was

2, centimes; in 1939, it was ,0 centimes.
.

(An

issue of Rn. cost

n centimes in 1933 and 1
.

FB in 1937,) Like Ru., Le Pays r$el offered deals on subscriptions for different periods
of time, which saved the reader a few francs, though not many.
Le Pays reel's format was much mote changeable and disorganized than Rex's.
Articles were crammed together, especially as the number of pages decreased, and all
sorts of topics were placed indiscriminately side by side. Degrelle himself described the
difference between the two papers: the daily was "essentieUement de combat et destine
a.la masse. tandis que Rex s'adresse aux intellectuels."l? Perhaps mixing all sorts of
articles would expose this not-sa-differentiating audience to a wide variety of issues; or
.'.

vas the intent of variety tQ prevent boredom? A more plausible explanation seems to
~

be simple inexperience, bad planning, and lack of seriousness on the part of bo~
writers and editors of Le Pays reel. It is true that articles on political issues were
usually concentrated 'on the front and back pages, but they also appeared in the inner

16Etienne, p. 69-70 .
1?As quoted by Jacques Lacomblez, in "Uon Degrelle chez les rexistes d'Ette.rbeek," in
Le Pays .reel. Jan. 12, 1939. p. 3.
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pages. along with feature articles. articles on entertainment. serials. and radio
programs. 1S
At the outset. Le Pays reel was less literary than Rex. although by 1936 they
were quite similar in content. Both covered political issues. and both engaged in
sensationalist and inflamatory language. while stressing a particular moral code.
Topics varied from such heart-rending themes as "Une jeune fille. nee sans jambes. va
apprendre a danser sur des jambes artificielles." to world events like "Des mesures
americaines de represailles contre Tokio?"19 The front page articles of both papers
were usually of a political nature and were most often written by Degrelle himself -which means not only that he was quick with his pen. but that he felt confident about
writing on most any subject. Both papers also had feature columns which appeared in
every issue and which Degrelle left to other journalists. In the early ~tages of Rex.
Pierre Nothomb wrote a weekly column on contemporarY political events. entiUed "La
critique internationale." Similarly. in Januarr.1939 JoseStreel started writing an
opinion column in Le Pays reel in which he commented on Rexist philosophy.
contemporary events. and attacks made on Rex. Other regular columns were
anonymous. Short-takes on local events. for instance. filled Le Pays reel's "Les faits
divers." "Ces Messieurs et ces dames" was the Rex equivalent. with more emphasis on
interesting (or funny) events in the lives of important personalities -- a kind of comic"

strip in words. -In addition. Le Pays reel regularly published stock market figures and

.

....

also covered sporting events. And Rex always had one section devoted to literary and
film criticism. neaUy organized according to what could and could not be read or seen.
Finally. Rex. Le Pays reel. and even Rex-illustre all spiced up their issues with the nasty
but hilarious caricatures of "Jam." (See examples on plate 8.>
18An example of articles on the second page of Le Pays reel of Jan: 1. 1939: "Une
revolution presque faite" (continued from page one. on the new multiplicity of
greeting cards!>. a serialized installment olThe Count of Monte Cristo. "La Vie a
Bruxelles" (on local entertainment), "Des etudiants belges in Espagne nationale." etc.
19Le Pays reel. Jan. 4, 1939, p. 3.
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Advertisements in Rerist news PIpers:
Both papers also ran many of the same kinds of advertisements. These were
divided into two categories. those for the Rexlst movement and those for pro-Rexist
businesses. The first consisted of slogans enclosed in thickly oulined boxes which let
readers know about upcoming Rerist events or called on them to do something
particular for the growth of the movement. Most were short. and to-the-point. "Lisez
Foyerl"20 "Lire REX et VLAN c'est bien. S'Y ABONNER. c'est mieux,"21 or "Ouvriers! Lisez
tous les lours 'Le Pays reel' Ie seul journal qui dise la verite."22 Some'spoke directly to
Rexist aims: "Justice d'abord/ Hn'y aura plus de desordres dans la ru.es, Ie jour OU it y
aura de l'ordre dans 1a societe."as In general. calls for action were in some way
sentimentalized. In the January 22, 1939 issue of Le Pays reel. for instance. Degrelle
lauded the many sacrifices Liege Rexists had made in order to come up with donations
for the movement (giving up food and clothing. apparently .. ,). If they could do it. why
couldn't others? asked DegreUe. "Vous rendez-vous digne parvos efforts. de l'idoeal qui
suscite des sacrifices complets comme ceux que nous venons de citer?" (p. 6)
Sentimentality. then. was often reinforced by guilt. Editors and writers used every
opportunity to advertise Rexist press and Rex editions. Coupons were frequently
offered to promote a new book. e.g. the coupon with "Un livre gratuitl" on it in Rex of
March 22. 193' (p. 9) would get one a free copy of H. Carton de Wiart's La Cite ardente
"
°

(Brux .. Rex eds .. 193'). Rex-brandprodu~ts were especially advertised. There were Rex ,
"'\

insignia. "REXA" cigarettes. Rex "aperitifs." Rex camera films. even Rex sho~s -- "Une
seule chaussure/ LA CHAUSSURE REX/ En vente partouotl"24
2~ Mr. 3. 1934. no. 9. p. 13.

21Rex-Vlan, Mr. 12. 1934. no. 12.p. 15.
22Le Pays reeL lu. 6.1936. p. 4.
2SLe Pays reel. lu. 6.1936. p. 2.
24Hu. lu. 26.1936. p. 21. If these last really existed. they were probably shoes made by
a Rexist shoemaker who simply replaced his name on the label with Rex's. The same
must have applied to the other products.

107

Commercial advertisements came from Rexist supporters. These were small
firms or artisans who were "amies de REX" and who. therefore. must be patronized
(which meant buying their products. telling friends to buy their products. and always
mentioning that they had found out about the store through Rex ).25 "Rexistes. rendezvous de preference dans les salles de nos annonciers" was a typical slogan. 26 (This

could be advantageous. since some businesses offered rebates for Rexist customers.
"Pour vos lunettes. Henri Delhougne ... remise j% aux Rexistes.")2? The same businesses
frequently advertised in both Rex and Le Pays reel. The distributors of "Chicoree
Trappiste Vinc3.rt." for instance. advertised first in the weekly Rex. and hiter. once it
came out. also in the daily Le Pays ree1. 28
There were. nevertheless. some differences between the advertisements in the
two Rexist papers. Le Pays reel tended to have fewer commercial ads and more
person·al/want ads. These were grouped together in one section. usually on the next-OOlast page and suitably entitled "Nos petites annonces." Tlie cost ofplacing one depended
on the kindof ad and the number of lines. Ads varied in size from one-liners to large.
almost half-pagers -- as the ones for the cure-all powder "La Croix Blanche." Although
the number of ads in Le Pays reel increased from barely three per issue in 1936 to
about sixteen or more in 1939. they remained ads for small businesses or self-employed
~sans.

Only the 1939 issues varied slightly from the norm. in that they suddenly

began carrying a multiplicity of tr~vel

~ertisements.

Rexists had their own travel
.

agency which organized trips within Belgium. "1. 2 ou 3 jours a L'EXPOSITION

"\.

INTERNATIONALE DE L'EAU. LIEGE. 1939. organisation de visites et.voyages individuels
ou par groupes. Pour renseignements. ecrivez sans tarder a: REX-LIEGE-TOURISME rue

2'''Avis important." in Rex. Dec. 9.1933 . .00 . 30. p. 11. (See also example on plate 9)
26Le Pays reel. Ap. 28.1939. p. 5.
.
2?Le Pays reel. Ju. 6.1936. p . 6.
28 e .g . Rex. Dec. 9.1933 . .00.30. p. 13; and Le Pays reel. Jan. 5.1939. p. 5.
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Lambert-Ie-Begue. -f.

a. Liege."29

In 1939. Rex favored travel within Belgium. or to

Germany and Spain. 30 They even seemed to have relations with Germany's and Spain's
official tourist offices. This points to the fact that. while advocating strict neutrality.
they nevertheless favored the Nazi and fascist powers. Interesting. too. is the fact that
Le Pays r6el carried ads for "La Soci6tl! nationale des Chemins de fer belges." if not a
government organization. certainly one greatly supported by it.31 Yet. in 1939. Rex
was finding more and more pretexts to attack the government. One might conclude that
there were some top officials of the "Societl!" who were Rexist sympathizers. and/or
that Rex had secret dealings with big businesses. while openly denouncing their
hyper-capitalisme.
Advertisements in ~ too. were limited to the usual small businesses (with one
noted exception. the Swiss tourist office). The same names often returned year after
year. such as "Les Chocolats G. Lechien." Typical ads ran like this. "SPONTIN CITRON
limonade parfaite."32 "EmployezELVEA Tomates."33 or "Un boo. cigare! Apres avoir
goOtl! dif£6rentes marques plus recommend6es les unes que les autres. j'en suis tOujours
revenu

a. mon ... 'CARAIBE' ."34

Very common were ads for miracle cures. such as "Bague

galvanique: Guerir radicalementRhumatismes musculaires et articulaires.
Arthrite, ... "35 or the Daury tea "Qui vous evitera toUte maladie."36 or the faithful
powder "La Croix Blanche." advertised continually. The number of advertisements in
Rex averaged between twelve and fifteen per issue before 1936-. with a slight increase
"\

29Le Pays r6e1. Ju. 8.1939. p. 3.
30Germany: Le Pays reel. Ju . 20.1939. p. 3; Spain; Le Pays reel.]y. 1.1939, p. 3. It is
unclear to me why Le Pays reel did not mention travel to Italy. since the movemencdid
have ties with that country.
31Le Pays reel. Jan. 5,1939. p. 3.
32m Sept. 9,1933. no . 22. p. 2.
33Rn, Mr. 3. 193-f, no . 9. p. 8.
Dec. -f, 193-f. no . -f9, p. -f.
35Rex, Sept. 9.1933. no . 22.p. 3.
36Rn., Mr. 3. 193-f. 0.0 . 9, p. 3.

34m
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(sometimes as many as twenty) after the merger with Vlan. After the elections.
however. the number of ads quadrupled. ranging between fifty and sixty per issue
before falli1lg again to an average of twenty by lune 1937. The leap in advertising goes
along with Rexist success. Right after the-elections. when Rex looked like the new. upand-coming group to belong to. many businesses might have decided to actually join
the Rexists themselves 01'. at least. to advertise in its paper, which obviously reached
lots of people. After the total failure ofDegrelle in the 1937 elections, and after the
general loss of popularity of the movement. businesses pulled out their ads. either
because they were no longer Rexists themselves. 01' because they were looking for a
more profitable newspaper.
The advertisements in the Rexist newspapers reveal a virtually self-sufficent
Rexist community. Rex manufactured its own products. was supported by many
friendly businesses. had its own press and even provided its own entertainment for its
members,37 Rex was a cult of sorts. Its ups and downs were. therefore. as with most
cults. quite drastic. People would throw themselves wholeheartedly into every aspect of
the movement. only to become completely disillusioned when one aspect of it suddenly
didn't please them. Before 1937. scandal- and joke-making seemed all part of the fun.
and part of the great spring-cleaning of Parliament and its old. worn-out parties. After
the 1937 election loss. and even 'already before it. Rexists began getting sick of the
'.

constant,name~calling and character-attacks, especially since these had yet to bring
~

any significa.o.t changes. What had started out'as necessary and valuable soon turne~
sour. These kinds of tactics simply did no,t work in politics as it now functioned. This
was one of the reasons why, by Spring 1937. the cult-movement suddenly dropped in
popularity. And the quantitative factor of advertising in the Rexist papers is a good
37Besides Degrelle's orations. Rex organized evenings with performances by the Rex
drama group. In March 1934. for instance, this group put on Erckmann Chatrian's
L'ami Fritz. And. since Degrelle was ever-present and. apparently. multi-skilled.
audiences at this particular performance would be treated between acts to a "causerie"
by their leader. [Rex, Mr. 3.1934. no. 9. p. 71.
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measure of this failure. The decreasing number of advertisements after 1937 reflects
loss of movement popularity. as more and more Rexists left the cult fold in
disillusionment.

Other Publications:
As a publishing house, Rex of course also published books and pamphlets. When
Degrelle started expanding Les Editions Rex, he initiated a Collection nation ale under
the direction of Edouard Coppens. The purpose of the collection was to publish great
books on great su~jects -- books by known Belgian authors on patriotic Belgian
subjects. Rexist newspapers always carried ads for the most recent Collection nationale
book.

Radio-Rex:
Rex was also on the radio. Starting in early 1933, Degrelle was allotted a slot of
the Action Catholique's air-time. He vas supposed to narrate a" chronique du
mouvement litteraire,"38 but it soon became apparent that the only books he talked .
about were those published by Les Editions Rex. Once the Action Catholique took note of
this, DegreUe's career as a radioman was cut off short. Never giving up, the Rexist chef
tried for radio-time again in late summer, 1936. His program would be non~political, he
",

wrote in anarticJe, and would only try to answer some of the accusations thrown at the
-

.

~

movement during the recent elections. 39 In fact, Rex wanted politics out of radio in
general. Radio, it said, must return to its original purpose, "Ie DIVERTISSEMENT et Ie
DELASSEMENT des auditeurs [sicJ.".w When Degrelle was refused air-time on Belgian
radio at the end of 1936, he simply turned to his friend Mussolini. Beginning on

38Charlier, p. 68; and Etienne, p. 19.
39"Rex et laRadio," in Rn.. Jy. 17.1936, p. 29.
40"Rex et laRadio," in
Jy. 17,1936, p. 29 .

m
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January 6,1937, half-hour broadcasts from Turin radioed Degrelle's and other Rexists'
voices into Belgium. 41
Rex on the radio was not very different from Rex in the press. It continued the
usual attacks through joke-making, for instance. Daye teUs of one Rexist meeting
where the TuriJl program was broadcast over'the loudspeakers. The audience listened
with amusement as a voice imitating Van Zeeland delivered a mock speech on Degrelle:
"Et Ie public de s'amuser ... [sicJ."~
It is unclear how long Rexistradio survived, though one can assume that it

declined as the movement did.

From Propaganda to Organization:
Besides the press, Rex had other forces dispensing propaganda for the
movement. In the summer of 193', young Rexists in Liege formed loose organizations
called Cadres actifs de propagande (CAP).43 Shortly thereafter, an official Front
Populaire (fP) was formed, comprising Rexists of all ages and all ranks of lile. Degrelle
was, naturally, director of the FP. CAPs were the more active of the bunch. They were
the ones whom DegreUe sent out at all hours of day and night to put up posters, sell Rex
insignia or newspapers outside churches or at busy crossings, sell tickets and advertise
Rexist events, and create general fervor among their young school friends. Others met
regularly at Rex houses or sometimes o~" monUl, ..Jong retreats to discuss Rexist
principles, Rexist politics and Rexist corporative organizations.44

"')

41Etienne, p. 113. Daye claims that DegreUe's presence in Italy caused the Van Zeeland
government to make political ovations towards Mussolini. who, in his defiant way,
simply ignored them. And when Foreign Minister Spaak called in the Italian
embassador to complain about Italian favoratism towards Degrelle, the ambassador
retorted, "Et les sanctions a propos de la guerre d'Ethiopi~ n'etaient-elle pas
regrettables et inamicales?" [Pierre Daye, Leon Degrelle et Ie rexisme (Paris, A. Fayard
et Cie., 1937), p. 205 J.
42Daye, p. 205-06.
43Usmard Legros, Un homme, un chef. Leon Degrelle (Brux. Editions Rex, 1938), p. 119.
44Etienne, p. 43; and Legros, p, 129,
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It was out of these groups that Rexist political cadres rtrst developed. The Rexist
FP for all of Belgium was first organized into fourteen separate geographical divisions.
Each was headed by a propaganda chief, whose pay depended on how many newspapers
he sold, and who was aided in his task by a number of volunteers -- many from the
CAPs."" 1.0. August, 193' Degrelle transformed these groups into decidedly political
organizations. The country was sectioned off into permanences d'arrondissement and
sections 10cales."'6 Each section. 1.0. turn, had separate services for propaganda, women
and security .. For the latter purpose, a service d'ordre et de protection (SOP) was
founded, consisting of unarmed, uniformed men whose main task was to keep
everybody in liJ1e at Rexist meetings; they were disbanded 1.0. January, 1937, under a
State order banl1ing militias of any .kind."'? The political sections remained relatively
autonomous from May, 1936 to May, 1937, after which they were gradually taken over
by the propaganda groups, CAPs in particular, who became more and more militant. If
not part of a CAP, or probably evel1 if they were part of such a group, Rexist youths
were, by 1936, also organized into Ieunesses rexistes. Since they too were uniformed,
however, they were disbanded along with the SOP in early 1937. ReI defied the ban
soon afterwards whel1 it re-formed its youth il1tO a non-political Association de
campement et de tourisme (ACT)."'8 Uniformed members organized outings, sporting
events, rallies, camps, marches, etc. -- very reminiscent of the Hitler youth, of which
the Rexists had certainly heard.
"'\

Ove~al1 of this activity', DegreUe ruled with a firm and strict hand. He insisted

on strict morality permeating all divisions and would strike down at anyone that
seemed to step out of bounds. One occasion for such sharp scolding came up in January,
1939, it seems. In an angry article in Le Pays reel on January 15, 1939, Degrelle
4'Etienne, p. 43.
46Etienne. p. 76.
4?Etienne, p. 76 .
48Etienne, p. 78 .

113

rebuked local Rex groups for spending too much time organizing parties and too little
doing their duties. He therefore forbade all festivities until Easter, or until the section
had sold its allotted amount of newspapers and subscriptions.
Vous etiez venus pour vous amuser? tant pis! Ce n'est pas ~a Rex!
Travaillez ou allez ailleurs .... II est tout de m6me autremel1t in.teressant de vivre en propageant nos jourl1aux et 110tre doctrin.e qu'en
dansant Ie Lambeth Walk et en contant fleurette a. de braves jeunes
filles qui 011t plus besoin d'Ul1 mariidealiste et travailleur que d'un
specialliste en tangos.49
Otherwise, movement org~ization represented the ideal Rexist State. It was
authoritative and decen~ized, with chefs appointed according to expertise (e.g .,all
matters deatin.g with Flanders were relegated to Rex-Flanders chief, Paul de Mont,
housed in. a separate building). Strict hierarchical order was based on deference to
one's superior at all times. 50 Degrelle, at the top, was accommodated with a "vaste
bureau d'ul1e simplicite toute moderne," which did not prevent him from having a
huge desk, emerald-colored velvet drapes and fresh flowers all over.51 Under him and
assisting him were a secret.a.ry' general and a Cabinet du Chef (essentially the same),
and, from November, 1936 until June H. 1937. a Conseil politigue de Rex. as well. 52
Members of this last body were already established Rexist leaders. Paul de Mont. Count
Xavier de Grunne (also head of Rex in the Senate), Gustave Wyns, Usmard Legros, Prof.
Mertens, Cados Leruitte (who had organized the first Rex sections in Liege), Hubert
d'Ydewalle, Jose Streel, Jean Denis; Pierr~ Daye (leader of Rexists deputes) and, as
presiding secretary,'Alfred Olivier. 53 On June 21. 1937, this council was replaewd by a
!

•

.

j

five-member Bureau executif de Rex, with fewer powers. -Degrelle appointed Jose
Streel. Jean Denis. Jean de Lophem. Usmard Legros and Paul De Mont to the new body,

49Quoted in Etienne. p. 79.
,ODaye, p. 229.
,1Daye. p.230.
,2Etienne. p. 80 .
'3Daye. p. 230.
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and kept closely involved in all their proceedings.,4 The reduction was most probably
part of DegreUe's whole scheme to gain more personal power, a scheme which started
to develop shortly before the 1937 elections. 55

Rexist Leaders:
Who were these leaders? Those who had star,ted out with Degrelle from the
beginning were friends from Louvain. university and/or from the ACJB. They were all
good Catholics, good writers, and bright and well-edllcated. Thus, they could all look
forward to a promising career within the Catholic Party, if they wanted it. And the
very fact that they decided, in the end, to leave the Party is a mark of their courage and
of their willingness to fight for what they believed; after all, departing from the path
that one .knew would lead to a sure and stable life is a rather daring feat. For this they
must be credited. On the other hand, their enthusiasm and 'energy did not necessarily
transla~

itself into maturity as the years went by. If a sense of fighting for their cause

was a large part of the cohesiveness of the early Rexists, another factor was their wish
to continue basking in the glories of gang play and the fun life in general. As a result.
Rex never learned new ways and Rexist leaders never formed themselves into
recognized and established leaders. (Non-Rexists thought of them more as big children
than as mature political leaders') As the' 1936 elections, rolled around, Rex was forced to
' .'.

find older Rexist candidates, older not only in age, but also in character. The outcome '
~

was both a generational split after 1936, but also a philosophical split. Later adherents
to Rex had not evolved within the prank-making atmosphere and therefore vere not
part of the gang. Some wouldn't last long; others would stay on for the ride, trying to
get whatever they could out of it for themselves. Degrelle would try to straddle the two ,
becoming a patriarch in every sense of the word: reprimanding like a father the
,4Etienne, p. 80-81.
"See chapter on Degrelle .
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sometimes too unserious younger Rexists. but. essentially. paying more and more
attention to his own personal career. The closely-knit group would begin to
disintegrate soon after its first successes.
The following short biographical histories of some of the most important of
these leaders will h~lp bring the movement into focus. 56
joo6 STBEEL is known among Rex historians as the movement's philosopher.
Born in jemeppe-Sur-Meuse in 1911. Streel went on to study for a ~octorate in Thomist
philosophy at Louvain University. He was active in the ACJB. where he met Degrelle.
His writings for the movement were profuse and well thought out (not just a collection
of vague ideas) Les Ieunes Genset la Politigue (Louvain. Rex eds .. 1932). La Parole est
aux Bourgeois: Lettre d'un Bourgeois Liberal a un Bourgeois Catholigue (Brux .. Rex eds ..

1936). Positions Rexistes ( BTUx., Rex eds., 1936). and Ce Ou'il Faut Penser de Rex (BTUx ..
Rex eds .. 1936).51 He vas shot by the partisans after the liberation.58
j!AN DENIS is usually twinned with Streel as Rex's other philosopher: True. he
did write several Rex "little red books," Principes Rexistes (Brux., Rex eds .. 1936); Bases
Doctrinales de Rex (Brux., Rex eds., 1936), and La ligne Generale (Brux., Rex eds .. [1935-

. 377])59. but these vere more repetitions of Streel than anything new. He apparently
liked to vrite and was willing to publish on any subject. "C'awt un polivalent qui
ecriv~t aussi bien. sur une locomotive que sur Ie rexisme ou la philosophie hindoue." 60

Denis was born in Chastre-Villeroux-Bl~mont on February 10. 1902 to a peasant
.

- ,.

"\.

56As usual. biographical information is sometimes scanty .. I have tried to collect from
as many appropriate sources as were available to me: unfortunately, much of this data
is still confidential and not available to the public. Some of the biographies are
therefore quite limited.
51Etienne. p. 187.
58Paul Legrain, Le Dictionnaire des Belges (BTUx., Paul Legrain. ed .. 1981) gives 1946 as
his death date. (p. 473).
59Etienne, p. 185.
60Interview of M. Jean Vermeire by Jose Gotovitch 25 .3.71 in the CREHSGM. Brussels. as
quoted in a letter to me from Mr. Martin Conway. PhD candidate. Oxford. England.
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, family. He was educated by Jesuits and, after his fa~er died, became head of the family.
He studied at Louvain in the Facu1t6 de Philosophie et Lettres. yet had difficulty in
settling into anyone particular job. He became very involved in the ACjB and even
ends up as Mgr. Picard's personal secretary for a while. He was also secretary of the
Conseil g6n6ral et Comite' g6n6ral of the association, and, starting in 1927, member of
the editing committee of the Cahiers de la jeunesse catholigue. 61 He was then editor of
50ir6es and, from there, followed DegreUe. His activities within the Rexist movement
were limited and, though he has been called Degrelle's right hand man, 62 he actually
had little intimate contact with the leader. 63 Even when he served his four years in
Parliament as a d6pute from Namur, he seems to have,been rather inactive in that role.
Among his main interests were the Spanish Phalangists and their definition of a new
Eu.ropean order. He stayed with Rex during the war, though without any truly heroic
deeds for the movement. Captured as he was trying to escape after the war, he was set
free -- so to speak -'- at the French border, on condition that he never return to
Belgium. He apparently still lives in France. 64
VICTOll MATTHYS came to Rex first as an office worker. He soon movedup

through the ranks to become chief of propaganda for the movement, at which he
-seemed to have a real knack. Already before the war, he was an ardent admirer of
everything.Hitlerian. In 1941, Degrelle appointed him. Chef de Rex adinterim while he
,

\

was on the eatern front. He was shotin 1946. 65
"'\.

RAnAn SD1DIC, unlike' th~ others, was not part of the ACjB. He came to Rex in

1933 only after he had submitted a man.uscript to be published and had been enticed by
Degrelle into joining, leaving his job as a university professor. He changed posts fairly

61 Etienne, p. 72.
62Etienne, p. 72.
63Mr. Martin Conway.
64Mr. Martin Conway.
65Etienne, p. 72.
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frequently within the movement. Degrelle having hired him without really knowing
his qualifications. In 1936. he was elected a depute for the movement and. as such. was
the hero of the famous affaire Sindic. He seems to have been fairly clumsy, "le type
meme de l'hurluberlu, du fantaisiste integra!, du farfelu impetinent"66 and, as such.
contributed greatly to the view that Rex was but a bunch of irresponsible youths
playing the game of politics.
USl'lARD lEGBos was drawn to Rex by Degrelle's writ1.o.gs. As a student in Uege,

he had been editor of the Catholic paper Vaillant and thus had first-hand press
experience. He became an official member in February, 1936 and soon headed
Degrelle's Cabinet du Chef. 6?

PIElmE DAH,-according to his own description, had a Rexist revelation when he
heard Degrelle speak in Brussels in 193,.68 Perhaps. At any rate, he seems to have
been an opportunist. Born in Scb,aerbeek in 1892. he had served in the Great War, had
had ayear's stint in Washington, D.C. in 1918-19 as military attache, and had travelled

all over the world as a journalist for Belgium's main paper; Le Soir. However,-his loose
morals fared him ill among Brussels circles. Through Rex, he hoped to regain face.
Elected as a Rexist depute for Brussels in 1936. he was given a minor post in the
occupation government during the war. He was condemned to death in 1946, but
escaped to Buenos Aires. He died there in 1960. 69
,

Coum XAVIER DE HmBICOUllT DE GRUND also came to Rex just in time for its first
~

elections. He'was born on June 11. 1894, in Rixensart to a noble family, and was
educated in the history of sociology at the the Sorbonne. Well-known in Belgium. both
as a confidant of King Albert I and as a great alpinist and explorer, he made a, point of
following the developments of the various youth movements arising around him
66£tienne, p. 73.
67Legros, p. 16 .
68Daye, introduction to his Leon Degrelle et Ie rexisme
69£tienne, p. 73.
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(without necessarily getting involved himself), so that, when Degrelle asked him to run
as Rexist senator, he accepted with enthusiasm. He carried the Rexist banner until
December. 1937 and then continued as a Senator without party affiliation. He was not
an avowed resistant during the var. but he hated the Nazis as much as he did the
English. He even tried to form a secret resistance army during the war. Unfortunately,
his scheme vas found out by the Germans. and he was deported to a camp in GrossStrehlitz, Silesia. where he died in 19+f. 70
Finally, PAUL DE MONT joined Rex as Rexist senator and director of Rex-Flanders
in 1936. Like Daye, he vas a WWI veteran (he lost both legs in the Battle of the Yser)
and a recognized vriter in Flanders. In Rex. he became chief editor of De Nieuve Staat.
as well. Otherwise, his imput into the movement was limited to Flemish affairs. 71

Conclusion:
These men were leaders of a Rexist community which acted as if it vas selfsufficient and separate from the rest of Belgium, while at the same time trying to incorporate its ideals into all of Belgian society. The contradiction would bring the
movement down. for without knoving hov to incorporate their system into the rest of
the country. they would never succeed. Rexist leaders believed so strongly in the
power of their press. that they could not see past it to vhat was necessary for their
,

"

survival. They did not reaJize that propaganda .alone would not satisfy the very
~

concrete nee<ls of their adherents.

10Etienne, p . 7~; Paul Van Molle, Le Parlement BeIge 189+ 1%9 (Ledegerg-Gent,
Imprimerie Erasme S.A., 1969), p. 78-79; and Legrain, p. 129-30.
11Elienne,
.
p. 7~.
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CONCLUSION

Why did Rex fail? How is it possible that a movement be at the forefront of
national and even international news one year and then suddenly disappear into
oblivion the next? Because Rex was an impossibility in Belgium. The movement itself
did not develop realistically. and the national climate was not suited to it as it Qi4
develop. Much of the trouble lay in Rex's background.
D~grelle

was director first of a publishing house. then of a movement. There

were advantages and disadvantages to having a political movement develop out of a
publishing house: on the one hand; it taught Degrelle and other future Rexist leaders
the indispensible techniques of propaganda; on the other hand. this concentration
created the illusion that propaganda was all that was necessary. Once they actually
entered traditional politics in the Parliamentary elections of 1936. the movement-party
would be prepared neither for day-to-day nor for long-term political work: for
propaganda: was a short-term project. bringing immediate, if limited. results. The
concept of planning ahead. of devising programs for realistic change. was unknown to
Rexists; it was unknown not only to the Rexist Parliamentarians themselves, but to the
movement,which they represented as well. Propaganda had gotten the~ elected. but
had not prepared them for political life, in anyway. The result was catastrophic. When
the initial sUrge of enthusiasm quieted down, Rexists inside and outside of Parijament
-

I

.

did not know how· to change their tactics in order to keep a steady base of supporters,
Instead, they resorted to what they knew best, making false accusations and generally
continuing the games of Louvain days.
In essence, Rex's problem was that it never grew up. Those Reust leaders de la
premiere heure. who had started their careers with the movement while still
university or lycee students. had gotten stuck in the rut of those first few years. They
could not see beyond their initial successes and blindly hung on to the old means that
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had brought those first triumphs. When 1937 and then 1939 ro11ed around, they were
stunned -- though they certainly did not admit it. But the damage could not be
. reversed. By the late 30s, most Belgians who had flirted with the idealistic new world
that Rex was"offering had seen the light; they were sick of waiting around for Rex's
attacks to bring about the changes they wanted.
Much of Rex's trouble lay with Degre11e and with his visionary plans for
himself as the savior of morality in Belgium. Had he not tried in 1937 to immitate
Hitler's tactic of staging ~ "legal" coup, Rex might have had a longer life as a movement
of its own definition, and might not have felt compelled to copy Nazi and Italian Fascist
propaganda strategies. If Degrelle became more traditionally fascist after 1937, as
Etienne argues (p. 141), it was because he and his movement had lost their power base
not only at home, but also abroad. Degrelle turned to a more traditional form of fascism
after' the 1937 elections not only because the Church broke entirely with the Rexist
movement at this point, but because he thought that by emulating his two most
poverfull allies -- Hitler and Mussolini -- he could win their favor again. They, of
course, were politically more astute than he was, and understood that to support a
movement which was losing popularity within its own country and which had no
possibilities of even performing ~ putsch was pointless. 1 If Hitler and Mussolini
remained on frien.d1y terms with Degrelle after 1937, they did not offer his movement
'\

the financial support he had received from them between 1936 and

1937~

Degrelle
"\

nevertheless' c~ntinued his faScistization of Rex, and iLl the process alienated not only
former Rexists but also, as an ironical consequence, the very allies he was trying to '
copy.
Although it was beyond the scope of this thesis to delve deeply into the specific
character of Rex's fascism, to define the movement only as very traditionally Catholic
would obscure the real nature of Rex. Rex)!M fascist. It may have begun as a simply
1Degrelle never had the support of the military.
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traditional Catholic movement working towards the establishment of an ideal Catholic
State, as defined by Mgr. Picard (see chapter one), but by the end of its second phase, it
had rejected the Catholic Party. By the end of its third phase, it had begun to attack the
very concept of the party system, thereby confirming its movement away from
traditional Catholic political methods in general.
ReI certainly was fascist after 1937 and, I would argue, even as early. as
November, 193'. But it was not the same as Hitlerian and Mussolinian fascism. ReI
retained its own character, especially between 193' and 1937 when it was confident in
its power, and did not need to look outside itself for political strategies. Even after the
1937 electoral defeat. when it did look toward fascist Italy and Germany for inspiration,
it still kept its narrow-minded political vision based solely in rhetoric. ReI was so
caught up in the idea that words were enough to carry the movement and to bring
about changes in society that it only borrowed what reaffirmed its own orientation:
propaganda. Still convinced that this alone broug-h t power, ReIist leaders once again
did not put words into action. Nazi and Italian fascist theory not put into practice had
no more success than Rexist rhetoric without program. Only the unusual
circumstances of the German occupation during the Second World War would enable
Rex to rise again.
So why study Rex before the war? Was it really that important if it never took
"

over power and if its fascism was ineffective? Yes, for fascism of any kind is a threat,
.

~

.

and the fascism5 of the 19305 were a prelude to the "last good war," the war which must
not be forgotten. The disasters of the Second World -War and the doubts it raised about
the existence of a basic goodness inherent in all human beings, impose upon present
generations the duty to continue the study of its causes and of its actors. The threat of
contemporary revisionist historians who deny the Holocaust must be fought down. For
we, students of today, along with future generations, must not ignore our past. We must
concentrate not, like the fascists themselves, solely 0.0 the times when history was

122

positive, but also on the times when it was negative. The 1920s and 30s were negative in
the sense that they saw the rise of many fascist groups. We must learn from this
history, because we must learn that fascism is not an answer and that the theory of
fascism can not work in practice. It only leads to chaos and disaster.
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From Leon Degrelle, Rex, Renaissance de fa Patrie (Brux., Editions Rex, 1940), n.p.n,

(PLATE 4)

ELECTIONS DE 1936: pourcentage, par rapport aux suffrages exprimes, - -------·obtenu par Ie mouvement Rex.
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from Jean-Michel Etienne, Le mouvement rexiste jusgu'en 1940 (Paris, Librairie
Armand Colin, 1968), p. 55
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(PLATE 5)
ELECTION RESULTS FOR REX IN 1936 AND 19391

Number
of votes
Am\1m

Antwerp
Malines
Turnhout
BiABAm
BruxeUes
Louvain.
Nivelles

19,213
6,531
3,059
2.343
68,685
53,582
6,959
8,144

WESTEDl
FLANDElIS

24,891
Brugge
4,695
Furnes, Dixmude,
Ostende
3,413
RouJers, Tielt 5,687
8,146
Courtrai
Ypres
2,950

EASTEBlIl
FL.AND!lIS

22,288
4,243
3.969
10,051
2,495
1,530
HAlNAUT
33.961
11,746
Charleroi
Mons
6,215
Soignie5
3,166
5,070
Thuin
Tournai, Ath 7,764
lJEOE
55.582
Uege
33.145
Huy,
·8,688
Waremme
Verviers
13,749
LnmOUBG
5,738
Hasselt
3.386
Tongres,
Maaseik
2,352
LmmmotmG
19,146
ArIon, Marche.
Bastogne
10,457
Neufchateau,
8,689
Virton
NAHUB
21.987
Dinant,
PhiHppeviUe 9,556
Namur
12,431

Alost
Audenarde
Ghent, Eec.k1o
Saint-Nicolas
Termonde

ID2.
Percentages

Number
of Votes

ill2

Percentages

4.24
14.22
15.77
8.15
14:09

6,414
2,284
1.044
459
30,501
24,823
2,060
3,618

1.95
2.75
1.53
.83
6.32
7.26
2.44
6.46

9.59
9.46

7,757
1.361

2.99
2.73

6.73
11.08
10.99
8.72

1,375
947
3,402
672

2.69
1.88
4.59
1.99

6.49
6.42
11.75
6.83
4.87
3.38

4,870
1,830

1.42
2.75

2.156
341
543
14,830
4.155
2,850
1.591
2,517
3.317
21.796
-13,971

1.47
.67
1.22
3.95
3.17
3.55
3.05
6.31
).I5
7.58
8.39

15.85
22.29
5.89
7.71

3,019
4,806
3,015
1,106

5.71
7.05
3.14
2.56

4.39
29.06

1,909
8,026

3.60
12.74

28.60

4,899

13.99

29.65
20.35

3.127
6,612

11.19
6.38

21.89
19.29

3,186
3,426

7.66
5.53

5.86
7.76

4A5

8~72

8.60
7.45
5.89
12.18
10,43
19.36
19,42

,

ITaken from Etienne, p. 179.

(PLATE 6)

BELGIAN ECONOMY 1928 TO 19392

Number of Unemployed

Industrial Production
(100=192~)

1928

6,000

1929

8,000

136

1930

22,000

121

1931

79,000

110

1932

161,000

9'f

1933

167,000

97

193'f

183.000

99

1935

165.000

112

1936

121.000

118

1937

10).000

132

1938

132.000

107

1939

160.000

113

"

2Ta.k:en from Etienne. p. 58-59.
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c Plus Jeune que jamals, la F~deratlon tend les bra!! aio: Jennes I» (M. &gus)

From Booklet of "Jam" caricatures, 1936.
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I.e gouvcrne:ment est en mesure de s' opposer efficaccment a toute vell,fite de
dic:tBture de gauche.._ vous pouve:; compter sur moL
(Dilalurs de M. Va.n

Z~and)

sufl

LE BAUDET I

LE COMPTABLE - Je me permets' de signaler
a plus un !IOU dans la caisse...

a M. Ie Directeur qu'il n'y

LE BANQUIER - File: ! je vous chasse pour avoir porte atteinte au credit
de notre Ctablisscment J

(PLATE 9)
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